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Public Service Television Policy and National Development in Morocco
Bouziane Zaid
ABSTRACT

Like many developing countries, and for many years, Morocco has sought the
help of television to disseminate development ideas to its citizens. The Moroccan
government has recently given policy considerations to regulate the use of television and
radio airwaves as important outside sources for promoting its development objectives.
The newly assigned importance of television in Moroccan developmental policies makes
a study on the relationship between television and development interesting and crucial.
This study investigates the extent to which the Moroccan public service television meets
the challenges of effectively contributing to the development objectives of the nation. It
focuses on the two government-owned public service television stations, Radiodiffusion
et Television Marocaine (RTM) and Soread 2M. Based on initial observations, the
general hypothesis is that television programming decisions in the two public television
stations are influenced by the elite class that wants more entertainment and has less need
for educational programs than their rural and urban-poor counterparts. Concerning
methodology, the study uses three main areas in critical media studies: content analysis,
production analysis, and audience analysis. The study conducted a quantitative and a
qualitative content analysis of a sample of Moroccan produced programs to examine the
viii

developmental themes addressed by the two public service television stations.
Concerning the production study, the study carried out a critical assessment of the current
choices undertaken by the TV producers in the two public service television stations
through conducting in-depth interviews with media executives. The third important area
is audience reception. Addressing this area helps tackle these research questions from
both ‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of both the
broadcasters and the audience. The audience reception study assesses the opinions of
television viewers on the quality of Moroccan produced programs and their perceptions
on the public service provided by the two TV stations. The audience study uses focus
groups as a standalone data-gathering strategy. Finally, the study offers a list of
recommendations for the use of TV for development.

ix

Chapter One: Introduction
1. 1. General Context
Morocco1 has been undertaking a comprehensive long-term development project
called the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD). In the inauguration
speech of May 18, 2005, Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, called attention to the
miserable living conditions of a large portion of Moroccans. They are sheltered in
shantytowns, poor urban and sub-urban districts, and in rural communities.2 They suffer
from a lack of access to basic social services such as, health, education, water, electricity,
etc.
Against this background, the NIHD aims at leading the nation on the path of
development by prioritizing areas of education, health, gender equity, economic growth,
and democratic reforms. The initiative mobilizes the country‘s institutional and financial
resources (national and international) to improve the population‘s living conditions and
the national social indicators. The NIDH aims to boost income-generating activities,
improve infrastructure and social services (such as education, literacy, and healthcare),
and provide assistance to the most vulnerable groups (women, youth, and the poor). The
1

Country‘s profile: Location: Northwest of Africa; Capital: Rabat; Largest city: Casablanca; Area: 710,850
sq km; population: 29.823.706; Major languages: Arabic (official), Amazigh dialects, French, Spanish;
Major religion: Islam; Life expectancy at birth: 70 years; Monetary unit: Dirham, 1 US $ = 7.6 dhs; Main
exports: minerals, seafood products, citrus fruit; GNI per capita: US $1,730; 42.3% of jobs are in the
agricultural market; Internet domain: .ma (World Bank, 2006).
2

See address by King Mohamed VI to the Nation on May 18, 2005,
(http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/06C42C8B-0F3C-4CF2-8ED3-563C0E421F6F).

1

initiative stems from the government‘s concern that there is a strong correlation between
poverty and religious extremism (Ibahrine, 2007).
On May 16 2003, Morocco was subject to the deadliest terrorist attacks in the
country's history. Five explosions occurred within thirty minutes of each other killing
forty three people and injuring more than 100 people in suicide bomb attacks in
Morocco's largest city, Casablanca. Morocco has been a staunch ally of the U.S. The
fourteen suicide bombers all originated from a poor suburban neighborhood in the
outskirts of Casablanca. A public debate ensued in the print and broadcast media
questioning the relationship between poverty and extremism.
Over the last decade, the media in many developing countries have undergone a
revolution in structure and accessibility. In Morocco, access to radio and television is
nowadays almost universal. Radio and television have witnessed remarkable progress
since Morocco's independence in 1956. Radio and television, both through terrestrial and
satellite broadcasting, cover 95 percent of the nation's territory (Ministry of
Communication, 2003).
Like many developing countries, Morocco has sought the help of television to
disseminate development ideas to its citizens. There are large numbers of non-literate or
marginally literate individuals who are living out their lives in print-scarce environments
with few or no reading materials in their homes, but they have regular access to
television. The illiteracy rate for Moroccan citizens of fifteen years and older is estimated
at 26.7% for males, and 61.7% for females; for citizens of fifteen to twenty four years
old, the rate is estimated at 22.6% for males and 38.7% for females (UNESCO Institute
for Statistics, 2003). National network television stations and satellite television channels
2

remain the main source of information and education for a large group of Moroccan
citizens.
This dissertation addresses the relationship between television and Morocco‘s
national development. This chapter first reviews the literature on development
communication and briefly summarizes the state of broadcast media in the Arab World
and in Morocco. Second the chapter delineates the research area, the research questions
and hypotheses, and describes the theory and methodology. Finally, it explains the
significance of this study and presents the outline of the chapters.
1. 2. Literature Review
1. 2. 1. Communication and National Development
Development communication deals with the basic question of how
communication (mass media and information and communication technologies ICT‘s)
can be put to use to bring about rapid social change and economic progress for the
developing countries. Development communication has its origins in post-war
international aid programs to countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa that were
struggling with poverty, illiteracy, poor health and a lack of economic, political and
social infrastructures. In the post World War II era, and after the last remains of European
colonial powers in Latin America, Africa and Asia fell apart in the 1950s and 1960s, the
world community was faced with the reality of the abysmal disparities between the
developed and underdeveloped worlds. The Cold War divided the world into two hostile
blocks, East and West, creating thus a Third World made up of countries that wanted to
avoid bloc politics and concentrate on the development of their economic and social
infrastructures.
3

Development communication paradigms became part of the Cold War discourses
of free market capitalism and state socialism. Supporters of capitalism argue that the
primary function of communication is to promote democracy and free markets, while
Neo-Marxists advocate greater state regulation on communication and media outlets
(Thussu, 2000). Developed countries of the West, mainly the U.S. championed the
concept of free flow of information, which reflected capitalists‘ opposition to state
regulation and censorship, deemed bad for business. Their argument was grounded in the
premises of democracy, freedom of expression, the ―public watchdog‖ function of the
media and their assumed relevance for political development and economic prosperity.
1. 2. 1. 1. Development communication paradigms. Complementary to the free
flow doctrine was the view that communication was the key to modernization and
development in the Third world. The Modernization approach to development
communication stressed the inherent ability of mass media to bring about social change
(Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1964; Roger & Shoemaker, 1962). The modernization approach
was considered a panacea for development for Third world regimes as well as Western
international funding organization. Since the late 1950's, amid the popular fascination
with radio and television as powerful tools of communication, early attempts to
investigate the relationship between media and development assumed a fairly simple and
unproblematic relationship between access to modern forms of mass communications and
economic and political development. It was assumed that society was not changing
because the large majority of people did not have the right kind of information to
facilitate change (Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1963). It was also believed that urbanization
and the spread of literacy would lead to growing access to modern technologies such as
4

telephones, newspapers, radio and television, which in turn would produce an informed
citizenry able to participate effectively in political affairs. Lerner (1958) argues that
―increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase
media exposure; increasing media exposure has ‗gone with‘ wider economic participation
(per capita income) and political participation‖ (Lerner, 1958, p. 46).
Development originally meant the process by which Third World societies could
become more like Western developed societies (Inkeles & Smith, 1974). In his seminal
book The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Lerner (1958)
argued that modernization and development take place only when traditional values are
replaced with ―rationalist and positivist‖ values. Lerner sees the Western model of
development as the most effective and viable path, one that is able to shake off the
―backwardness‖ of traditional societies.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, skepticism grew as major setbacks
for economic growth and democracy in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia
occurred. It was clear that the modernization approach, a panacea for development for
Third world regimes as well as Western international funding organization, had failed to
deliver. Other approaches emerged either as a continuation of the modernization
paradigm or as alternative approaches to the dominant paradigm. Diffusion of innovation,
social marketing, and entertainment-education approaches were continuations of the
dominant modernization paradigm. Alternatives to the dominant paradigm are the
dependency theory, structural imperialism theory, media advocacy, and the participatory
community-based theories (Waisbord, 1999).3
3

I will address in details the evolution and the theoretical debates surrounding development

5

Part of the 1960s and early 1970s skepticism was a growing recognition that
public access to newspapers, radio and television was insufficient by itself to promote
economic and political development. The modernization theory considered the mass
media to be neutral tools and ignored the fact that they (mass media) are subject to
cultural, economic and political conditions. In many developing countries, mass media
played a key role in legitimizing the power establishment, under the control of a tiny,
often unrepresentative, elite (Thussu, 2004). Once under the control of authoritarian
regimes (common in Third world countries), print and broadcast media were used
effectively to reinforce autocratic power and the power of multinational corporations.
1. 2. 1. 2. Media, democracy, and national development. The relationship between
media and democracy and the influence this relationship has on national development has
been widely researched. Classical liberal theorists from Milton through Locke and
Madison to John Stuart Mill have argued that a free and independent media can play a
critical role in the processes of democratization and human development. Edmund
Burke‘s concept of the ‗fourth estate‘ has traditionally been regarded as one of the most
efficient mechanisms of checks and balances. Investigative journalism is considered a
powerful tool in the hands of journalists to scrutinize and critically evaluate government‘s
record, and hold authorities accountable for their actions, be they public sector
institutions, non-profit organizations, or private companies.
According to Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize laureate in Economics, political freedoms
are linked to economic development and good governance in developing countries. The
right of freedom of expression strengthens the responsiveness of governments to all

communication theories in Chapter Two.

6

citizens and provides a pluralist platform of political expression (in Besley & Burgess,
2001). Freedom of expression and information is regarded as a basic human right in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, the European
Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
These basic assumptions about the power of a free and independent mass media
apply to both developed and developing countries. The mass media, unlike other
businesses and industries, and by the nature of the products they offer the public are
assumed to carry out tasks that contribute to the short and long term benefits of the
society as a whole, especially in cultural and political matters (McQuail, 1992; Smith,
1989; Melody, 1990). There is widely shared belief that the media have an important part
to play in public life, therefore the activities of media institutions are inextricably linked
to the public domain.
1. 2. 1. 3. Mass media and the public interest. The public interest is a concept that
has a long and contentious history in media studies in general and media policy in
particular (Napoli, 2001). In so far as the public interest has served as the primary
benchmark against which media systems are assessed, it will continue to represent a
contested territory (Napoli, 2001). This concept embodies the standard that most media
policy makers are supposed to adhere to in their decision-making. Policy decisions
should never reflect the interests of small groups but rather the interest of the population
as a whole. McQuail (1992) states that a wide range of normative criteria can be
embedded in the concept of public interest, criteria such as freedom, diversity,
competition, pluralism, as well as access, participation, and objectivity (McQuail, 1992).
7

In the United States, in the 1920's, an extended debate over the licensing
arrangements of a limited number of broadcast frequencies triggered debates over the
issue of public interest. The Government's exclusionary licensing arrangement was
justified by requiring that broadcasters act as ―public fiduciaries‖ (Benjamin, 1998).
Public interest obligations were an attempt to reconcile the prerogatives of commercial
interests on the one hand with the needs of the democratic system on the other. Unlike
newspapers and magazines, broadcasters have regulatory obligations to serve the public
in specific ways. A key principle of the U.S. federal communications law is that in
exchange for free use of the public airwaves, broadcasters agree to provide a service that
benefits the large public. Both the 1927 and 1934 Acts provide that the primary duty of
the broadcaster is to ―serve the public interest, convenience and necessity‖ (Benjamin,
1998). The Federal Radio Commission, which was created by the 1927 Act, described the
public trustee model in this manner:
[Despite the fact that] the conscience and judgment of a station's management are
necessarily personal....the station itself must be operated as if owned by the
public.... It is as if people of a community should own a station and turn it over to
the best man in sight with this injunction: Manage this station in our interest. The
standing of every station is determined by that conception. (Benton Foundation,
2008)
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) released a report, widely known
as the 1960 Programming Policy Statement, to clarify the meaning of the public interest
standard and to articulate guidelines for programming. The report listed 14 major
elements necessary to serve the public interest:
8

1. Opportunity for local self-expression.
2. The development and use of local talent.
3. Programs for children.
4. Religious programs.
5. Educational programs.
6. Public affairs programs.
7. Editorialization by licensees.
8. Political broadcasts.
9. Agricultural programs.
10. News programs.
11. Weather and market services.
12. Sports programs.
13. Service to minority groups.
14. Entertainment programming (Benton Foundation, 2008).
Public service broadcasting is a vital part of the society and culture of the nation
where it exists and it must teach, educate, illuminate and inspire. Stacey (1998) argues
that ―to sustain the well-being of this society and its culture the state (perhaps 'the body
politics' is better phrase) has not just a right but a duty to make strategic decisions and
interventions through its nominated institutions. In broadcasting those interventions are to
guarantee a range, depth, quality, and independence of programme output which other
arrangements would simply not apply‖ (Stacy, 1998, p. 11).
Is there any empirical evidence that supports the claim that the mass media has
the power to promote and uphold democracy, or to transform countries from a state of
9

underdevelopment to one of economic prosperity? Much of the existing research confirm
that countries with media systems ―characterized by widespread mass access and by an
independent free press experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency,
higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better social outcomes
such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, lower economic inequality, lower
infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on health‖ (Norris, 2002). Freedom
House, a non-profit organization that promotes democracy and freedom around the
world, conducted many quantitative studies to determine the relationship between
freedom, economic well-being, and media use and availability (Stephens, 1995).
Stephens argues that the data shows that measures of economic prosperity are strongly
related to the level of freedom. Stephens (1995) concludes that ―people‘s political rights
and civil liberties and their economic well-being are linked to press freedom and media
availability‖ (in Merrill 1993, p. 19).
1. 2. 2. Mass Media in the Arab World
These basic assumptions about the power of a free and independent mass media
apply to both developed and developing countries, including the countries of the Arab
world. However, some communication scholars doubt the potential of mass media in
Arab countries in bringing about social change (Hafez, 2001, p. 10). They argue that
since mass media in Arab countries have been under tight control by Arab authoritative
regimes, the effects of mass media on democracy, politics, society or economy would be
at best minimal. Arab regimes use mass media mostly for propaganda and entertainment
purposes at the expense of other functions and services (Ayish, 2003).

10

1. 2. 2. 1. Rugh’s typology of Arab press systems. In the 1960's, there was no
systematic study that addressed the relationship between mass media, democracy, and
development in the Arab world. Lack of research during this period is understandable
given the restrictions on media policies imposed by Arab regimes. In the 1970's, the
recognition of the role of mass media in the Arab world was both specific and limited.
William Rugh (1979) addresses the history, functions and structures of print media in the
Arab world, spread across eighteen Arab countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Rugh (1979) uses a media typology to
illustrate the relationship between print media and Arab power regimes. Rugh groups
various countries in three typologies. The first typology is the ―mobilizing‖ press. It is
characterized by its complete subordination to the political regime. This typology
includes countries such as Algeria, Egypt, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Libya, and Iraq.
Rugh argues that mass media, under such circumstances, have not exerted any impact on
the process of modernization in these countries, except as mobilizing instruments to
support and approve the economic and social policies of the regimes.
The ―loyalist‖ press is private-owned but is subject to censorship and has direct
ties to the regime. It supports the establishment and journalists function under strict laws;
any transgression of the red lines is punished. This type of press groups countries such as
Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The
―diverse‖ press enjoys a certain degree of press freedom and is characterized by diversity
in opinions. It includes only three Arab countries: Lebanon, Kuwait, and Morocco.
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Both the ―mobilizing‖ and the ―loyalist‖ press support and defend authoritarian
regimes. They cannot initiate change in the respective countries where they operate.
Private ownership for the ―loyalist‖ press did not make it free from the grip of the
authoritarian regimes. Hence they served the same propaganda and entertainment
functions dictated by the establishment. Ibahrine (2007) argues that the privately owned
―diverse‖ press, a typology that applies to Morocco, also functions as a propaganda tool.
He argues that because it functions in a ―context of authoritarian political structure and
restrictive media policies,‖ the ―diverse‖ press was striped from its democratic political
functions (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 9). As an instrument of social and political change, it was
incapable of triggering socio-economic change or democratic reforms.
I do not agree with this assessment for many reasons. First, it is important to note
that Rugh's typology is to be applied only to the print press. Ibahrine‘s argument may
apply to broadcast media which was owned and controlled by Moroccan State. In
Morocco, the print press was owned by political parties, with the exception of two
government-owned newspapers. Second, newspapers were the mouth piece of the
opposition political parties since Morocco‘s independence in 1956. Print media suffered
not only from serious deficiencies in the democratic process, in forms of intimidation,
censorship, and imprisonment, but also from deficiencies in social life due to high rates
of illiteracy (in 2004 at 26.7% for males and 61.7% for females, this illiteracy rate was
87% in 1960).4 However, journalists managed to carry out significant attempts to
challenge the approved "government line" on many contentious issues such as corruption,
election frauds, and constitution amendments. Therefore, I think it is incorrect to deem
4

Jaidi & Zouaoui, 2005, p. 74.
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the work of journalists and activists as propaganda in the service of the establishment
when many journalists/activists took many risks and some lost their freedom in pursuit of
social and political change.
1. 2. 2. 3. A Typology of world media systems. Before I discuss the broadcast
media in the Arab world, it is important to delineate another attempt to think about media
internationally and to offer a typology of media systems. Siebert, Peterson, and
Schramm‘s (1956) Four Theories of the Press did not address Arab media in particular
the way Rugh did. However, the book is relevant because it offers a larger framework
through which we can understand Moroccan media system. These world media systems
provide a map according to which we can identify the characteristics of Morocco's media
system. They provide a set of criteria (extent of freedom of expression, media ownership,
media/government relations, etc.) that can be used to better understand Morocco's media
system.
Four Theories of the Press represents the first widely recognized attempt to
clarify the link between mass media and political systems. Unlike Rugh, Siebert et al. use
the term "press" to refer to all media of communication, including television and radio. In
this classic, Siebert et al. offer four categories of how media are regulated and organized
around the world. The four categories are authoritarian, totalitarian, libertarian, and social
responsibility. The authoritarian media is characterized by censorship, licensing, and
autocratic power. The role of the media is to support the state and leadership and no
threats or criticisms of the power elite are allowed. The totalitarian (communist) media is
characterized by the control of the ruling party and government. The media are not
allowed to criticize communist party objectives. The main difference between this system
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and the authoritarian system is that the authoritarian is concerned with controlling the
mass media and allowing private freedoms, while the communist aims at controlling all
aspects of a person's life. The libertarian media refers to media in Western countries,
where the role of media is to help find the truth, inform and entertain. It is characterized
by private ownership and freedom of the press. Finally, the social responsibility media
stems from the 1947 Hutchins' Commission report on the Freedom of the Press (Merrill,
1995). The role of the media is to inform, educate, and help social progress. In terms of
ownership, it argues for private ownership, but allows for governments intervention to
assure public service. In terms of freedom of the press, it defers from the libertarian
model in that it considers the social responsibility of the press as more important than its
freedom.
Other scholars added two new categories, the developmental and the participatory
media (Altschull, 1984; McQuail, 1994; Hatchen, 1992; DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1990).
A developmental media system aims at the development of the nation‘s economic
infrastructure. It aims at internal political unification. The role of the media is to help
alleviate poverty, illiteracy, and ill health. The media are instruments for education, social
change, social justice, and peace. Developmental media, according the Altschull, is a
vehicle for a two way exchange whereby the media help to mediate public issues, and
that the public be allowed to play a bigger role in the news decision making process. The
participatory media is community-based, small scale and democratically organized
media. It calls for public participation in editorial decisions and policies. Through the use
of community radio, public access video, and ICT‘s, it challenges the necessity to use
high-cost, centralized broadcast systems (Downing, 2007).
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These media systems have received many criticisms. They were criticized for
their strongly normative aspects (Downing, 2007). This means that they did not just
attempt to explain the media systems, they offered definitions of how they should
―operate according to a certain guiding principle‖ (Downing, 2007, p. 25). They were
also criticized for their failure to account for the stages of development of media within
countries. Countries do not just move from communist media to libertarian media over
night. What happens in-between the stages is not accounted for, as was the case for many
Eastern European countries in the early 1990‘s (Downing, 2007).
1. 2. 3. Broadcast Media in the Arab World
The Arab media do not fit neatly into any of these categories (Rugh, 2004).
Elements of each of these categories exist within Arab media. Before I discuss Moroccan
media, I will first address the Arab broadcasting and its relationship to the Arab political
regimes. Since their inceptions in the 1950's, almost all Arab broadcast media have been
owned, operated, and controlled by governments, most of them non-elected and
authoritarian. There are several reasons for this. First, radio and television reach beyond
the borders of literacy and geography. Print media can be used to reach the educated elite,
and when it is seen as a threat, it is not nearly as great as the threat of reaching millions of
people. Radio and television are too important to be left to private persons (Rugh, 2004).
Second, most radio and television stations were established by British and French
colonial administrators who used them as instruments of colonial rule. They handed them
over to the newly independent governments instead of private owners, because of their
experiences at home (in France and England) with government owned broadcast media.
Finally, the cost of establishing a radio or television station is high the fact that
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encourages the pooling of resources.
Until the 1990's there were a few exceptions to this trend, with private television
experiments in Iraq, Lebanon, and Morocco (Kraidy, 2005). In Morocco the experiment
lasted for seven years when the private channel 2M, which started in March of 1989 as a
private company was taken over by the State, which, as of January 1996, owns 72% of its
share. It is fair to say that Rugh is right in his assessment of Moroccan print media; his
assessment, however, does not apply to audiovisual media.
According to Ayish (2003), audiovisual systems in the Arab world were
developed by the ruling regimes to further their domination and control. The Arab states
controlled the financing, regulation, production, and distribution of the audiovisual
system, considered as the most powerful of all existing media, given the high rates of
illiteracy in the Arab world. The main argument advanced by the Arab ruling elite is that
mass media was in the service of nation building. Arab regimes deployed mass media to
build ―modern‖ states, and therefore conceived them as part of ―the architecture of the
power apparatus‖ (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 11). Accordingly, all dissenting voices were denied
access to public broadcasting or print press.
For the above mentioned reasons, the study of Arab mass media was apparently
not a worthy endeavour for empirical or theoretical research. Sreberny (2000) notes that
―the corpus of work on the media in the region remains empirically and theoretically thin,
what research exists being predominantly descriptive and devoid of significant analytical
framing‖ (Sreberny, 2000, p. 70).
In the 1990‘s, with the launch of Arab satellite channels, the television landscape
of the Middle East region is said to have changed (Ayish, 2003). With the exception of Al
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Jazeera, most satellite television channels were owned and controlled by their respective
governments. Whatever change happened occurred at the level of quantity of media
outlets (Saeed, 2006). Of all the new Arab satellite channels, Al Jazeera drew much
attention from researchers, journalists, and politicians alike. Unlike the state-owned and
state-censored national television stations of the Middle East and North Africa, Al
Jazeera presented controversial views about the governments of many Arab states. Al
Jazeera exposed unethical, immoral, and illegal behavior by individuals, businesses and
governments in the Arab world. This level of freedom and independence in news
reporting was previously unheard of in many of these countries. For the first time, people
in the region had access to a free and independent source of news and commentary that
was not under the control of dictatorial regimes. Whether Al Jazeera has any effect on
Arab politics and culture remains a debatable issue. Some argue that Al Jazeera opened a
platform for Arab audiences to hold public discussions on controversial issues with a
high degree of freedom. Others argue that in the name of press freedom, Al Jazeera
serves as a mouthpiece for extremist views at the expense of moderate rational voices
(Al-Hroub, 2006).
Rugh (2004) examines the Arab mass media and unlike his 1979 study, he
includes radio and television in his analysis. He revises the three typologies he suggested
in 1979, and adds a new typology the ―transitional‖ print media, where he groups
countries like Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria. Morocco stayed in its initial typology
of the ―diverse‖ press. Rugh's significant contribution in this book, in my view, lies in his
attempt to offer a new typology for broadcast media. He argues that while Arab broadcast
media are under the control of Arab governments, there are differences in terms of the
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political role radio and TV played prior to the 1990. The three groups are: the strictcontrol systems (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and Sudan), the
loyalist broadcasting (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, Oman, North Yemen, and Qatar) , and finally Lebanon as a special case.
Countries in the strict control system recognised the great importance of radio and
television as instruments of mobilization of the population. They therefore devoted
greater resources to broadcasting and established earlier and more sophisticated
broadcasting systems. In terms of content, television and radio programming disseminate
political messages to try and control public opinion. The politicized programming is
characterized by revolutionary overtones advocating ―leftist, anti-imperialist Third World
themes‖ (Rugh, 2004, p. 189). Countries in the loyalist media, Rugh argues, are aware of
the importance of broadcast media and kept it under government control, but, unlike the
strict-control media, they did not use it extensively for political mobilization of the
populations. Political content consisted of presenting evidence of the achievements of the
government and the virtues of the monarchy or ruling party and top personalities.
I think Rugh's broadcasting typology is grounded on a differentiation between
countries that adhered to the socialist/communist block and those that adhered to the
Western block. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and Sudan are all
countries that adopted a socialist system. They are known for their revolutionary rhetoric
and their harsh criticism of Western civilization. Moroccan broadcast media, as this study
will demonstrate, were equally and extensively used for political purposes. The only
major difference between Moroccan TV and Algerian TV (strict control) is content.
Algeria is a socialist country and it used the media to critique capitalism and the West.
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Morocco, much like the Western world, was immersed in the righteousness of the
capitalist system, and therefore did not feel the need to critique the socialist East.
1. 2. 3. 1. Broadcast media in Morocco 1956-1999. In Morocco, the regime used
the broadcasting system as an important communication vehicle ―to promote regimedirected policies and to serve what the regime considered vital development goals of the
nation‖ (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 82). According to Ben Ashour (1992) Hassan II, King of
Morocco from 1961 to 1999, was very sensitive to the potential of the broadcasting
system and explained on various occasions that he regarded it as ―a very important
element in the process of nation building‖ (Ben Ashour, 1992). It is important here to
discuss briefly the historical context of Morocco in its relation to development
communication.
From 1912 to 1956, Morocco was a protectorate of France and Spain. It became
independence in March 2nd, 1956. It was not until 1962 that Morocco developed its
national broadcasting system named Radiodiffusion et Télévision Marocaine (RTM)
(Moroccan Radio and Television).5 It is important to note that Morocco chose a prowestern stance and adopted democracy and liberal economy as its political and economic
system since its independence. These choices put it at odds with the majority of Arab
nations and Arab national movements which aligned themselves with socialist ideology.
The adoption of socialist ideology was not so much due to the fact that the Soviet Union
provided a better media model but because socialism was appealing to many third world
Marxist intellectuals who considered the inequalities within the world as a direct outcome
of ―imperialist‖ and capitalist policies and practices. Morocco's opposition political
5

Modeled after the French broadcasting system, Office de la Radiodiffusion et Télévision Française,
ORTF.
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parties consisted mainly of pan-arabists (the Istiqlal party) that called for a unified Arab
nation (influenced by Egyptian socialist president Jamal Abd Nasser), and the socialist
party that called for reducing the power of the king and the nationalization of the
country‘s resources.
Early introduction of radio and television transmissions came from colonial
powers and from foreigners living in the country. The print press was much more
developed with a dozen publications issued by Moroccan nationalists. Print press was a
tool in the struggle for liberation and independence. Under the imperative of security, the
French colonial powers introduced a number of press codes to regulate the nationalist
press and contain its influence. For instance, in the 1950‘s, as the struggle for
independence intensified, all Arabic papers were banned (Jaidi, 2000).
In the 1960‘s, King Hassan II mobilized radio and television for political
awareness and education, such as the preparations for the country‘s first general elections
and constitution referendum. For instance, in the campaign for the 1962 referendum on
the constitution, the regime distributed TV sets in public cafés to inform the public about
the constitution and to mobilize them to vote (Ben Ashour, 1992).
The 1960‘s witnessed political and economic change in the power structure of the
nation. New social and political groups began to affect the media relationship between
the political regime and the opposition (Ben Ashour, 1992). The print press, mostly
owned by political parties, were critical of the politically conservative role of the
Moroccan broadcast media. They accused TV and radio of ignoring the needs of the
majority of Moroccans and of being a tool of propaganda in the hands of the regime. In
the parliamentary election of 1963, the government decided that the broadcasting system
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would stay away from any involvement in any political debate during the elections
campaign. Leaders of the opposition demanded that this restriction be lifted but King
Hassan II refused their demand (Ben Ashour, 1992). Also during the 1976 elections, the
opposition campaigned for parliamentary elections without access to TV or radio.
Opposition leaders used the print press, newspapers in particular, as chief weapons of
political agitation because they had no alternative for articulating their challenges against
the regime. Considering the high rates of illiteracy among Moroccans, estimated in the
1960 at 87% (Jaidi & Zouaoui, 2005, p. 74), it remains to be seen what kind of effect, if
any, newspapers may have had.
The struggle between the regime and opposition continued through the 1980‘s.
There were few moments of relative openness, but mostly repression was the rule. During
the 1970's and 1980's, it was difficult to determine whether television cameras were used
for journalistic purposes or for policing purposes. The line between providing
information to audiences and providing information to police service was blurred for
more than twenty years. When TV cameras attended public demonstrations, it was not
clear whether the footage would end up in an editing room at the TV station or at the
secret service offices.
Another point of contention between political parties and the regime relates to the
creation of 2M. In March 1989, 2M SOREAD was launched as a private channel. It was
one of the first private television stations in the Arab world. It was subscription based and
needed a decoder to get clear signals till January 1996, when it turned public. The
channel's self-proclaimed function is to entertain. The news bulletins were short in form
of news briefs. French language was predominant with 80% of the programs in French.
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Lamnadi (1999) highlights the political dynamics of communication policy
decisions regarding the creation of 2M SOREAD. He argues that the most important
participants and actors in launching were the Royal Palace, Omnium Nord-Africain (the
largest Moroccan economic conglomerate), and the Ministry of the Interior and
Information (Lamnadi, 1999). His research results show that a combination of domestic
and external factors have affected the creation of the private television station. He states
that international moves towards privatization and political liberalization had an impact
on the development of private television, but the influence of an elite local group also
played an important role in the advent of the station. The public and the intellectual/social
elite who were dissatisfied with the government broadcasting system also had some
influence on the government's decision process, even if the public was not so much
asking for the creation of private television as it was demanding reforms of the public
television system (Lamnadi, 1999).
The most encouraging signs of improvement in press freedom appeared in the
1990‘s via the creation of the Consultative Council on Human Rights in 1990. The
constitutions of 1992 and 1996, while they did not include a specific clause on press
freedom, included it as part of the general right to free expression. Article 9 of the 1996
constitution secures and guarantees freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. In
more explicit terms, the constitution allows everyone the freedom to express his or her
political opinions as long as these opinions do not represent a threat to the political
system or the status quo (Ibahrine, 2007).
The relationship between the regime and the mass media took a radically different
turn when the opposition and socialist led government was elected to power in 1997. The
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new government led a campaign to formulate a new press law that promised to enhance
press freedom. This campaign was the first attempt to draft a comprehensive media
policy for Morocco.
The impasse in developing a coherent media policy is due to the fact that the
media since Morocco's independence in 1956 were caught up in internal political struggle
between the regime and opposition political parties. The media addressed development
issues only to document and glorify the successes and accomplishments of the regime in
power, and indirectly to discredit the opposition. There is an utter absence of legal texts
that regulate the use of television and radio broadcasting in Morocco in terms of content
(e.g. to protect youth or to ensure cultural diversity), structure (ownership patterns), and
infrastructure. Besides the dahir6 of 1962 which created RTM, the press code of 1959,
nothing happened in terms of legal documents until 2002. The creation of both Medi 1
and 2M for instance occurred within a legal vacuum (Ibahrine, 2007). The government
did not issue a dahir that would justify their creation. The press code that existed since
1959 (ratified in 1960 and 1973) was modeled after the oppressive French colonial press
code.
1. 2. 3. 2. Broadcast media in Morocco 1999-2008. When King Mohammed VI
succeeded his father Hassan II in July 1999, he instantly became a symbol of hope for a
more democratic and free Morocco. Unlike his father, whose 38-year rule was stained by
human rights violations, corruption and a discredited political system, Mohammed VI –
famed in the Moroccan and foreign media as the "king of the poor" -- embodied modesty,
social justice and moderation. He made the promotion of human rights a priority. One of
6

A royal decree.
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the first major pro-human rights measures under his reign was the creation with a royal
decree of the Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2003 that investigated the human
rights violations of the past. Besides establishing the truth about the past violation, the
Commission organized public forums in 2004 to allow victims to voice their pains and
sufferings. These forums were broadcast live on TV, which I consider a very important
moment in Moroccan television history. The goal of the Commission is to facilitate the
reconciliation of Moroccans with their recent past.
Another major initiative was the new Family Status Law or Moudawana. It was
decreed in 2003 to protect women‘s rights. A Freedom House‘s study (2004) on women
in Morocco, Women’s Freedom in Focus: Morocco, praised this initiative and noted the
improvements of the status of women and their rights (Freedom House, 2004). Mohamed
VI also created the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture. The Institute‘s role is to
safeguard and promote Amazigh language and culture. Imazighen are the majority ethnic
group in Morocco, yet Amazigh culture was undermined for many years. For political
reasons, Hassan II regime identified with Arabism hence the predominance of the Arabic
culture and identity.
The National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) remains the most
important long term development project undertaken under the reign of Mohamed VI.
The Moroccan government has clearly stated the role it expects the mass media in general
and television in particular, to play to support and enhance these development initiatives.
It has given important policy considerations to regulate the use of television and radio
airwaves as important outside sources for promoting its development goals. It pledged to
reform the state broadcast system, turn it into a public service broadcasting system, and
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relieve it from political control. Consequently, the structure of the broadcast media was
re-defined, an independent regulator was set up, the public service broadcasting was
reformed, and a framework for private broadcasting was provided.
As a first step, the government created the High Commission for Audiovisual
Communication (Haut Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle-HACA) in August
2002 to establish the legal framework for the liberalization of the audio-visual sector. In
September of the same year, it promulgated a decree law that ended the state's monopoly
of the national broadcasting system and allow the licensing of new private radio and
television stations. The Moroccan parliament adopted the reform law on November 25,
2004. The law assigns public service obligations to the two major television stations in
Morocco (RTM and 2M). The law also puts an end to the state‘s monopoly in terms of
broadcasting management by transforming Moroccan Radio and Television (RTM) from
a subsidiary of the Ministry of Communication to an independent and self-governing
body, the National Company of Radio and Television (la Société Nationale de
Radiodiffusion et de Télévision—SNRT). The SNRT is a public company that will
manage both television stations, but will no longer be subject to the financial control and
supervision of the ministry of Communication. RTM7 is to be called Al Oula (meaning
the first). 2M will implement the editorial directives of the government, a legal document
that HACA approved. The two stations will have to grant an important portion of their
programs to national productions, and increase the percentage of development oriented
programs.

7

On April 2007, the SNRT changed the name of RTM to ―Al Oula.‖ I will be using henceforth ―Al Oula‖
to refer to this television channel.
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Therefore, by virtue of this Audiovisual Communication Law, the number of
radio stations and television channels has increased in since 2006. The number of radio
stations increased from six stations in 2006 to seventeen in 2007. The number of TV
channels increased from three stations in 2004 to eight in 2007. In the field of radio, in
addition to the existing public radio stations, many new commercial and private radio
stations were launched in 2006, including Chada FM, Aswat, Marrakech Atlas FM,
Agadir Radio Plus and Likoulli Nass.
Moroccan Television has also undergone a restructuring process. Morocco today
has eight channels, 1) Al Oula (formerly known as RTM), 2) 2M (these two are general
news and entertainment channels), 3) Arriadia (all sports channel), 4. Arrabiaa,
(Morocco‘s education and cultural channel), 5) Al Maghribia, (channel for the Moroccan
community abroad), 6) Assadissa, (religious channel), 7) Laayoune, (regional TV
designed for the southern region) and 8) Medi I Sat. (Arabic and French service news
channel).
While the growth of the audiovisual sector in Morocco is encouraging, I have
many questions about the short time it took to implement all these changes, and about the
guiding principles and the overall media philosophy behind all these decisions.
1. 2. 3. 3. Concluding Remarks. There are at least two main points that emerge
from this literature review. First, a free and independent mass media can play a vital role
in transforming developing countries from a state of underdevelopment to one of
economic prosperity and democracy. As noted earlier, there is enough empirical data to
prove this. Second, since 2002, the Moroccan government has given important policy
considerations to regulate the use of television as an important outside source for
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promoting its development goals. In fact since 2004, the media reform law assigns public
service obligations to the two major television stations in Morocco (Al Oula and 2M).
The two stations have to grant an important portion of their programs to national
productions, and increase the percentage of development oriented programs.
These two main points are interrelated. The facts that television is widely adopted
in Moroccan society, and that television represents a major source of information and
education for a large number of Moroccans, make the role of television in the process of
development of a developing country an important area of research. The aim of this
dissertation is to explore the role of Moroccan public television in development. The
focus will be on the period from 2006 to 2008. In November 2004, the national media
reform law assigned public service obligations to the two major television stations, but it
was not until January 2006 that the two public stations were committed to these
obligations.
1. 3. Area of Research
Drawing from critical studies research, this dissertation situates television within
the broader context of Moroccan social life and interrogates its goals, messages and
effects. The major site of research is television itself. As a cultural critic, I have come to
understand and study television from a cultural studies perspective. In a most general
level, television is a technology, a social, economic, cultural, and ideological institution.
As a technology, it produces electronic images and sounds; as a social institution, it
produces viewers and helps in their socialization process; as an economic institution, it
produces consumers and gives business; as a cultural institution, it produces programs
and schedules that tells people who they are, where they are, and when they are; and as
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an ideological institution, television provides norms, values and rules that tell viewers
what to consider as acceptable and what to consider as unacceptable.
This dissertation will investigate the extent to which the Moroccan public service
television serves the development objectives of the nation. It will first examine the
contents of the programs that are offered in order to assess the public service function of
Moroccan television. Second, it will examine the current media policy and editorial
choices of media executives in the two public television stations, namely Al Oula and
2M. Based on my observations, there seems to be a void in the area of media policy in
Morocco, a void that this dissertation aims to explore. Finally, this dissertation will
investigate the views and opinions television audiences have vis à vis their public TV.
This dissertation will focus on the two government-owned public-service
television stations, Al Oula and 2M. I chose to work on the two stations for three main
reasons. First, they are the most watched TV stations (Marocmetrie ratings results 2008).8
Second, they are the most accessible to all audiences because their broadcasts require
only an aerial antenna to be captured, an item almost all Moroccan households can afford
(compared to satellite dishes). Third, Al Oula and 2M are owned by the State and run by
the National Company for Radio and Television (SNRT). They cover a broad spectrum of
programming: news, sports, music, documentaries, films, TV series, commercials, public
relations announcements etc. After the launching of the NIHD, both stations witnessed a
remarkable increase in development programs that aim at supporting the government's
developmental goals and fostering its projected democratic reforms. The stations seem to
serve as the mouthpiece and the carriers of the changes the government aims to achieve.
8

Marocmetrie is the leading audience measurement firm in Morocco. It determines the audience size and
composition of television shows viewers.
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1. 3. 1. Research Hypotheses
Based on my initial observations, there is reason to be concerned about how the
communication gap between the public service TV and its public at large is widening. On
the one hand, there are large numbers of non-literate or marginally literate individuals
who are living out their lives in print-scarce environments with few or no reading
materials in their homes, but they have regular access to television. On the other hand,
television seems to promote a cultural agenda that benefits only a small privileged
segment of Moroccan society and seems to shy away from, if not prevent, the possibility
of allowing the concerns and perspectives of the poor and marginalized to be highlighted.
Based on my observations, my first hypothesis is that television programming
decisions in the two public stations seem to be influenced by the elite upper-middle class
who want more entertainment and have less need for educational programs than their
rural and urban-poor counterparts. The two TV stations seem to propagate a consumerism
mentality that seems to serve the ends of the rich more than those of the poor. Catering to
urban and elite tastes may interfere with the government‘ commitment to using public
television for development purposes.
My second hypothesis is that the two public television stations seem to restrict
access to and participation in public debates to only the wealthy and highly educated
classes of Morocco. For instance, Moroccans speak darija,9 a derivative of Arabic, in
their everyday life, but both public service television stations use formal Arabic which
according to estimates, only 40% of Moroccans understand, and formal French which
9

Darija is a variation of Arabic; it refers to the dialect spoken in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It has a
few vocabulary words from Amazigh, French and Spanish. It is an oral language, not used in writing. The
official languages are modern standard Arabic and French.

29

only 10 percent of Moroccans understand. French in particular is the language of the
elite. The choice of language restricts access to public television for a large portion of
Moroccan society.
The third hypothesis is that the two public television stations, being highly
patriarchal, seem to contribute to the reproduction of an undemocratic social order by
targeting the urban elites as their main audience and by disregarding the needs of poor
urban, suburban and especially rural classes. The locally produced programming contents
seem to project the life-styles and values of the elite while at the same time projecting
rampant images of misrepresentations of women, poor classes, rural and suburban people.
They target the urban elites as their main audience and disregard the needs of poor urban,
suburban and especially rural classes.
The three hypotheses are interrelated in the sense that catering to the urban elite
tastes and needs projects an undemocratic social order. It is undemocratic in the sense
that it limits the possibilities of television to play the development role it is supposed to
perform, and limits the possibilities for participation in public discourse. Television gives
legitimacy to what it shows. For instance, if most people featured on television are
wearing suits and ties and speak classical Arabic and French, this would present the
average Moroccan with the list of things he or she doesn't have: to speak French and
Arabic and to look a bit Western, or at least not to look aroubi (rural person). Many
people feel more comfortable in their djellabas and traditional hats or turbans. Many feel
comfortable speaking their own dialect, including darija. French and Arabic have more
credibility than darija and much more than Tamazight (Ennaji, 2005). Instead of
broadening public debates, a function the technology of television can fulfill, television
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seems to create a narrow space where only a few can participate.
Besides, the two public television stations seem to fail even in their basic function
of informing their viewers on some very important national reforms. For instance,
according to an investigation done in 2005 by the High Commission for Planning (le
Haut-Commissariat au Plan), the Moroccan governmental authority in charge of the
national economic forecasts and of economic and social planning, and in charge of the
elaboration and implementation of the government policies for development, 38% of
Moroccan are unaware of the existence of the new Moudawana (the reform law on
Family Code). This reform is one of the most important legislative reforms achieved by
the State and is considered as a major step towards gender equality in Morocco. Both
public television stations devoted a lot of air time to this issue and yet 38% of Moroccans
remain unaware of the existence of such law. I suppose the languages the TV stations
used to disseminate the information were classical Arabic and French.
Norris (2002) argues that an independent media with a watchdog function is a
necessary but not sufficient means of strengthening good governance and promoting
human development. She suggests that these goals are efficiently achieved if people have
widespread access to these media. An independent media is only efficient for
development and democracy if all sectors of society, especially those who are most
disadvantaged or marginalized, can access the media to gain information and make
informed decisions that affect their lives. I agree with Norris that access is important, but
I have to ask, access to what kind of content? Access to a content that undermines an
ethnicity, a gender, or an age group limits the possibilities of participation and
engagement for the marginalized groups.
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1. 3. 2. Research Questions
My main research question is: to what extent does the Moroccan public service
television serve the development objectives of the nation? To provide substantial answers
to this question, for the sake of analysis, I will tackle the question from three main angles:
content, production, and reception. In other words, I will tackle these research questions
from both ‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of both the
broadcasters (supply) and the audience (demand).
The research questions can therefore be divided into three main areas in critical
media studies: 1) content analysis, 2) production study, and 3) audience reception
analysis.
1. Content analysis:
 What are the demographic characteristics of participants in the television
programs in terms of their gender and geographical origin?
 What is the language used in the programs?
 Do the programs offer the possibility and means for television viewers to send
feedback to the shows‘ producers?
 Does public television propagate consumerism and the lifestyles of the wealthy
and highly educated classes?
2. Production study:


Is there a media philosophy or a general guideline that informs the production
process?



What is the media production executives‘ vision for the role of television in
development?
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What are the perceptions of television executives on their audiences'
educational level, attention span, and their values and beliefs?

3. Audience reception analysis:


Do the two public television stations‘ programs represent the audiences‘
lifestyles and their concerns?



Are television viewers satisfied with the public service provided by the two
television stations?



What expectations do television viewers have of the two public TV stations?
1. 4. Theoretical Background

1. 4. 1. Development Communication
This dissertation situates itself within the fields of development communication
and critical media studies. Development communication addresses issues of using
communication and media to bring social and economic progress in developing countries.
The field emerged in the late 1950's, amid the popular fascination with radio and
television as powerful tools of communication that can successfully be put to use in the
world's developing countries to bring about rapid social change and economic progress
(Mody, 2003; Thussu, 2004).
The area of development communication will, on the one hand, provide the
context for the development issues related to the broad questions this dissertation will try
to answer, i.e. the role of television in development. Discussing development
communication will serve as background knowledge that is necessary to understand how
development communication scholars have theorized on the role a powerful mean of
communication like television should play in a developing country. The review will also
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provide the context where Morocco's public television is situated vis-à-vis development
communication theories and practices.
On the other hand, development communication scholars described world media
systems and their philosophies, namely, libertarian, authoritarian, communist, social
responsibility, developmental, and participatory (Downing, 2007). These world media
systems and the philosophies that support them provide a map according to which we can
locate where Morocco's media system is. They provide a set of criteria (extent of freedom
of expression, media ownership, media/government relations etc.) that can be used to
determine whether Morocco's media policy fit any of the systems. This section will be
very relevant to the analysis of the editorial policies and choices of Moroccan television
producers.
1. 4. 2. Critical Media Theories
This dissertation draws its theoretical vigor from critical media studies. Critical
media studies examine the effects of mass communication on society and culture, and the
role they play in perpetuating an unjust social order. Television, it is argued, can
propagate ideologies, construct identities, and normalize life styles. Television provides
information about relationships and lifestyles, and offers numerous kinds of
―prescriptions or guidance‖ that help people make sense of their lives (Kellner, 1990).
Critical theorists interrogate the structure, goals, values, messages of mass media, and
analyzed their ideological and normalizing effects on society and culture. Critical
research also ―develops critical perspectives by which media are evaluated and
appraised‖ (Kellner, 1990). Critical theories are essential for a better understanding of
issues of representations of gender and class, as well as issues of participation in public
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discourse. It is important to note that critical theories have influenced many studies in
development communication, namely structural imperialism theory, the dependency
theory, and the participatory developmental approach.
1. 5. Methodology
This dissertation will look at the extent to which the two television stations serve
the development goals of Morocco. This dissertation will look at three main areas in
critical media studies: content analysis, production study, and audience reception analysis
(Kellner 1990).
1. 5. 1. Content Analysis
I will conduct a quantitative content analysis10 of a representative sample of
Moroccan produced programs to examine the public service function of Moroccan public
broadcasting. I would like to address the research methodology, and in particular the use
of both critical and quantitative methodology. Such combination is rarely attempted
considering the fact that quantitative and critical scholars generally do not favor each
others' methods. To clarify this choice, I am using quantitative content analysis as a
counting tool that is imbedded in the project. The quantitative study is not an overarching
framework that constrains the critical study with hypothesis testing tools, etc. I employ
quantitative methodology because it allows me to make reliable claims about the degree
of access and participation in public service television. To rely only on a few examples
and claim that they are representative would be insufficient. Contributions from this
approach are essential to achieving substantial and balanced results.

10

A more thorough description of the methodology will be provided in Chapter Three.

35

In this content analysis, focus will be one the principle of universality of appeal
and in particular on access to and participation in public television. Before making
decisions on the unit of analysis and the sampling method, I conducted a pretest of the
data. The initial sample consisted of twelve shows from both public TV channels that
were broadcast at different times from January 2006 to January 2008. They represent a
variety of shows meant to educate audiences on issues of economy, health, and politics.
This preliminary data collection and analysis informed the subsequent data collection
decisions.
The operational definitions of the concepts of access and participation are as
follows. Access means the extent to which regular citizens from all regions of Morocco
have a chance to express their views on public television. In the preliminary data
collection and analysis, I observed that most participants (either as experts or guests) in
the television shows are from urban centers, in particular the country's capital Rabat and
the economic capital Casablanca. For television to serve the public it must be inclusive
and offer the largest portion of the audience to access. Participation refers to the
opportunities of the public to participate in the production of content. Participation looks
at whether there are means whereby audiences can give feedback to the television shows
and to other audiences. To have access to and be able to participate in public television
requires language skills. Access and participation entail the following sub-categories: the
languages being used in the television shows, the demographic characteristics of hosts
and guests of the TV shows, the availability of means of feedback, and the thematic
location (urban versus rural themes discussed). The operational definitions of the four
sub-categories are:
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The demographic characteristics of hosts and guests of the TV shows: They
include gender, socioeconomics, and geographic location.



The language used in the programs: they include the use of darija, Arabic,
French, Amazigh, or any combination of them.



The availability of means of feedback: they include phone calls and text
messaging. E-mail feedback is not counted considering the high percentage of
computer illiteracy in Morocco (estimated at 90% according to the Ministry of
Communication, 2006).



Thematic location refers to whether the themes discussed in the show relates to
urban or rural issues.
Sampling is the process of systematically selecting that which will be examined

during the course of the study. The sample will consist of all locally produced shows in
both public stations over the span of one year, from January 2007 to January 2008. The
reason why I choose to work on the period between January 2007 and January 200811 is
that, after the launching of the National Initiative of Human Development, both stations
witnessed a remarkable increase in development programs that aim to support the
government's developmental goals and to foster its projected democratic reforms.
Besides, in November 2004, the national Audio-visual Communication Law assigned
public service obligations to the two major television stations, but it was not until January
2006 that the two public stations were committed to these obligations. The content

11

This period includes two irregular television seasons: the summer (June through August) and the month
of Ramadan (Mid-September to Mid-October). Some shows do not air in the Summer. Ramadan is a month
of fasting where the audiences‘ eating habits are disrupted, the fact that affects primetime placement.
Therefore, some shows either did not air or were placed outside of primetime, and were therefore excluded
from the sample.
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analysis will focus on the period from January 2006 to January 2008, in particular on the
second half of this period to make sure that the public television stations have started to
carry out their public service obligations.
The sample includes all the shows that are broadcast during three main time
blocks, pre-prime time (19:00 - 20:30), prime time (20:30 – 23:00), and post prime time
(23:00 – 00:00).12 Primetime witnesses the highest ratings and are therefore more
meaningful in terms of audience exposure. This sample size consists of seventy eight
shows. The shows must be locally produced, non-fiction, and must deal with
development themes such as education, politics, economy, culture, and society. They
include talk shows, newsmagazines, documentaries, game shows, reality-based shows,
debate shows, and practical advice shows. It is important to note that other foreign and
locally produced drama and fiction shows such as television series, films, and sit-coms,
and music and sports programs such as live concerts or soccer games are broadcast
during prime time and are excluded from the sample.
I would like here to address the research methodology, and in particular the use of
both critical and quantitative methodology. Such combination is rarely attempted
considering the fact that quantitative and critical scholars generally do not favor each
others' methods. To clarify this choice, I am using quantitative content analysis as a
counting tool that is imbedded in the project. The quantitative study is not an overarching
framework that constrains the critical study with hypothesis testing tools, etc. I employ
quantitative methodology because it allows me to make reliable claims about the degree
of access and participation in public service television. To rely only on a few examples
12

I use HACA's designation of primetime.
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and claim that they are representative would be insufficient. Contributions from this
approach are essential to achieving substantial and balanced results.
1. 5. 2. Television Production Analysis
Concerning the production study,13 I will carry out a critical assessment of the
current choices undertaken by the TV producers in the two public service TV stations.
The production study will be mainly based on the results of the content analysis. Initial
results of the content analysis show that public service television offers the majority of
Moroccans few opportunities for access, and even less opportunities for participation. Indepth interviews with media executives will help obtain insights on the reasons behind
this seemingly discrepancy between the television's public service mission and the
contents it offers audiences. Focus will be on examining the constraints in production
processes that may influence content. The study will look at both political and economic
constraints; it will address the issues of state ownership and the degree of political control
that may limit TV producers' ability to operate.
All interviewees will also be asked specific questions pertaining to the role of
television in development. The interviews will also unveil whether there is a clear vision
for the role of television in development. I will also try to examine the perceptions of
these media executives on their audiences' educational level, attention span, and their
values and beliefs. The interviewees are program directors, media managers, editors,
anchors, and reporters. While conducting interviews as a methodology does not lead to
generalizable results, it offers the opportunity to distill media professionals‘ personal
experiences and insights (Berger, 2007).
13

A more thorough description of the methodology will be provided in Chapter Five.
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1. 5. 3. Audience Reception Analysis
Addressing audience reception14 helps tackle these research questions from both
‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of both the broadcasters
and the audience. An audience reception study will assess the opinions of television
viewers on the quality of Moroccan produced programs and their perceptions on the
public service provided by the two TV stations. The goal is to obtain the opinions and
insights of TV audiences with regard to what public service television they may (or may
not) want. To cover all segments of Moroccan society requires addressing a multicultural
society characterized by different ethnic, linguistic, and geographic characteristics,
including urban, sub-urban, and rural communities. Accordingly, I will use focus groups
as a standalone data-gathering strategy. To conduct interviews or surveys would require
human and financial resources that go outside the scope of the current research endeavor.
Focus groups are interviews designed for small group of usually six to ten distinct
individuals. Focus groups are efficient in collecting rich data in participants own words
and for developing deep insights. They are also good for obtaining data from people with
low level of literacy (Berg, 2005). Indeed, the audience reception analysis will focus
mainly on television viewers of lower educational backgrounds and lower income
because they are the main focus of both national and international development programs
and initiatives. The National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) and the national
media reforms that followed it are supposed to address the needs of those who lack
access to basic social services such as, health, education, water, electricity, etc. as well as
access to print press. The television viewers comprise large numbers of non-literate or
14

A more thorough description of the methodology will be provided in Chapter Six.
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marginally literate individuals who live out their lives in print-scarce environments, but
they have regular access to television. These focus groups' assessment and perception of
the public service provided by the two television stations are of utmost importance and
are necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the investigation under study.
The focus groups participants consist of Moroccan television audiences that reside
in sub-urban and rural areas. Sub-urban areas are poor neighborhoods located at the
outskirts of the city, and they are for the most part inhabited by rural migrants. The
demographic characteristics of the participants in the groups are as follows: women and
men aged eighteen to forty, illiterate or semi-literate, average to low income. The groups
will be divided up in terms of gender, age, and locality. There are a total of ten focus
groups, made up of eight to ten individuals each. The focus groups are separated in terms
of gender and age because in Morocco masculinity and age affect the dynamics in group
discussions. Older men tend to dominate group discussions, and younger participants
tend to conform to the older participants views. Six focus group sessions were conduced
in the area close to Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. Timmedikine is a poor suburban
neighborhood in Ifrane where low income residents live. I used the local elementary
school (school Annasr) for the meeting. Azrou is fifteen-minutes drive (18 kilometers)
west of Ifrane. I know the members of a local youth association and I used their meeting
room for the focus groups. For the rural area, I used Dayet Ifrah, a rural community that
is 20 minutes drive north east of Ifrane. I used the local association to meet with the
participants.
Two focus groups were held in Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, 32
kilometers east of Tangier in the north of Morocco. I chose this rural area to get a sense
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of what people from other rural areas think of the TV stations under investigation.
Khmiss Anjra is a small community of 14,700 inhabitants (Haut Commissariat au Plan,
2004). I also used the local association for contacts and for meetings. The last two focus
groups were conducted in a suburban neighborhood in Casablanca. Karian Toma is
located in Sidi Moumen, one of the poorest communes in the suburbs of Casablanca.
Inhabited by 170,000 inhabitants, the commune is infamous for its shanty towns and
dusty wasteland of low crumbling houses. Karian Toma was home to several of the
suicide bombers who killed 45 people in downtown Casablanca on May 16, 2003. This
was the deadliest terrorist attack in Morocco since the Independence in 1956.
The focus groups will consist of guided discussions on public service television.
The goal is to obtain the opinions and insights of TV audiences with regard to what
public service television they may (or may not) want. Because the study is not looking for
specific information about specific programs, the study will rely on the participants‘
memories and their long term exposure to television. The first phase of the meetings
entails factual questions that serve as a warm up for the subsequent questions: What
television channels do you watch the most? What television programs do you watch the
most? Then, the questions are more abstract: What are your opinions on the quality of
locally produced programs? Do the shows in the two public television stations represent
your lifestyle and your concerns? Whose lifestyle do you think is being represented on
the two television stations? Do you feel you have a right to participate in some way on
what goes on the public television stations? What expectations do television viewers have
of the two public TV stations?
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1. 6. Significance
The Arab media have received very little attention from the American public
discourse, with the exception of few articles and opinion pieces in some national
newspapers. Arab media appeared in the North American radar screen when Al Jazeera,
an all-news pan-Arab satellite television station, surprised the world's media by its
coverage of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan at the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Al Jazeera also drew much attention
when it broadcasted almost exclusively footage and statements of Oussama Bin Laden
and other terrorist groups. As a result of this lack of interest, the development of mass
media in the Arab countries, their socio-cultural impact and their political implications,
remain poorly understood.
Other areas that are also woefully under-researched are Arab audiences and
television viewing habits. Audience research is scarce (Ayish, 2003; Boyd, 1999;
Hamada, 2001), except for recent attempts by marketing research companies such as the
Arab Advisory Group (Jordan) to categorize TV consumption in selected Arab countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, which is the major source of advertising income in the region.
Recent interests in Arab public opinion especially as they pertain to U.S. image and
foreign policies after the U.S. invasion of Iraq have triggered much attention to this topic.
The flow of information from the U.S. to the Arab world is overwhelmingly one way.
Arab audiences know much more about Americans than Americans know about Arabs.
As a result, Americans know very little about the Arab world and almost nothing about
the Arab media. Rugh (2004) points out, ―mass media in any country reflect their
particular social, cultural, and political environments. Anyone who wants to understand
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the Arab World should therefore know its media‖ (Rugh, 2004, p. x).
With regards to research on Moroccan television, besides Lamnadi‘s study (1999),
the only other studies done so far in Morocco on television deal with quantitative
audience analysis (ratings analysis), mainly studying who is watching what and when.
The data collected is used by advertising agencies and media service organizations. The
present study goes far beyond what exists now in Morocco in terms of media research.
Morocco‘s major project is the National Initiative for Human Development, and
many policy considerations were taken to make television an important outside source for
promoting this national initiative. The facts that television is widely adopted in Moroccan
society, and that television represents a major source of information and education for a
large number of Moroccans, make the role of television in a developing country an
important site of research.
This study will contribute to a better understanding of the intersection between
public television, development, and media policy. It seems obvious to me as this stage of
the research, that there is a void in terms of a clear media policy, vision, or philosophy in
Morocco. The aim of this study is therefore to contribute to the elaboration of a
comprehensive national media philosophy that would allow the two public television
stations to be more effective in Morocco‘s development efforts.
1. 7. Preview of the Chapters
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter Two deals in details with the
theoretical review and the conceptual foundation of development communication
theories. The aim is to review the existing approaches of development communication
and to see their broad impact on Morocco‘s development and media policies and
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practices. This chapter will provide the theoretical context where Morocco's public
television is situated vis à vis development communication theories and practices.
Chapter Three traces the historical development of the broadcast media in
Morocco, with a focus on television. This account will unveil important social, economic,
and political data needed for understanding the forces and imperatives of development
television in Morocco. To evaluate the nature of the role of television in
development requires close scrutiny of three major factors: the legal, the
economic, and the political environments. The chapter examines the media policy as
enacted in the Constitution, the Press Law, and the Audiovisual Communication Law.
The chapter provides a careful and detailed examination of the economic and political
environments and addresses the issues of ownership and the degree of political control
and the government's tendency to use media policy to limit the media's ability to operate.
Chapter Four consists of a quantitative content analysis of a representative sample
of Moroccan produced programs to examine the issues of access to and participation in
the two public service television stations. The first principle of public service
broadcasting is universality of appeal. This principle refers to the extent to which the
programs cater to the different tastes and interests of all the segments of Moroccan
society. The content analysis will test one of the hypotheses of this study which claims
that the two public television stations seem to restrict access to and participation in public
debates to only the wealthy and highly educated classes of Morocco.
Chapter Five will examine the current choices undertaken by the TV producers in
the two public service TV stations. The production study will be mainly based on the
results of the content analysis. Focus will be on the analyzing the constraints in
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production processes that may influence content. The study will look at both political and
economic constraints; it will address the issues of ownership and the degree of political
control that may limit TV producers' ability to operate. All interviewees will also be
asked specific questions on their perceptions of their audiences.
Chapter Six will explore audience reception, in particular to assess the opinions of
television viewers on the quality of Moroccan produced programs and their perceptions
on the public service provided by the two TV stations. The analysis will focus mainly on
people of lower income and lower educational backgrounds because they are the main
focus of both national and international development programs and initiatives. The goal
is to obtain the opinions and insights of TV audiences with regard to what public service
television they may (or may not) want.
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter where I summarize all the findings and
draw appropriate connections between them. Based on the research findings, the Chapter
will provide a list of recommendations for Moroccan public service television.
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Chapter Two: A Review of Theory
2. 1. Introduction
This dissertation situates itself within the field of development communication.
Development communication deals with the basic question of how communication (mass
media and information and communication technologies ICTs) can be put to use to bring
about rapid social change and economic progress for the developing countries. Many
terms are used to describe this field; among them are communication and national
development, national development, communication and development, communication for
development, and development communication. In this dissertation, I will use the term
development communication to refer to the systematic use of communication resources to
trigger social change and promote human development.
The following theoretical discussion provides the context where Morocco's mass
media are situated vis à vis development communication theories and practices. The aim
is to review and understand the existing approaches of development communication and
to see their broad impact on Morocco‘s development and media policies and practices.
Since the 1950's, a diversity of theoretical and empirical traditions has converged in the
field of development communication. Such convergence produced a rich analytical
vocabulary but also a conceptual confusion. Concepts such as development, participation,
community, communication, are hard to define (Huesca, 2003). There are many ways one
can approach them. However, after a careful review of development communication
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theories, I found that, despite the multiplicity of theories and concepts that have so far
emerged, all the studies have converged to offer two different diagnoses and answers to
the problem of underdevelopment. One position, the dominant position, argued that the
problem was lack of information and technology within developing countries, the other,
critical of the first, argued that the problem was lack of participation.
I use the concept of the paradigm to discuss these two diagnoses. A paradigm is
an approach that provides a community of scholars a way of looking at some problem or
phenomenon. According to Kuhn (1996), a paradigm is a set or constellation of concepts,
values, and practices that are shared by a community of scholars and that define a
scientific discipline and its vision of reality during a particular period of time. A
paradigm provides guidelines for what questions research can ask, and what answers it
can provide. I will argue that all the approaches to development communication since the
1940's consisted of two basic paradigms for understanding communication and
development. In communication, major paradigm shifts occurred from a
conceptualization of communication as a one way flow of information from sender to
receiver, to a conceptualization of communication as a transactional and dialogic process
where communication happens only when all participants contribute equally to the
construction of meaning. There was also a shift in the conceptualization of mass media as
having magic bullet effect and of audiences as passive recipients, to a conceptualization
of mass media as having limited effects and of audiences as selective recipients and
resilient receivers.
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In development theories, there was a paradigm shift from a conceptualization of
development in terms of industrialization and economic growth, to a conceptualization of
development as in terms of human well-being (education, health, environment, human
rights, etc.) along with a recognition of the uniqueness of cultures and ethnic identities.
Therefore in the area of development communication, the dominant paradigm had blind
faith in the assumed powerful effects of media on audiences, it promoted a top-down
approach from experts to audiences, and it focused on economic development. The
alternative paradigm sought the use of communication in a more participative fashion,
and promoted the idea that media can be effective only if audiences are considered equal
partners in the production and dissemination of development messages.
In this chapter, I will first discuss and critique the dominant paradigm (Lerner,
1958; Schramm, 1964; Rogers, 1962). I will focus on the modernization approach,
represented by Lerner‘s national development theory and Rogers‘s diffusion of
innovation theory because they address the question of national development at a macro
level. I will also discuss two other approaches that carried forward modernization
theory‘s premises of behavior change and diffusion of innovation models. Since the
1970s, social marketing and entertainment-education have been the most influential
strategies in the field of development communication (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Bandura,
1977).
Second, and with regard to the alternative paradigm, I will discuss the neoMarxist approaches and participatory approaches to development communication (Baran,
1957; Schiller, 1976, 1992; Galtung, 1971; Mowlana, 1985; Freire, 1970; Masmoudi,
1979; MacBride, 1980). The neo-Marxist approaches, namely the dependency and the
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structural imperialist theories, emerged as major setbacks for economic growth and
advances in democracy in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia occurred.
The modernization approach to development, considered as a panacea for the
development of the newly independent countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, had
failed to deliver (Mody, 2003). Concerning the participatory approaches, I will discuss
two theoretical responses that drew upon the notion of the participatory model. The first
is Paulo Freire‘s dialogical pedagogy and the second involves the UNESCO-sponsored
debates on the New World Information and Communication Order. The concluding
section of this chapter is a synthesis of both paradigms and a discussion of their broad
impact on Morocco‘s development and media policies and practices.
2. 2. The Dominant Paradigm
The dominant paradigm emerged in the 1940's, and remained valid or
unquestioned until the 1970's. To better understand this paradigm, it is important to
provide a brief review of the historical events that guided the intellectual discussions on
development and influenced national development programs. Development theories have
their origins in post-war international aid programs to countries in Latin America, Asia
and Africa that were struggling with poverty, illiteracy, poor health and a lack of
economic, political and social infrastructures (Merrill, 1995; Mody 1991). In the post
World War II era, and after the last European colonies in Latin America, Africa and Asia
gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the world community was faced with
the reality of the abysmal disparities between the developed and underdeveloped worlds.
The Cold War divided the world into two hostile blocks, East and West, creating thus a
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Third World15 made up of countries that tried to avoid bloc politics and concentrate on
the development of their economic and social infrastructures (Stevenson, 1988).
Development communication theories became part of the Cold War discourses of
free market capitalism and state socialism (Thussu, 2000). Supporters of capitalism argue
that the primary function of communication is to promote democracy and free markets,
while Neo-Marxists advocate greater state regulation on communication and media
outlets (Thussu, 2000). Developed countries of the West, mainly the U.S. championed the
concept of free flow of information, which reflected capitalists‘ opposition to state
regulation and censorship, deemed bad for business. Their argument was grounded in the
premises of democracy, freedom of expression, the ―public watchdog‖ function of the
media and their assumed relevance for political development and economic prosperity.
The industrial revolution in the U.S. and England, and the wealth they generated
served as models for developing countries (Nair & White, 1993). The rapid economic
growth in these countries implied that the process of development was tied to economy,
and that industrialization was key to development. Development was defined in economic
terms; it was believed that economic gains and financial incentives are the catalyst and
generator for change in individuals' behaviors and their response to profit motive and
cash incentives (Rogers, 1993, p. 37). Industrialization implies the availability of
technology which developed countries possessed in abundance compared to developing
countries. The main criterion for development was the economy measured in terms of
gross national product or per capita income. Indeed, the UN declared the 1960‘s decade

15

Cold war terminology referring to newly independent/former colonies in Africa, Latin American, and
Asia, capitalist being ‗first‘ and socialist being second‘ world. Also called the South, under-developed and
developing, the latter being the most « politically correct »
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as the decade of economic development.
The tendency to quantify was an outgrowth of North American social science
empiricism. The dominance of the positivist and quantitative research methods was also a
contributing factor to these tendencies in defining underdevelopment quantitatively.
According to Rogers (1993), ―if some dimension of development could not be measured
and quantified in numbers, then it probably did not exist, or so it seemed in the 1960's‖
(Rogers, 1993, p. 37). The main index for the level of national development was the gross
national product, or, when divided by the total population, the per capita income. Values,
such as justice, freedom, or dignity did not fit the measurement methods employed, and
therefore remained unaccounted for. The simplicity of measurement made it easy to
forget that countries such as India, China, and Egypt were old centers of civilization,
because cultural richness was not measurable and could not be used as an index for the
level of development (Roger, 1993). For economic growth to occur, political stability was
thought to be a necessity. As a result, authoritarian governments in forms of military
dictatorships and autocratic leaderships, with the support of developed world, emerged
progressively in developing countries.
One fascinating interpretation of this emphasis on economic development is
David Harvey‘s (2003) argument in The New Imperialism. He argues that for capitalism
to survive, capitalism being an economic system with a ―chronic tendency … to produce
crises of overaccumulation‖ and surpluses of commodity and money, it has to find the
means to dump its surplus capital (Harvey, 2003, pp. 87, 88). In other words, in order for
the system of capitalism to work (for accumulation and growth to continue) excess
capital has to be disposed of. The development projects in developing countries that
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consisted of investments in massive infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams,
bridges, and highways were ideal for dumping the overflow of capital. For developed
countries, the success (or failure) of these projects was virtually meaningless.
Therefore, since the 1940's through the 1960's, development programs for
developing countries used to consist of investments in economic infrastructures and
technology. The U.N. called the 1960‘s decade the ―decade of development.‖ It was
assumed that economic progress would lead to progress in all other facets of life, in terms
of better education, better health services, improvements in human rights etc. Many
international organizations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, the United Nations for
Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank devoted large percentages of their
funding resources to economic oriented projects (UNDP, 2006).
2. 2. 1. The Modernization Approach
2. 2. 1. 1. Lerner’s theory of national development. In his seminal book The
Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Lerner (1958) argued that
the mass media had the potential to change the way of life of citizens in developing
countries. Lerner‘s theory of national development posits that modernization and
development take place only when traditional values are replaced with secular, rationalist
and positivist values. He conducted his field research in 1950 in Turkey, Jordan,
Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Greece. He categorized the people of the Middle East
along the lines of a spectrum from traditional to modern. ―Traditionals,‖ like the
Europeans of the Middle Ages, seemed ―immobile, stranger to empathy, and suspicious
of the new.‖ The moderns, on the other hand, are more empathetic and confident. For
him, secular and rationalist values create ―psychic mobility‖ and ―empathy,‖ by which
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Lerner means, respectively, the capacity to think of life beyond one‘s immediate
environment and the capacity to imagine oneself in someone else‘s situation. Lerner
writes, ―high empathetic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern
society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate, and participant‖ (Lerner, 1958, p.
50).
Lerner sees the Western model of development as the most effective and viable
path, one that is able to shake off the ―backwardness‖ of traditional societies. Lerner sees
the mass media, or what he called ―the mobility multiplier,‖ as the main tools and
transmitters of modern values and can even function as surrogate for travel. In other
words, the shift from a traditional to a modern lifestyle can be done through information
transmission via mass media and communication technologies; rural residents do not
have to travel to the city to see and live modernization, media can bring modernization to
rural residents' homes. Lerner emphasized the relationship between communication,
urbanization, and modernization. He believed that the availability of communication
facilities would lead to faster progress and greater modernization. Based on a simple
correlation analysis, showing a strong connection between the spread of communications
and economic and political development, Daniel Lerner theorized:
[The] Western model of modernization exhibits certain components and
sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere for example increasing
urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase
media exposure; increasing media exposure has ‗gone with‘ wider economic
participation (per capita income) and political participation‖ (Lerner, 1958, p. 46).
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Wilbur Schramm further developed Lerner's ideas. In 1963, he published a short
but influential article that set the agenda for communication and development for the
following ten years (Schramm in Chu, 1994). Schramm proposed the following:


―Communication must be used to contribute to the feeling of nation-ness.



Communication must be used as the voice of national planning.



Communication must be used to help teach the necessary skills.



Communication must be used to help extend the effective market.



As the plan develops, communication must be used to help prepare people to play
their new roles.



Communication must be used to prepare the people to play their role as a nation
among nations‖ (Schramm in Chu, 1994, p. 37).
Lerner and Schramm sought the use of communication resources for fundamental

social transformation and basic cultural change. In his book, Mass Media and National
Development, Schramm (1964) saw the mass media as a ―bridge to a wider world,‖ as a
vehicle for shifting new ideas and models from the developed North to the
underdeveloped South and, within the South, from modern urban to traditional rural
areas. For him, the mass media in the South face the challenge of raising the aspirations
of the people and stirring them from fatalism and fear of change. ―Individuals must come
to desire a better life than they have‖, he wrote, ―and to be willing to work for it‖
(Schramm, 1964, p. 130). Lerner and Schramm sought the use of mass media as tools for
fundamental social transformation and cultural change.
This theory relies on the assumption that modern and traditional lifestyles were
mutually exclusive. The theory held a dismissive view of the cultures of the South, what
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Lerner called, ―indigent natives‖ the fact that led to the belief in the inevitability of a shift
from the traditional to the modern. For instance, in the Arab world, Islam, a dominant
cultural and religious force, was seen as ―sentimental sorties into the symbolism of a
majestic past‖ (Lerner, 1958, p. 405). For Lerner it was not a matter of ―whether, but of
how one should move from traditional ways toward modern life-styles. The symbols of
race and ritual,‖ he argued, ―fade into irrelevance when they impede living desires for
bread and enlightenment‖ (ibid.). It is important to note that Schramm published his book
Mass Media and National Development in conjunction with the UNESCO, thereby
setting the agenda of research on the link between communication technologies and
socio-economic development.
Schramm is often referred to as the father of communication studies (Rogers,
1997). He founded the first doctoral programs in communication and the first institute of
communication research and he trained the first generation of communication scholars.
Schramm worked and had close associations with a number of forerunners in the
communication research field such as Harold D. Lasswell, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Kurt
Lewin, Carl I. Hovland, Warren Weaver, and Claude E. Shannon. His close association
with both aspects of academic life, i. e. research and funding, made him an influential
figure who sat the stage for further theory development from diffusion to participatory
theories.
2. 2. 1. 2. Diffusion of Innovation. Everett Rogers‘ theory of diffusion of
innovation (1962) originates from the preoccupations of U.S. sociologists with the
questions of how to promote technical innovations in agriculture in rural areas. This
concern was extended to involve looking at the process of adoption of innovations in
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society. Along the lines of the magic bullet theory of mass media effects, the theoretical
premise is: when given relevant information about a particular new practice, whether it is
a new chemical fertilizer, a family planning device, or a nutritious food, the audience will
likely abandon the old in favor of the new. The new has to be perceived as more
rewarding and the adoption needs to take place in a socially supportive environment.
Rogers16 (1962) defines diffusion as the process whereby an innovation is
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system. This definition contains four main elements:


Innovation: an idea, an object, a technical invention, or a practice, that is
perceived as new by an individual.



Communication channels: the communication means by which messages move
from one individual to another or from an institution (advertising) to individuals.



Time: The time it takes for an innovation to be adopted by an individual or a
group, and the innovation's rate of adoption.



Social system: Individuals and social groups engaged in joint problem solving to
accomplish a common goal.
The theory describes two processes: the process of diffusion and the process of

adoption. The process of diffusion deals with how an innovation is diffused through
communication channels and through time within a social system. The process of
adoption addresses how individuals come to adopt an innovation, i.e. how does an
individual go from not knowing about an invention to using it. Rogers (1962) identifies
the characteristics of five main segments of any given population that adopt an
16

Rogers later abandoned the modernization approach and became in the 1980‘s one of the advocates for
alternative approaches to development communication.
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innovation. The differences between the segments are based on how much time it takes
each segment to adopt an innovation. The innovators, not to be confused with those who
actually invent things, are the segment of the population that adopts the innovations first.
They require the shortest adoption period than any other category. After the innovators
come the early adopter, the early majority, the late majority, and finally the laggards.
Rogers identifies several characteristics dominant in the innovators type. They are
venturesome; they have a craving for the daring, and the risky. They control substantial
financial resources that allow them to absorb possible loss in case the innovation turns
out to be unprofitable. Innovators have higher than average education level that enables
them to understand and apply complex technical knowledge, and they have the ability to
cope with uncertainty.
Regarding the process of adoption, the diffusion of innovation theory breaks the
adoption process down into five stages: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and
adoption. In the awareness stage, the individual is exposed to the innovation but lacks full
information about it. At the interest stage, the individual becomes interested in the
innovation and seeks additional information about it. At the evaluation stage the
individual mentally evaluates the usefulness of the innovation with regard to his or her
present and anticipated future situation, and then makes a decision whether or not to try
it. During the trial stage, the individual uses the innovation to see how it works and
whether it will help him/her solve problem. At the adoption stage, the individual decides
to continue using the innovation. Roger argues that prior conditions such as previous
practice, felt needs and problems, innovativeness, and norms of the social system
determine to a large extent the manner in which the adoption process takes place.
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Rogers states that mass media can help make very efficient the awareness and
knowledge stages (or fulfillment of interest stage) of an innovation. To create awareness
of and interest in an innovation, Rogers argues that mass media, thanks to their ability to
reach large numbers of people, can be efficient in drawing opinion leaders‘ attention
(innovators and early adopters) to innovations and raising their interest in them. Once
opinion leaders adopt the innovation, they will then transmit their experience through
interpersonal communication to other members in the social system. This is an example
of the trickle down effect assumption this theory leans on.
Rogers, in a divergent move from media centrism and magic bullet effects
theories, incorporated insights from the two-step flow theory advocated by Katz and
Lazarsfeld (1955). Contrary to the media effects model that suggested a direct relation
between the mass media and audiences, Katz and Lazarsfeld argued that media effect is a
two-step process, from the mass media channels to opinion leaders and from opinion
leaders to the masses. To make decisions, media audiences rely on the opinions of
members of their social networks, especially influential opinion leaders, rather than
solely or mainly on the mass media. Because mass media are effective in making people
aware about innovations, both exposure to mass media and face-to-face interaction were
necessary to induce effective change (Hornik 1988).
Katz and Lazarsfeld‘s findings (1955), summarized in their book Personal
Influence, shook the foundation of modern communication theory and raised questions
regarding the premises upon which the dominant paradigm rests. They changed the way
researchers understood the role of mass media and audience reception, and at the same
time they opened up new horizons in communication research (McQuail, 2002). McQuail
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(2002) points out that researchers used not to pay attention to the variables that
intervened between message producers and message receivers. They saw mass media as
having direct effects on audiences. Katz and Lazarsfeld saw mass media as one of the
many variables that influence people's attitudes and voters‘ behavior. Katz and Lazarsfeld
conceptualized ―the audience as a tissue of interrelated individuals rather than as isolated
point targets in a mass society‖ (McQuail, 2002, p. 27). Giddens argues that ―research on
the 'two-step flow of communication' shows that formally identical content, as
disseminated in the mass media, can be interpreted and responded to in quite different
ways‖ (Giddens in McQuail, 2002, p. 28). Katz and Lazarsfeld's notion of active
audiences is both a critique of the notion of an all powerful media and an expression of
faith in the autonomy of people and in the importance of interpersonal communication.
To apply their findings to development communication, Katz and Lazarsfeld
inaugurated a move from a conceptualization of communication involving media
message experts and beneficiaries, to one that involves a triadic model that included
media experts, beneficiaries, as well as change agents (Waisbord, 1999). By pointing out
the fact that interpersonal networks were necessary to induce effective change, they also
drew attention to the importance of sociocultural environment where communication
takes place. Katz and Lazarsfeld anticipated the paradigm shift to the transactional, social
constructionist and participatory models of communication. It was not until the 1990's
that this paradigm shift materialized to become part of the agenda of government and
non-government development agencies. The same happened with audience research. It
took many decades before the notion of an active audience became popular.
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Rogers and Schramm incorporated many of these findings in their later writings.
By the mid-1970's, Rogers published a much quoted article ―The passing of the dominant
Paradigm‖ where he defines development communication as a participatory process of
social change.
2. 2. 1. 3. Summary. The modernization theories served as the blueprint for
development communication activities for many decades. They exemplify the free flow
of information doctrine and the top-down approach to communication. The two theories
assumed that contact with the media would help the process of transition from traditional
to a modernized state, with the media being a mobility multiplier. The messages are to be
designed by a group of specialists and transmitted to the audiences. Once audiences
receive the messages, they will respond to them. For instance, if the purpose of the
message is to raise awareness or change attitudes about a particular issue like health or
environment, it is enough to design a message that can be understood by audiences and to
transmit it to them. It was assumed that the audiences would then act on what they have
learned (Haberman, 1986).
In Morocco, like many other developing countries, development was conceived in
terms of the modernization approach, in terms of industrialization, transfer of technology
and innovations, and economic growth. The process of development was tied to the
economy, and industrialization was considered key to development. According to a study
by the Moroccan Ministry of Social Development (2006) entitled Understanding Human
Development, development programs and policy in Morocco during the 1950‘s and
1960‘s consisted of investments in economic infrastructures and technology. It was
assumed that economic progress would lead to progress in all other facets of life.
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Emphasis was placed on the accumulation of financial capital, on infrastructure
development and the exploitation of natural resources. In the 1970‘s, the focus of
development shifted slightly to the development of human resources, focusing mainly on
the labor force to increase productivity. These development projects did not target
women and poor classes living in rural and suburban areas. For instance, projects such as
the ―great dams‖ have obviously contributed to the water conservation and the
development of modern agriculture and maintained drinking water supply to the cities.
However in remote areas, populations without water did not necessarily benefit from the
positive advantages of the dams, the roads or the electricity network. The trickle down
effect did not occur, and the knowledge of and access to technologies remained restricted
to a small powerful class.
The modernization theory‘s view of the role of communication in development
originated in two influential communication models. The first is the Shannon-Weaver
Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR) model. The second model is the propaganda
model which was developed during World War II. Both hierarchic views on
communication can be summarized in Lasswell's classic formula -- ―Who says What
through Which channel to Whom with What effect?‖ -- which dates back to research
(mainly American) on campaigns and diffusions in the late 40s and 50s. According to this
model, the mass media has a ―magic bullet‖ effect on attitudes, beliefs and behavior.
Besides, the behavior science theory on persuasive communication constitutes the
intellectual base that influenced most communication research in mid 20th century
(Waisbord, 1999). The communication process consists of an input (message designed by
sender) and output (listener's response triggered by input). The problem of
62

underdevelopment was then believed to be an information problem, and communication
was considered as the instrument that would solve it.
Lasswell (1948) had in mind a managerial function for communication. For him,
the role of communication is society was to mitigate dysfunction of the social system. He
points out that ―[O]ne task of a rationally organized society is to discover and control any
factors that interfere with efficient communication‖ (Lasswell, 1948, p. 223). For him,
interferences with efficiency can be of a technical nature, and these can be solved via the
use of knowledge. However, inefficiencies in communication can be related to human
factors, such as lack of knowledge, lack of professionalism, or a desire to promote a
particular ideology. Lasswell believed that to avoid human-related inefficiencies in
communication, the communication channels should be under the control and command
of experts. Here, he draws a distinction between specialists, leaders and laymen. He
argues that ―the attention structure of the full-time specialist on a given policy will be
more elaborate and refined than that of the layman. That this difference will always exist,
we must take for granted.... It is by no means fantastic to imagine that the controllers of
mass media of communication will take the lead in bringing about a high degree of
equivalence throughout society between the layman's picture of significant relationships,
and the picture of the expert and the leader‖ (Lasswell, 1948, p. 227). He advised against
allowing groups in power to control communication because the communication channels
would be ―controlled in the hope of organizing the attention of the community at large in
such a way that only responses will be forthcoming which are deemed favorable to the
power position of the ruling classes‖ (ibid.)
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Lasswell's idea of control of communication channels by experts can easily be
applied in a democracy because there are systems of checks and balances, free and
transparent elections, and a strong public opinion that can change things. In developing
countries such as Morocco, the ruling classes were in control of communication and
considered mass media as too powerful instruments to be handed to private persons.
2. 2. 2. Other Theories within the Modernization Approach
In the early 1970s, modernization theory was the dominant paradigm of
development communication. The climate of enthusiasm that had existed a decade earlier
had notably receded but the notion that the diffusion of information and innovations
could solve problems of underdevelopment reigned. Consistent with the empiricist topdown approach to development, but less dismissive of the grass roots participation are
research in social marketing and entertainment-education.
2. 2. 2. 1. Social marketing. It is one of the approaches that carried forward the
premises of behavior change and diffusion of innovation models. Since the 1970s, social
marketing has been one of the most influential strategies in the field of development
communication (Novelli, 1990). One definition of social marketing states that ―it is the
design, implementation, and control of programs calculated to influence the acceptability
of social ideas and involving consideration of product planning, pricing, communication,
distribution, and marketing research‖ (Kotler and Zaltman 1971, p. 5). The central
premise of social marketing strategies is that since advertising/marketing campaigns have
been successful in making the public aware about the existence, the price, and the
benefits of some product, these strategies can also benefit developing countries in many
of their interventions regarding immunization programs, condom use, breast-feeding, etc.
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The development of social marketing as a development communication theory is
the product of specific political and academic developments in the United States
(Waisbord, 1999). The political climate in the 1960‘s put pressure on academic
disciplines to respond to social issues, and the emergence of non profit organizations saw
in marketing an effective tool of promoting its social programs (Waisbord, 1999; Elliott
1991). Social marketing consists of putting into use standard techniques in commercial
marketing to promote pro-social behavior. From marketing and advertising, it borrowed
theories of consumer behavior and inserted them into development communication
(Novelli, 1990). Waisbord (1999) argues that ―at the core of social marketing theory is
the exchange model according to which individuals, groups and organizations exchange
resources for perceived benefits of purchasing products. The aim of interventions is to
create voluntary exchanges‖ (p. 7).
Social marketing‘s affinity with modernization and diffusion of innovation
theories lies in the fact that it focuses on behavior change, in its understanding of
communication as persuasion (―transmission of information‖), and its top-down approach
to implement change.
2. 2. 2. 2. Entertainment-education. Entertainment-Education shares behaviorchange premises with the modernization paradigm. It is a strategy that helps maximize
the reach, effectiveness and efficiency of development messages through the combination
of entertainment and education. One of the starting points of entertainment-education is
that populations in developing countries are widely exposed to entertainment media
content. The pervasiveness of media content matched with heavy exposure provides
numerous opportunities to design and communicate messages that can help educate
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people on a myriad of problems that they confront.
Singhal and Rogers (1999) define entertainment-education as ―the process of
purposely designing and implementing a media message to both entertain and educate, in
order to increase audience knowledge about an educational issue, create favorable
attitudes, and change overt behavior‖ (Singhal and Rogers 1999, xii). Paradigmatic
examples of this approach are soap operas in Latin America (telenovelas) and in India
that were designed to provide information about literacy and education, health issues,
family planning, sexual behavior, and agricultural development. Its major premise is
Albert Bandura‘s (1977) social learning theory which posits that people learn socially
desirable behavior by observing and imitating role models, especially in the mass media
(Bandura 1994, Maibach and Murphy 1995). This theory is rooted in the dominant
paradigm because it is concerned with behavior change and subscribes to a top down
communication model.
2. 2. 2. 3. Summary. Entertainment-education and social marketing approaches‘
affinity with modernization and diffusion of innovation theories lies in the fact that they
both focuses on behavior change, in their understanding of communication as persuasion
(―transmission of information‖), and in their top-down approach to implement change.
The theories can be used as strategies that can inform a particular development project or
awareness campaign, but they do not offer large scale applications for the use of the mass
media in development at a national level.
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2. 2. 3. Criticism of the Old Paradigm
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, after decades of interventions, skepticism grew
as major setbacks for economic growth and advances in democracy in Latin America, the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia occurred. The modernization approach to development,
considered as a panacea for the development of the newly independent countries of Latin
America, Africa and Asia, had failed to deliver (Mody, 2003).
One major shortcoming of the modernization approach is that it advocates a topdown approach, one-way flow of information via the mass media from governments or
international development agencies to the developing countries, and from developing
countries governments to their citizens. Messages are designed and transmitted by media
executives to large audiences. The contents of the messages that matter are related to
those pertaining to the changes in attitudes and values and to the uses of the technological
innovations, and do not pertain to the everyday life concerns of the citizens. Pasquali
(2003) argued that the notion of ―mass communication‖ was an oxymoron, and that Latin
American media constituted an ―information oligarchy‖ that cultivated a social context
characterized by ―communicational atrophy‖ (Pasquali in Huesca, 2003, p. 58). The old
paradigms' unilateral decisions on definition of the problems, solutions, and their
diffusion were seen as a violation of the essence of communication.
The modernization theory ignored the fact that mass media are themselves subject
to cultural, economic and political conditions. As a media consumer of the Moroccan
television and radio, I will describe how television was used as an instrument of
development and social change. RTM (the only available TV channel from 1962-1989)
aired many development oriented programs that were meant to teach Moroccans about
67

science, technology, industry, modern agriculture, geography, etc. They were mostly
imported programs from Western countries, mainly German, British, French and
American, and were dubbed in classical Arabic or French. The locally produced
programs consisted mostly of a continuous propaganda campaign in support of the
political regime. In particular, the news bulletins in RTM consisted of countless stories
about royal engagements and ministers' activities. The "holiness" of such stories in the
running order was unchallenged. It did not matter what happened in any given day; royal
activities were the most newsworthy stories. Other local programming consisted of
awareness campaigns on issues of health (vaccination), family planning, traffic accidents,
environment (conservation of water) etc.
I never took these awareness campaigns seriously, and neither did the people
around me. Most of the news programs consisted of glorifying the successes and
accomplishments of the regime. We knew that that was propaganda because our lives
were rarely changing and if they were changing, they were changing for the worst. So we
wondered what accomplishments television was talking about. Television became the
embodiment of government lies and deceit, and so were the development programs.
The major function of Moroccan mass media at the time was to legitimize the power
establishment, and buttress the control of tiny corrupt and unrepresentative elite. The
media are part and parcel of their social, political, and cultural environments. The
modernization paradigm considers developing world audiences as isolated individuals
who lack information, refuse to change their traditional ―backward‖ manners, and refuse
to adopt innovations. It did not take into account other variables such as the interpretive
capacities of audiences and the impact of interpersonal communication. The approach
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also undermines the instrumental role of larger political and social transformations that
affect social change (Wilkins, 1999). RTM tried to convince people to change their
attitudes and behaviors vis à vis a variety of issues, but it failed. Moroccan mass media
were more successful in legitimizing the power establishment of tiny and
unrepresentative elite than in triggering change in people's perceptions of their current
and future conditions. It was not a matter of whether people were interested or not to
improve their quality of life; due to the oppressive political regime, they were not given
the opportunity to have that choice.
Diffusion theory assumed that development will eventually reach the poor classes
thanks to the trickle down effects of communication. The innovators and early adopters
will adopt the innovations, and then through influence, opinion leadership and economic
necessity, they will manage to convince the late adopters to catch up. What happened in
most developing countries is that the elite, having access to information and resources,
managed to benefit from the innovations but the trickle down effect rarely if ever
happened (Nair and White, 1993). In agriculture, small farmers in Morocco were aware
of many innovations but they either could not afford to buy them or could not understand
their complex technical knowledge and soon run out of business. In few years, they could
no longer compete with big farmers (Ministry of Social Development Report, 2006).
Mody (1991) states that ―the rich continued to be the most innovative because they have
disproportionate access to education, purchasing power, and contacts required for
adoption of new ideas.... The few rich got richer and the poor remained poor‖ (Mody
1991, p. 26).
The local elite in capital cities, in coordination with foreign specialists design and
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execute development programs. Local people were considered as passive receivers of
development programs. They were not given a sense of ownership over their own
development; they were not involved in conceptualization or the instrumentalization of
the development interventions. Interventions basically conceived of local residents as
passive receivers of decisions made outside of their communities, and in many cases,
instrumented ill-conceived plans to achieve development (Mody 1991; Servaes 1989;
Nair and White 1993).
Because of their top-down nature, development programs and the innovations
they introduced were deemed by the local communities as foreign property. When
something broke, the locals waited for the government officials to come and fix it.
Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2002), a practitioner and activist in development
communication, describes what he calls the ―cemetery of development:‖
I‘ve seen in a small town of Burkina Faso a brand new construction for a hospital
which never opened its doors because there were no nurses and doctors to run it.
I‘ve seen two thousand post office mail boxes rusting under the rain in a village of
five hundred illiterate families who neither received nor wrote letters. I‘ve seen
water being wasted during months (a path of mold went down on the street) from
a tap at a very dry village in the south Saharan belt known as Sahel, because
nobody would spend about 3 US$ dollars to buy a part to repair the faucet. I‘ve
seen expensive and sophisticated OB vans (mobile television studios) grounded
for years because their tires were flat (Gumucio-Dagron, 2002).
Critics of the dominant paradigm see the lack of local participation as responsible
for the failure of many programs. The local communities needed to take an active role in
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the development programs. Another flaw was the lack of sensitivity to local cultures and
traditions. People were asked to change their centuries-old way of life in the name of a
better more efficient knowledge, a knowledge that dismissed their culture and traditions
as backward. Development in the old paradigm also meant disempowerment. The local
communities had to accept the development program and did not have the choice to reject
or modify development interventions.
Experts learnt that development was not a matter of building roads, piping water,
and distributing electricity (Vilanilam, in Nair and White, 1993). The essence of poverty
is not lack of food and shelter alone. It is also powerlessness, exclusion, a state of being
in which a number of human rights or freedoms are unfulfilled, such as the right to
participation, information, expression, education, and equality before the law (White and
Nair, 1993). Many development projects failed because local populations were reluctant
to be part of a project that did not treat them as equal partners (Vilanilam in Nair and
White, 1993).
The leading figures of the modernization paradigm (Lerner, 1976; Roger, 1976,
1993; Schramm, 1976) later on acknowledged that their conceptualization of
development and their emphasis on mass media were oversimplified. They also
acknowledged the value of participation and the extent to which it rendered the process of
development more humane, more expansive, and more flexible (Roger, 1993).
International institutions such as the World Bank and USAID use such reformist
approaches to participation (White, 1999). They however discard the value of grass-roots
participation and local knowledge as incompatible with the contemporary reality of
globalization. The apparent epistemological contradictions of integrating participatory
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elements to enhance the traditional development practices have received much criticism
from development scholars (Huesca, 2003). It was perceived as an attempt to redeem the
modernization approach (Huesca, 2003).
2. 3. The Alternative Paradigm
The alternative paradigm consists of two distinct sets of theories. First, the neoMarxists theories (Baran, 1957; Schiller, 1976, 1992; Galtung, 1971; Frank, 1969)
redefined the problem of underdevelopment and raised important questions on the biases
embedded in the premises of the modernization approach. Second, the participatory
theories (Freire, 1970; Masmoudi, 1979; Mowlana, 1985; MacBride Report, 1980)
offered a new conceptualization of communication that replaced the transmission, oneway, top-down model of communication with a transactional, horizontal, and social
constructionist perspective. What these two sets of theories share is their sharp criticism
of the dominant paradigm. The alternative paradigm reflects the spirit of the 1960‘s and
1970‘s which witnessed the emergence of many social movements calling for equality
and social justice, such as the women‘s movement and the Civil Rights movement.
2. 3. 1. The Neo- Marxist Approaches
The neo-Marxist approaches emerged as a consequence to the failure of the
modernization approach in the developing world, especially in Latin American, in the late
1960‘s and 1970‘s, and as a reaction to the political situation in Latin America, with
increasing U.S. support for right wing authoritarian governments (Thussu, 2004). The
theories are based on the Marxist analysis of the capitalist free market ideas advocated by
the modernization theorists. The analysis considers the inequalities within the world as a
direct outcome of imperialist and capitalist policies and practices.
72

2. 3. 1. 1. Dependency theory. Grounded in the neo-Marxists approach,
dependency theory posits that transnational corporations, mostly based in developed
countries (U.S., Britain, France) exercise control, with the support of their respective
governments, over developing countries by setting the terms of global trade. Paul Baran
(1957) was one of the first to articulate the thesis that development and
underdevelopment are interrelated processes, that is, they are two sides of the same coin.
The theory conceptualized the world into the industrialized ―core‖ and the
underdeveloped ―periphery‖, with the colonialist, capitalist and imperialist core
developing at the expense of the structurally impoverished periphery (Thussu, 2000).
It is a central contention of dependency theory that rich states are enriched by the
way poor states are integrated into the "world system." Poor states open their markets to
rich nations‘ products which help raise the standards of living of the wealthy nations.
When poor nations resist or refuse the terms of trade, rich nations counter these attempts
by economic sanctions or military actions. Dependency theory rejected the modernization
theory‘s major premise: that underdevelopment is an internal problem to developing
countries. They argued that the modernization theory calls for strengthening the
dominance of developed nations and for maintaining peripheral nations in a state of
dependence, what Gunter Frank (1969) called ―the development of underdevelopment.‖
The dependency theory has a cultural dimension, examined by scholars interested
in issues of media and cultural production. They aim to show the link between discourses
of modernization and the policies of international media organizations and
communication corporations (Schiller, 1976, 1992). The concept of media and cultural
imperialism is central to the dependency theory. Schiller (1976) defines cultural
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imperialism as ―the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern
world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and
sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the
value and structures of the dominating center of the system‖ (Schiller, 1976, p. 9).
Schiller like many other dependency theorists argues that the beneficiaries of the
modernization programs are Western media and communication companies. They expand
to Third world countries and sell their media products in the name of development.
As a result of this dependency on Western, mainly U.S. media products, citizens
of developing countries have only limited choices for information and entertainment
provided by media, outside those of Western global distribution systems. In the 1970‘s,
debates about the nature of development and its relation to dependency issues triggered
other debates at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) about inequalities and imbalances in the news flow. According to Mowlana
(1986), there were at least three reasons for this imbalance in news flow. First, most
international news flew vertically from developed nations to developing countries of the
South via major international news agencies (e.g. Reuters—Britain; Associated Press-US., Agence France Presse—France). Second, the U.S. and Western Europe received a
greater amount of news coverage compared to other parts of the world. Finally, news did
not flow horizontally among countries belonging to the poor developing South.
The UNESCO sponsored debates on the World Information and Communication
Order is an important element in the general debate on the role of mass media in national
development. I will discuss this debate more closely when I address the participatory
approach.
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2. 3. 1. 2. Structural imperialism theory. The theory was developed by Norwegian
sociologist Johan Galtung. He argued that even if the imperialism era of colonies was
ending, a new imperialism was beginning. He defines this theory as one that ―takes as its
point of departure two of the most glaring facts about this world: the tremendous
inequality, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of human living conditions,
including the power to decide over those living conditions; and the resistance of this
inequality to change. The world consists of Center and Periphery nations‖ (Galtung,
1971, p. 81).
Galtung focuses on the complicity between the elite in developed countries, from
where modernization and innovations emanate, and the elite in developing countries,
where modernization and innovations are to be adopted. Galtung (1971) argues that the
world consists of developed ―center‖ states and developing ―periphery‖ states. There is a
core center in the center nations and a core center in the periphery nations. The core
centers in the center and periphery states refer to the elite and the groups in power.
Galtung argues that there is a harmony of interest between the core centers in center and
periphery nations. In developing countries, the dominant elite‘s interests coincide with
the interests of the elite of developing nations. The values, attitudes, and beliefs of the
elite in the periphery nations are closer to the elites of center nations than with the values,
attitudes, and beliefs of other groups in their own country (periphery). Periphery in center
state and periphery in periphery state have a disharmony of interest. Developing world
elites are used to help developed world elites maintain their economic, political and
cultural dominance over Third world countries.
Galtung distinguishes five types of imperialism: economic, political, military,
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communication and cultural. Communication imperialism is closely tied to cultural
imperialism. The centers in periphery and center states maintain their relationships via
information flows and economic activities. Institutions in the center of the periphery
often mirror those of the developed nations (democracy, parliament, ministries etc.) and
thus recreate and promote the latter‘s value systems (Thussu, 2004).
For example, Morocco is a ―periphery‖ state and France is a ―center‖ state. The
Moroccan political and economic elite, i.e. the center in the periphery state (Morocco),
share many of the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the elite in France, i.e. center of the
center state. To illustrate, in Morocco, French is the language of politics and business, it
is also the language of the elite; this is an undisputed fact within Moroccan society. The
elite of France and Morocco have harmony of interest, but they have disharmony of
interests with poor people in their own respective countries. Poor people of France and
poor people of Morocco have a disharmony of interests; besides, they speak two different
languages and adopt two sets of values, respectively, French and Arabic.
According to Galtung, two types of interactions provide the mechanism for the
periphery-center relationship: vertical and feudal. In the vertical interaction, the
relationship is asymmetrical in the sense that information, technology, political and
military power flow downward, from center to periphery, while political and economic
benefit flow upward. The feudal interaction principle points to the fact that there ―is
interaction along the spokes, from periphery to the center hub; but not along the rim,
from one periphery nation to another‖ (Galtung, 1971, p. 89). Communication
imperialism, Galtung argues, is based on the feudal interaction principle. Information
flows from center states to periphery but little information flows among periphery states.
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Periphery nations learn about other periphery states through the eyes of the transnational
news agencies of the center (developed nations), namely Reuters, Associated Press, and
Agence France Presse. For instance, Morocco and Algeria (neighboring countries)
receive and broadcast more information about France than France receives and
broadcasts about Morocco and Algeria. And there is more information exchange between
Morocco and France on the one hand, and Algeria and France on the other hand, than
there is between Morocco and Algeria.
A link can be drawn between this theory and Rogers' diffusion of innovation, a
link that further demonstrates the failure of the modernization model. For Rogers, an
innovation is adopted in a social system when information about the innovation is
diffused through mass media and interpersonal communication. The center in the
periphery nations adopts innovations that are manufactured in the center nations. Rogers'
theory presupposes a trickle down effect according to which the periphery in the
periphery nations would also adopt the innovations once they receive information about
them from the elite in their countries (center of the periphery). The trickle down effect
was not proven to be effective in triggering change (Waisbord, 1999, p. 5; White and
Nair, 1993), and the knowledge of and access to technologies remain restricted to a small
powerful class. This implies that participation in message design is limited to a small elite
group. Because the dominant values and beliefs in both core centers in the center and
periphery states are similar, it becomes difficult for core periphery in the periphery states
to voice their concerns and be considered equal partners in the process of their country's
development.
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2. 3. 1. 3. Summary. To sum up, the neo-Marxists argued that modernization
theories were guided by behaviorist, positivist and empiricist approaches that entail
particular biases which guided the interventions to focus mainly on behavior change at
the individual level rather than on the root causes of underdevelopment, poverty and
marginalization. For neo-Marxist theorists, the solution to development is political, not
simply informational. They called for social change through the redistribution of power
and resources in developing countries, a call that did not resonate with the existing
oppressive regimes in developing countries and their loyal allies in the developed world.
Information and media institutions also needed transformations in terms of policies and
regulations as the media structures in developing countries were dominated by
commercial and propaganda principles. New policies needed to be in place to promote
media systems that could put in the service of the people rather than as pipelines for
capitalist ideologies (Mowlana, 1985). Such positions were expressed in a number of
international fora, particularly during the UNESCO-sponsored debates about the New
World Information and Communication Order in the 1970s and 1980s.
Both modernization theory and the neo-Marxist theories shared an important
common feature: the nation-state as a unit of analysis. This left them both open to
criticism. The two theories tended to cancel each other out due to their deployment as
ideologically oppositional narratives during the Cold War, with modernization espousing
free market capitalism and neo-Marxist theories espousing state controlled socialism
(Thussu, 2000). It is important to note that the neo-Marxist theories offer useful insights
into the role of media in the reproduction of the status quo and as an arena for class and
ideological conflict. They also highlighted the importance of Western cultural domination
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and how culture can be used to reinforce developing countries' dependency on the
Western world. Audiences in developing countries are exposed to media contents that
emphasize contemporary events in Western societies, secular beliefs and values, and the
material cultures of the U.S. and Western Europe. Neo-Marxist theories failed, however,
to propose a coherent approach to the use of communication for development.
One major shortcoming of the dependency and the structural imperialism theories
lies in their unfounded assumptions about developing countries audiences, which they
consider as passive consumers at the mercy of media influence (Fiske, 1987). They
assumed a hypodermic needle model of media effects while undermining the
complexities of Third world cultures (Sreberny-Mohamadi, 1991; 1997) and failed to
recognize the intricacies in audience perceptions (Thussu, 2004).
Unlike the neo-Marxist approach, the participatory approach posits the
―community‖ as the unit and level of analysis, arguing that since the reality of
development was most evident in communities, the participation of communities in the
design and implementation of development programs and of mass media contents was the
key to their success (Serveas, 1995).
2. 3. 2. Participatory Approaches
Scholars have produced a wide range of theoretical responses that drew upon the
notion of ―participatory communication.‖ Servaes (1989) argues that there are two major
approaches to participatory communication which everybody today accepts as common
sense. The first is the dialogical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, and the second involves the
ideas of access, participation and self- management as they were articulated in the
UNESCO debates of the 1970s (Servaes, 1989).
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The participatory approaches inaugurate a move from obsession with
modernization and economic growth to development of human competencies along with
the uniqueness of culture and ethnic identities. They posit the ―community‖ as the unit
and level of analysis, arguing that since the reality of development is most evident in
communities, the participation of communities in the design and implementation of
development programs and their access to and participation mass media contents is
fundamental. Communities are acknowledged as the owners of their own development,
and communication is viewed as key to facilitating and amplifying the voice of all
segments of the society, especially the poor and the marginalized.
2. 3. 2. 1. Freire's Dialogical Pedagogy. Paulo Freire's approach of ―dialogical
pedagogy‖ promotes the idea of equity and respect for the autonomous personhood of
each human being and on the right of people to be different. He insisted that subjugated
peoples must be treated as full human subjects. Servaes (1989) points out that this view
of participation was a moment of utopian hope that was derived from early Marxist
writings. This Marxist vision believed in the notion of a human destiny that was larger
than mere fulfillment of material needs. It is important to note here that Freire's point of
departure was Christianity, not Marxism (Servaes, 1989).
Education, for Freire, is not the process whereby people with information (those
―who have it‖) educate those ―who lack it,‖ i.e. transmission from the powerful to the
powerless, but rather learning is a collaborative and creative discovery of the world. He
insisted on equity in participation in the learning process. Communication should give a
sense of ownership to all participants through sharing and constructing experiences
(Aronowitz, 1993). Unlike the modernization theories, his approach posits that people
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should not be forced to adopt new practices no matter how beneficial they seem in the
eyes of development agencies and governments. Instead, they should be encouraged to
take an active role in development with solution emerging from their own knowledge and
resources. Lack of voice is perceived as an element of poverty itself (Panos, 2006). The
role of communication is to enable indigenous people to become self reliant and speak for
themselves directly to the power elite. Development is conceived as a process, rather than
a list of specific outcomes to be achieved and deadlines to meet (Servaes, 1996).
With these goals in mind, Freire stressed on the necessity of using alternative or
―other‖ media and forms of communication, i.e. community-based forms of
communication such as community radio, public performances, theater, video, and other
activities. Studies in a variety of developing countries rural settings found that illiterate
groups preferred to communicate face-to-face rather than through mass media or other
one-way sources of communication (Okunna, 1995). Okunna concludes that development
workers act as facilitators of dialogue and rely more on interpersonal methods of
communication rather than national media and technologies.
Like social marketing and Entertainment-education approaches, most applications
of Freire's approach focus on small scale development projects. His approach offers new
insights into how to carry out a particular development project but it does not suggest
specific ways in which mass media can be used for development. In its applications, his
approach is more a strategy than a theory of development communication.
2. 3. 2. 2. UNESCO’s MacBride Commission. The second discourse about
participatory communication is the outcome of the debates that took place within the
UNESCO about the New World Information and Communication Order triggered by the
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inequalities and imbalances in the international information system (Huesca, 2003).
Developing countries and the Soviet block argued that developing countries were heavily
dependent on the developed countries for both software and hardware in the information
sector. They argued that the existing order perpetuates inequalities in development with
serious implication for developing countries. Three international Western news agencies,
British Reuters, American Associated Press and French Agence France Presse, controlled
more than 80% of news flow (Masmoudi, 1979; Altschul, 1984). Developing countries
complained about this control of information and news, and about the unfair media
coverage of the developing world. Developing countries receive less media attention
compared to developed nations, and media coverage of their countries consists of reports
on famines, natural disasters, and military coups. The public in developing countries were
exposed to more Western media contents and Western lifestyles and culture than local or
regional contents (Masmoudi, 1979).
A commission was appointed to generate a set of recommendations to make
global communication more equitable. The MacBride Commission, a UNESCO panel
chaired by Nobel Prize winner Sean MacBride, produced a report entitled ―Many Voices,
One World.‖ The report outlined the main philosophical foundation of the New World
Information Communication Order. The Commission found that imbalance of
information and news cannot be blamed on Western news monopolies alone. The
Commission found many examples of repression of information on the part of ruling
elites in developing countries
The Commission called for the democratization of communication and this call
represents one of its most innovative recommendations. The Commission argued that
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democratization was impeded by developing countries‘ undemocratic political systems,
bureaucratic and corrupt administrative systems, technologies controlled and understood
only by a few, the exclusion of minority groups, and the abundance of illiteracy and
semi-literacy (MacBride Report, 1980). The Report pointed out that access for the strong
and the ―haves‖ have negative consequences for the weak and the ―have nots.‖ It called
for the abolition of censorship on the part of governments as well as the abolition of
constraints imposed by advertisers and concentration of media ownership.
The MacBride reports called for the use of the mass media for public service,
instead of the use of media as instruments for political propaganda and control. The
Report recommends that media inform, educate, and promote diversity, pluralism, respect
and equality for all people, not just developing countries‘ elite. The Report also
recommends that mass media offer a variety of relevant programs to the public and must
allow that public means of feedback to express its reactions and demands to media
outlets. The media must be responsive to the concerns of the public and involve them in
the elaboration of information (MacBride Report, 1980).
The Commission‘s major contribution to the participatory approach lies in the fact
that it recommended that people be given the right to access and participate in the mass
media. Access refers to inequalities in terms of availability of technology, and to
inequalities in terms of skills. People must have access to media via the promotion of
small scale community press, local radio, low-cost small format television and video
systems especially in rural areas and small towns to provide ample opportunity for
diversified cultural expressions. In this vein, the Report stresses equally the importance of
educating and preparing young people for communication activities by introducing them
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at primary and secondary school levels to the various forms of mass media such how to
read newspapers, how to evaluate radio and television shows, etc. Participation means
that higher level of public involvement in communication systems must be allowed. This
includes the involvement of the public in the production process, which means to open up
the opportunities for the public to participate in the production of content. This includes
also the participation of the public in the management and planning of communication
systems. The public must be involved in decision-making within media outlets, as well as
be involved in the formulation of media policies and plans (MacBride Report, 1980).
Other recommendations dealt with the issue of news reporting. The commission
held that journalists were not only responsible for providing objective and impartial news
but also for providing commentaries and analysis that might ―play a vital role in the
worldwide struggle to promote human progress‖ (Altschul, 1984, p. 236). The role of the
journalists became that of an activist. The mass media had the power to promote peace,
further human rights, strengthen international security and cooperation and help decrease
international tensions.
The United States withdrew from the UNESCO as a result of these
recommendations. What was implied in these recommendations was stronger government
intervention and control. The U.S. saw these recommendations simply as barriers to the
free flow of communication and as a threat to the interests of its media corporations. The
Western media viewed the demands for ―national communication policies,‖ ―national
sovereignty over information,‖ and for ―democratization of communication‖ as ―entailing
a too interventionist a role for the state‖ with the consequent restrictions on information
flows (Wells, 1987, p. 27). The U.S. viewed the UNESCO, an organization run by
84

governments, as unfit to function as controller of the global media, and concluded that
this might be dangerous to freedom of the press. The U.S. rejoined the UNESO in 2003.
2. 3. 2. 3. Summary. Both the MacBride Commission‘s discourse and Freire's
discourse called for the democratization of media. They theorized it differently. The
MacBride Commission emphasized the importance of the use of national mass media for
public service. It also emphasized the importance of the public‘s access to and
participation in mass media contents. Freire called mainly for the use interpersonal
methods of communication rather than national media. When media are used, they must
be community-based and grass-roots forms of communication such as community radio,
public performances, theater, video, and other activities. Freire points out that
community-based media should be used only as supplements to interpersonal
communication. The MacBride report uses the term ―public‖ in a neutral way, while for
Freire, the ―public‖ consists of what he calls the ―oppressed‖ (Serveas, 1989).
The participatory approach calls for the participation of local communities and
their direct involvement in the design and implementation of development programs and
their involvement in the contents of mass media. This conceptualization of
communication constitutes the foundation for the current conceptualization of the role of
communication in development for major international development and aids agencies.
The formal United Nations definition of development communication, adopted in the
General Assembly resolution 51/172 Article 6 says: ―Communication for development
stresses the need to support two-way communication systems that enable dialogue and
that allow communities to speak out, express their aspirations and concerns, and
participate in the decisions that relate to their development‖ (UNDP, 2007).
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The United Nations Development Program (2006) defines development as an
activity that involves issues that transcend economic progress or the rise or fall of
national incomes. Development is:
about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential
and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. People
are the real wealth of nations. Development is thus about expanding the choices
people have to lead lives that they value. And it is thus about much more than
economic growth, which is only a means —if a very important one —of enlarging
people‘s choices... human development shares a common vision with human
rights. The goal is human freedom. And in pursuing capabilities and realizing
rights, this freedom is vital. People must be free to exercise their choices and to
participate in decision-making that affects their lives. Human development and
human rights are mutually reinforcing, helping to secure the well-being and
dignity of all people, building self-respect and the respect of others
(www.undp.org, accessed June 20, 2006).
The UNDP Millennium Development Goals reflect this new vision of
development. The MDGs are: ―Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving
universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empower women; reducing
child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global
partnership for development‖. None of the goals mention the need to develop the
industry, economy, or infrastructure. The human development approach recognizes the
fact that the essence of poverty is not lack of food and shelter alone; it is exclusion,
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marginalization, and lack of participation in one‘s own development.
2. 3. 3. Criticism of the Alternative Paradigm
The participatory approach in its Freirian version is very well elaborated at the
theoretical level. It is even difficult to think of drawbacks in terms of its
conceptualization of development. There are, however, a few shortcomings to this
approach. The participatory approach ―disturbs‖ and disrupts the structure of the local
community. Communities have hierarchies, based on age, wealth, or family lineage.
Participatory approaches instill a sense of inequality within the community because some
community members take on larger roles than others and as a result acquire new status in
their community.
From my experience as a practitioner17 of the participatory approach in
community development in Morocco for the past four years, I noticed this shortcoming
firsthand. For instance, Dayet Ifrah18 project consisted first of creating a local association.
The community members who took leadership roles within the newly created association
managed to gain a higher status than the community would otherwise be willing to grant
them. Some of these people are young and were seen to gain more respect than their age
would otherwise grant them. Some community members may choose not to take an active
role and this should not imply that they are any less important than those who do. To

17

I presented a paper on this project in the International Association for Media and Communication
Research Stockholm, Sweden 20-25 July 2008. This is a comprehensive development project for the village
of Dayet Ifrah in the Middle Atlas mountain region. The project which started on September 2004 consists
of working with the local population, using the participatory approach, to help them adopt alternative
agricultural methods, launch income generating projects, and improve education and health services
especially for women.
18
Dayet Ifrah is a small rural village in the province of Ifrane, Morocco. The population is estimated at 890
(2004 National Census Bureau). The main sources of income are agricultural activities: raising cattle and
sheep, wheat harvesting, potato and few other vegetable plants. The level of illiteracy is high: 68% overall,
55,6% for men and 81,4 for women, one of the highest rates in Morocco.
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think otherwise, one may risk violating the community‘s autonomy and people‘s right not
to be coerced to participate.
One other shortcoming is the time it takes for change to happen. There are at
times problems that require immediate action. For instance, public health cases such as
epidemics need prompt top-down solutions (Waisbord, 2000). To try and involve people
in decision making and implementation in such cases may be too risky and counterproductive. Participatory approach is effective for long term change, not for short-term
ones.
2. 4. Synthesis
2. 4. 1. Development Communication Paradigms
Both the dominant paradigm and the alternative paradigm aim at improving the
living conditions of citizens in developing countries. They both attempted to use the
media to serve the development objectives of nations. The modernization approach has
been historically discredited. A look at the literature on development communication or
at the international development agencies programs shows clearly that this approach has
been abandoned for a more promising participatory approach. In Morocco, like many
other developing countries, development was conceived in terms of the modernization
approach, in terms of industrialization, transfer of technology and innovations, and
economic growth. Since the Independence in 1956, the process of development was tied
to the economy, and industrialization was considered key to development. It was assumed
that economic progress would lead to progress in all other facets of life. Development
initiatives did not target issues of education, health, environment, marginalized groups
such as women and poor classes living in rural and suburban areas. For instance, projects
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such as the hydroelectric dams have obviously contributed to the water conservation and
the development of modern agriculture and maintained drinking water supply to the
cities. However, in remote areas, populations without water did not necessarily benefit
from the positive advantages of the dams, the roads or the electricity network. The trickle
down effect did not occur, and the knowledge of and access to technologies remained
restricted to a small powerful class.
The neo-Marxist paradigm deployed an ideologically oppositional narrative to
that of the modernization theories during the Cold War (Thussu, 2000). The neo-Marxist
theories offer useful insights into the importance of culture and the role of media in the
reproduction of the status quo and as an arena for class and ideological struggle. They
failed, however, to propose a coherent approach to the use of communication for
development. Unlike the majority of Arab nations which aligned themselves with
socialist ideology, the Moroccan government and political elite chose a pro-western
stance and adopted democracy and liberal economy as the political and economic systems
since the independence in 1956. Because much of its framework was provided by the
French cultural and political influence, the Moroccan media model was neither a western
model based on free market of ideas, nor a soviet model based on a revolutionary
rhetoric. Broadcast media were owned by the state and print media served essentially as
the mouthpiece of particular political or ideological expressions. Moroccan media system
was authoritarian much like other Arab media systems, but unlike socialist regimes it
allowed for mild forms of political criticism.
With regard to the participatory theories, I think that the Freirian view of
participation empties the media from their political dimension as instruments of power,
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and Freire‘s conception of participation is idealistic if we consider the oppressive and
authoritarian nature of the developing countries regimes. Freire argues that decision
making regarding media production should be in the hands of community members,
rather than ―professionals,‖ hence giving a sense of ownership to the community of their
own development process. He adds that in countries where the mass media are usually
controlled by governments and the urban elites, small media can offer the opportunity for
media access, not just in terms of being an audience but in terms of being a content
producer.
This view is unrealistic because it assumes that relocating power to the people is a
neutral and non-political act. According to many scholars, participation implies a new
definition of power and a new power distribution in society. Lozare (1989) points out that
participation ―may not sit well with those who favor the status quo and thus they may be
expected to resist such efforts of reallocating more power to the people‖ (Lozare, 1989, p.
2). It may also not sit well with the ruling classes and the local elites (often
unrepresentative and undemocratic) in countries of the developing world. In the Arab
world, mass media represent an important national resource and an important political
tool in the hands of the mostly autocratic regimes (Ayish, 2003). Participation in media
implies equitable sharing of this political instrument. For a redistribution of power,
structural change must first happen (Serveas, 1989). Many communication experts agree
that structural changes are necessary to establish participatory communication policies.
Media policies are an intricate part of the power arrangement in any given society, and
any change in the function of media involves large scale political adjustments (Mowlana
and Wilson, 1987). In Morocco, to call for equity and participation means calling for the
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transformation of the political regime, an undemocratic and authoritarian regime.
The MacBride Commission‘s recommendation for the use of the mass media for
public service constitutes, in my view, the most coherent approach to the use of mass
media for development. The modernization approach, the neo-Marxist approaches, and
the participatory approaches all had many limitations. They either misconceived the
process of change or were focused on small scale development projects. The MacBride
Report remains in my view the closest model for the use of mass media for development.
The concept of serving the public embodies the standard that most media policy
makers are supposed to adhere to in their decision-making (Napoli, 2001; Tracey, 1998).
This concept has been the primary benchmark against which media systems are assessed
(Napoli, 2001). Public interest implies that policy decisions should never reflect the
interests of small groups but rather the interest of the population as a whole. McQuail
(1992) argues that a wide range of normative criteria can be embedded in the concept of
public interest, criteria such as freedom, diversity, competition, pluralism, access,
participation, and objectivity (McQuail, 1992).
The MacBride Commission‘s approach is also the closest to Morocco‘s current
vision of the role of mass media in development. The Moroccan government has given
important policy considerations to regulate the use of television and radio airwaves to
adhere to the public service broadcasting model. As a first step, the government created
the High Commission for Audiovisual Communication (Haut Autorité de la
Communication Audiovisuelle-HACA) in August 2002 to establish the legal framework
for the liberalization and the privatization of the audio-visual sector. In September of the
same year, it promulgated a decree law that ended the state's monopoly of the national
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broadcasting system and assigned public service obligations to the two major television
stations in Morocco (RTM and 2M).
2. 4. 2. Public Service Broadcasting
Public service broadcasting (PSB) is the dominant form of broadcasting around
the world. There is no standard or widely accepted definition of public broadcasting;
there are, however, some key characteristics that many scholars agree upon. Radio and
television receive funding from the public in form of state subsidies that originate in taxes
or other national funding resources, and in return they produce and transmit programming
that is independent from the influences of advertisers, political parties, and the
government (Stacey, 1998). The programming must aim at informing, educating and
entertaining, and at improving society by giving viewers balanced information that helps
them make informed decisions.
A number of studies have addressed the role of public service broadcasting in
nation building. Many studies, particularly on several European countries, have
demonstrated that public broadcasting ―was specifically designed to provide a common
culture to a diverse and fragmented audience‖ (Waisbord, 2004). Nation making was one
of the central missions of public broadcasting (Curran, 2002; Scannell, 1996; Tracey,
1998). Public broadcasting programs were created by cultural engineers and were
expected to produce a national identity.
There are eight principles that guide public service broadcasting. They are
borrowed by the Peacock Committee from the Broadcasting Research Unit study that
identified these characteristics in an inductive fashion by polling British broadcasters and
commentators (Stacey, 1998; Collins in Allen and Hill, 2004):
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1. Universality of availability: broadcasting signal must be available for all.
2. Universality of appeal: the shows must cater to the different tastes and interests
of all the segments that constitute society. It is driven by ―the desire to make
good programs popular and popular programs good; it understands that
serving the national diversity of a society is not the same as 'giving people
what they want' (Stacey, 1998, p. 27).
3. Provision for minorities, especially those disadvantaged by physical or social
circumstances: PB does two things, it provides such group access to allow
them to speak to one another and speak about the issues as they see them; and
it provides coverage of their interests, concerns, and histories.
4. Serving the public sphere: Stacey (1998) refers to Richard Hoggart who said
that one of the great benefits of public broadcasting is that ―it allows a nation
to speak to itself‖ (p.29). The focus here is on shows that give a sense of
national identity and that tells the public, ―this is who we are today.‖ An
important and vital function of television is to help society understand itself.
5. A commitment to the education of the public: the education of citizens is
designed to help them participate in a democracy.
6. Public broadcasting should be distanced from all vested interests: this is a key
principle in public broadcasting; the shows serve the public best when they are
produced within a structure of independence. PB must remain distanced from
any commitment to any power structure within the nation, be it political or
economic.
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7. Broadcasting should be so structured as to encourage competition in good
programming rather than competition for numbers: quality is the prime
concern for public service broadcasting regardless of who the intended
audience might be.
8. The rules of broadcasting should liberate rather than restrict the shows-maker:
the essence of the legislative foundation must maintain a liberal function that
provides a secure environment for show-makers.
In the absence of other criteria, these principles will function as the criteria on the
basis of which the public service function of Moroccan public broadcasting will be
evaluated. I will also incorporate insights from Lasswell, Katz and Lazarsfeld into issues
of media production and audience research. The chapter on content analysis of the shows
of RTM and 2M will focus on the principle of universality of appeal and in particular on
access to and participation in public television, including the provisions for minorities.
The chapter on production analysis will address the extent to which the two TV stations
are distanced from all vested interest, be it political or economic, and will look at the
political and economic constraints, or lack thereof, that are involved in the production
process.
2. 5. Conclusion
The review of theory in this chapter provided the context where Morocco's mass media
are situated vis à vis development communication theories and practices. It aimed at
reviewing and understanding the existing approaches of development communication and
to see their broad impact on Morocco‘s development and media policies and practices.
The following chapter provides a historical review of radio and television. It
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reviews the major stages of their development, with a particular focus on television.
Second, it examines the history and current status of media policy in Morocco.
The chapter will also answer the question of what media system best describes Morocco's
media during the periods 1956 – 1999 and 1999 – 2008.19 It describes the governmentmedia relationship in light of the world media systems, and the role of Moroccan
broadcast media in the processes of nation-building and the democratic transition
period.

19

1956 is the year Morocco got its independence from France. 1999 is the end of the Hassan II era. The
period 1999 – 2008 is the current Mohamed VI‘s era.
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Chapter Three: History and Current Status of the Moroccan Broadcast
Media System
3. 1. General Characteristics
Morocco was a protectorate within the French colonial empire of North Africa for
forty four years (1912 – 1956). The French cultural and political influence provided much
of the framework for its judicial, political, and educational systems (Ayish, 2003b).
Morocco also inherited media and press systems that were formed and nurtured by
French media and journalistic traditions. Historically, French broadcast media were
owned and controlled by the state. It is also customary in French society that newspapers
reflect particular political viewpoints and social agendas (Kepel & L e v e a u , 1 9 9 6 ) .
Newspapers serve essentially the mouthpiece of particular political or ideological
expressions. Moroccan media continued these traditions. TV and radio remained in the
realm of the state until 2002 when HACA20 was founded and a new audiovisual
liberalization law was decreed. Regarding newspapers, far from providing their readers
with factual and unbiased news reporting, Moroccan newspapers have continued the
French tradition of providing their readers with a steady flow of editorialized news.
In terms of media laws, Morocco perpetuated a French concept of the freedom of
the press that emerged from the authoritarian regimes of the nineteenth century (El

20

Haut Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle-HACA, the High Commission for Audiovisual
Communication was created in August 2002 to establish the legal framework for the liberalization of the
audio-visual sector in Morocco.
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Kobbi, 1992). King Mohammed V (1956-1961) instituted the first national press code in
1959 on the basis of the French legal framework that had been in force under the French
protectorate between 1912 and 1956. King Hassan II (1961-1999) strengthened this
repressive press law by instituting the press code of 1963. Generally, the Moroccan
government accepts mild forms of political criticism but does not tolerate attacks on the
monarchy, Islam, or the Western Sahara.21 Media professionals are considered patriotic
citizens who must be mindful of their social responsibility to the public.
Another effect of the French colonization is the bilingual nature of its media. TV
channels and radio stations broadcast shows in French and Arabic. Newspapers are also
published either in French or Arabic. Even today, 44 years after the independence, French
is still used in both broadcast and print media. As Morocco underwent a process of
reclaiming its cultural heritage since the succession of King Mohamed VI (1999-present)
Arabic and Amazigh dialects are increasingly being used in the media.
The development of the Moroccan broadcasting system has followed in
the footsteps of many developing countries. The French colonial rulers were the first to
start broadcasting in Morocco in February 1928, when radio signals were sent from the
city of Rabat. In 1951, the first TV license was issued for a French private television
company, TELMA. It began broadcasting in 1952 and was considered the first Arab and
African private television (Bertrand, in Ibahrine, 2007). It operated for three years and
had to stop in May 1955 due to severe financial hardships and to the tense political
situation at the time in Morocco.
21

The Western Sahara refers to the southern province in Morocco. The legal status of the territory and the
question of its sovereignty remain unresolved; the territory is contested between Morocco and the Polisario
Front.
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The arrival of radio and television in the post-independence period was part
of Morocco's efforts to modernize. The forty-four year domination by the regime has
significantly influenced the development of the broadcasting system. In this
chapter, I will demonstrate how broadcast media has operated since the
independence, and focus on how it interacted with the socio -political and
cultural environment.
This historical review will not address the Moroccan print media.22 Newspaper
circulation today is at 300,000 copies a day, the equivalent of one copy for every one
hundred Moroccans, far from the UNESCO's minimum requirement of ten copies for
every one hundred persons (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2003). With an illiteracy
rate of 43 percent, large numbers of non-literate or marginally literate individuals live out
their lives in print-scarce environments with few or no reading materials in their homes,
but they have regular access to radio and television. Print media has been a site of
political tensions between the liberation movement and the colonial powers, and later
between the opposition political parties and the regime. An examination of print media is
relevant to development issues as a whole but it is outside the scope of this dissertation.
This chapter first provides a historical review of radio and television. It reviews
the major stages of their development, with a particular focus on television. Second, it
examines the history and current status of media policy in Morocco. Here, I will
give a summary of the provisions of the media law and policy from the
Independence to today as outlined in the Constitution, t he Press Code, the 2004
Audiovisual Communication Law, and the Licensing Obligations of RTM and
22

For a thorough account of the history of print media, see Ibahrine (2007).
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2M. Third, the chapter will answer the question of what media system best describes
Morocco's media during the periods 1956 – 1999 and 1999 – 2008.23 It describes the
government-media relationship in light of the world media systems, and the role
of Moroccan broadcast media in the processes of nation-building and the democratic
transition period.
3. 2. Historical Development
In March 1962, six years after Morocco's independence from colonial France and
one year after the succession to the throne of Late King Hassan II, Radiodiffusion et
Television Marocaine (RTM), a state owned television station, was launched. In 1981,
Medi 1 a private radio station was created. In March 1989, 2M was launched as a private
channel, and in 1996 the government took it over and had since become a public
television station. In 2002, HACA was created. On November 25, 2004, the Moroccan
parliament adopted the Audiovisual Communication Law to put an end to the state‘s
monopoly in terms of broadcasting, and allow for the liberalization of this sector. By
virtue of this law, the number of radio stations and television channels has increased.
3. 2. 1. Radio
Radio has its roots in the colonial period. The French were the first to start
broadcasting in Morocco in February 1928. Radio Morocco broadcasted its signals from
the capital city of Rabat. The French Resident General24 was positioned to appoint the
director of the station and to supervise news programs contents (Alami, 1985). Already in
1952 Radio Morocco broadcasted about 171 hours weekly, 75 in French, 60 hours in

23

1956 is the year Morocco got its independence from France. 1999 is the end of the Hassan II era. The
period from 1999 to 2008 is the current Mohamed VI‘s era.
24
The official representative and head of the French colonial power in Morocco
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Arabic, 20 in Berber, 10 and a half in Spanish and five and a half in English (Alami,
1985).
Similarly the Spanish colonial ruler established Radio Dersa Tetuan in the north
of the country. Tangier, which was part of the international zone, witnessed an emergence
of several radio stations, such as Radio Tanger, Voice of America and Radio Africa
Maghreb. These stations offered a variety of programming to boost colonial intentions,
while criticizing competitive colonial powers over Morocco (Alami, 1985, p. 22).
Foreign residents ran and controlled all these radio stations.
The Moroccan resistance sought the use of radio in their fight for independence.
Nationalist leaders used clandestine radio stations based in Spain and Italy to voice their
ideas for liberation. The colonial powers had issued a dahir, a royal decree, in 1929 to
define the scope of the monopolization to include all signal transmissions, whether they
are radio, telephony or telegraphy (Ibahrine, 2007). This restriction was designed mainly
to prevent Moroccans from using radio transmissions. The Voice of Cairo,25 the Egyptian
pan-Arab radio station established by Egyptian president and Arab revolutionary figure
Gamaal Abdel Nasser, was the new platform for Moroccan nationalist and allowed them
to communicate their political messages in their fight for independence (Alami, 1985, p.
22). Voice of Cairo was a very popular radio station in the Arab world.

25

Based in Cairo, Egypt, this station was an international service, which in the 1950's and 1960's became
the pulpit of revolution across the Arab world.
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Morocco gained its independence in 1956. Radio Morocco continued to operate.
In 1957, it had three programs: the A program in French and (75 hours per week), the B
program in Arabic (60 hours) and Berber (20 hours), and the C program in Spanish (10
hours 30 minutes) and English (five and a half hour). In 1958 Radio Morocco was
officially renamed as Moroccan National Radio (Jaidi, 2000, p. 226).
In March 1962, the regime established the county‘s broadcasting system offering
radio and television services in Rabat by the name of A1-Idaa WatTalfaza A1-Maghribiya
(Moroccan Radio-diffusion and Television; French: Radiodiffusion et Télévision
Marocaine, RTM). The Moroccan government either took over or bought the exiting
infrastructure in Rabat, Tangier, Tetouan and other major cities. The studios' equipments
were relatively respectable in the light of the time (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 69). The airing
covered mainly the coastal region of Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangier, and some big cities
such as Fez and Meknes. The broadcasting system was under the control and
administration of the Ministry of Information.26
To build a national network,27 the regime established the main station in Rabat,
and created several regional radio stations in Casablanca, Marrakech, Fez, Oujda, Agadir,
Laayoune, Tetouan, Tangier, and Dakhla. By the late 1990's, the radio sector consists of a
national network radio station in Rabat and nine regional radio stations. The national
radio covers ninety five percent of the territory via long waves, and eighty five percent on

26

It has been named Ministry of Communication since February 1995.
In the 1960s, the modernization of the broadcasting was the outcome of the cooperation between
Morocco and European countries such as France and Italy. The governments of both these countries were
largely responsible for building the infrastructure and upgrading radio facilities. From a network of three
stations at the time of independence, Morocco‘s radio had grown into a major network of almost nine radio
stations.
27
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a medium wave (Jaidi, 2000, p. 226). Broadcasts are in four languages: Arabic, French,
English, and Spanish, and three dialects (Tarifit, Tamazight and Tachelhit).
Based in Rabat and part of RTM, Radio International was created in 1984. It airs
its programming in French, English and Spanish on FM waves. It broadcasts for nineteen
hours daily, sixteen hours in French, two hours in English, and one hour in Spanish. Fifty
percent of the program consists of music and entertainment, fifty percent consists of
culture, sport, education and talk shows. Ninety percent of the shows are live broadcasts.
Since March 3, 1993, and thanks to EUTELSAT, all RTM radio stations started
broadcasting by satellite, they reach many countries especially the Moroccan immigrant
community in Europe.
The first private radio station was launched in 1980. Medi 1 radio was part of a
Moroccan-French partnership comprising associates from banks and major enterprises of
the two countries (Ministry of Communication, 2005). The radio was an initiative of the
late King Hassan II and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It is a bilingual radio
station (French and Arabic) of international news and entertainment. It broadcasts
everyday from its Tangiers-based studios. Daily airing hours have been extended from
twenty hours in 1991 to twenty four hours in 2004. This station covers the entire west
Mediterranean basin, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and a part of Libya. It is also
received in Spain, France and Italy. Its listeners in the Maghreb are estimated at between
twenty two and twenty three million persons and it exceeds twenty four million listeners
during the holidays (Ministry of Communication, 2005). Since March 3, 1993 the shows
were broadcasted by means of satellite and were also available on the Internet.
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Moroccan radio's golden age happened during 1970s. A 1973 study found that
92.1 percent of the urban population and 75.2 percent of the rural population listened to
radio on a regular basis (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 70). The number of radio receivers in the
country increased from 512,000 in the late 1960s to three millions in 1980s.28 The
number of receivers peaked in mid-1990s. In 1997 estimates placed the number of radio
receivers at 6.62 Million.29 Today, eighty percent of Morocco‘s population can receive
radio signals. The advent of TV and satellite broadcasting, however, dramatically
affected radio. The number of radio listeners declined substantially in the late 1990s.
Casablanca Radio, a regional and private radio station, went on the air on 13th
October 1987. This station initially broadcasted for ten hours: from 12:00 A.M. to 22.00
P.M. Since May 1989 it increased its broadcast time from ten to 22 hours. The station
provides mostly music (70 percent) but it also broadcasts cultural programs and news on
current event. The broadcasts were mainly for the Casablanca area and its environment
and are available online.
In 2003, Radio Sawa began broadcasting in Moroccan soil. It is an American 24hour, seven day a week Arabic-language network. Radio Sawa received an exceptional
authorization from the government to broadcast in Morocco. There was at the time no
legal framework for such authorization. HACA was just created yet and the parliament
did not approve the media reform law yet. Negotiations between Radio Sawa and HACA
ended in May 2006 with an agreement to reinstate the station‘s legal situation according
to the newly established broadcasting law. The network is a service of U.S. International

28

In 1930, out of the 2,649 radio sets in Morocco, only 19 belonged to Moroccan nationals (Ministry of
Communication, 2002).
29
Morocco‘s population was 29.8 Million in 2004.
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Broadcasting and is publicly funded by the U.S. Congress. Its broadcasts originate from
studios in Washington, D.C. and Dubai, U.A.E. as well as from news bureaus throughout
the Middle East.
On November 25, 2004, the Moroccan parliament adopted the media reform law
on the audio-visual communication, to put an end to the state‘s monopoly in terms of
broadcasting, and allow for the liberalization of this sector. By virtue of this law, the
number of radio stations has increased in since 2005. The number of radio stations
increased from six stations in 2005 to seventeen in 2007. Most of these stations are
commercial and private radio stations: Chada FM, Aswat, Marrakech Atlas FM, Agadir
Radio Plus and Likoulli Nass.
Much of the post-independence broadcasting development in Morocco was based
on the framework set down by the French. As the central mouthpiece of the regime,
extending radio services to reach all Moroccan citizens especially in isolated areas was a
top political priority. Since the 1960s, the potential of the radio as a national propaganda
tool appeared obvious. Radio was affordable, entertaining, and remained one of the most
important and popular cultural medium within Moroccan society until the creation of the
second TV channel 2M (Ibahrine, 2007).
3. 2. 2. Television
The beginning of Moroccan television can be traced back to the early 1950s. In
1951, the first TV license was issued for French private television company, TELMA. It
began broadcasting in 1952 and was considered the first Arab and African TV (Bertrand,
in Ibahrine, 2007). Due to the tense political situation and severe financial difficulties, it
stopped broadcasting in May 1955. Like many developing countries, the arrival of radio
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and television in the post-independence period was part of Morocco's efforts to
modernize. On March 3d, 1962 the national TV channel went on the air as part of the
national broadcasting system Radiodiffusion et Télévision Marocaine (RTM). The
development of television differs from that of the radio in so far as there were no attempts
to create public regional channels or private channels until 1989 when 2M was created.
Color television transmission began in 1972. By 1973, television only c overed
thirty three percent of the national territory. Until the late 1970's , the price of a
television set was too expensive for the overwhelming majority of Moroccans.
Television was a luxury for most people in Morocco. During the first decade of its
introduction in Morocco, the number of TV sets grew from 5000 in 1962 to
151.000 in 1970 (Ministère du Développement, 2008). The general public began to
have access to TV in the late 1970s. With lowered prices triggered by domestic mass
consumption, television sets soon found their ways into all avenues of Moroccan
society. There were an estimated 3.1 million TV receivers in 1997. Today,
virtually every urban Moroccan home has a television set. RTM and 2M signals
reach eighty eight percent of the total area of the kingdom in 1996, today, via
satellite transmission, they cover all of Morocco‘s territory (Ministry o f
Communication, 2006).
3. 2. 2. 1. Radiodiffusion et Télévision Marocaine (RTM) 1962 – 1999.
Launched on March 3 1962, RTM was the only television station available for
Moroccans until 1989. In the same year, 1962, late King Hassan II oversaw the writing of
the first constitution which defined the role of the king, giving him broad powers
including the power to appoint ministers, governors, judges; the power to dissolve the
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parliament, declare a state of emergency, and revise the constitution. The 1962
constitution also created two major institutions: the parliament and an independent
judiciary system. It also provided for freedom of press, freedom of speech and
movement. Since its inception, and although self-proclaimed as a public service
television, RTM was the mouthpiece of the government and the palace. RTM's role was
to promote nationalism, reinforce the sacredness of the monarchy, and discredit
communist and anti-monarchy/republican ideologies.
From 1962 to 1989, the RTM broadcasts started at 6:30 pm. and ended at 11:30
pm. The first broadcasts were children programs, then documentaries or religious
programs, then the news in French at 7:30 pm, then a documentary, a religious program,
or a music show. At 8:30 pm RTM featured the main news in Arabic, finally a film, TV
series (mostly Egyptian), theatre play or music concert. There were sports programs on
weekends. Live coverage of the king's activities took priority over everything else.
One of the most important television moments in Morocco's TV history happened
in July 1971. A military coup d'etat took place and for few hours, and RTM was taken
over by a military commando. They interrupted the regular programs, played military
music, and obliged a famous newscaster, Mohamed Ben Daddouch to announce the new
republic and declare that the nation was then a new republic under the control of the
military. At the time there was increasing dissent on the part of the people concerning
rampant corruption, injustice, and favoritism. One year later another coup d'etat took
place but failed as well. RTM was not taken over that time. No other coup d'etat took
place after 1972.
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In 1975 Late King Hassan II organized the Green March to expand the territory
and recover the Western Sahara. RTM played a key role in educating people about the
State's effort, and in mobilizing them to participate in the march. Besides the rebroadcasts
of the King's speeches, RTM also featured many nationalistic songs and music videos
glorifying the State's call for the march. The Green March, a highly mediated event,
pushed the regime to invest in upgrading the broadcasting infrastructure.
In 1979, Driss Basri, a former chief of police was nominated by late King Hassan
II as the minister of Interior and minister of Information (the Ministry of Information was
named Ministry of Communication starting February 1995). Basri was minister of
Interior from 1979 to 1999 and minister of Information from 1985 to 1999. Minister of
Interior is the chief law enforcement officer of Morocco; one can only imagine the
twisted authoritarian logic of putting the same man to be in charge of security and of
press freedom. Basri held both positions till 1999 when he was removed by King
Mohamed VI. Driss Basri was late King Hassan II's notorious minister in charge of
domestic security and political repression. Basri is the embodiment of the despotism and
the rampant corruption of King Hassan II's era. Basri's was known as "King's Policeman"
during his time as Interior Minister under Hassan II, a period referred to as the "years of
lead" and characterized by the imprisonment, murder and "disappearance" of political
opponents of the regime.
During the time when the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Information
were under the supervision of Basri, it was difficult to determine whether television
cameras were used for journalistic purposes or for policing purposes. The line between
providing information to audiences and providing information to police services was
107

blurred for more than twenty years.
The national news consisted of news related to the king and government
activities. What was striking about RTM news bulletin was the countless stories about
royal engagements and ministers' activities. The "holiness" of such stories in the running
order remains unchallenged till today. For example the news bulletin would still feature,
for instance, a letter the king sent to the president of Uganda at the occasion of Uganda's
national holiday. The newscaster would read the content of the entire letter. Uganda and
Morocco have very little economic, social or political ties, if any. The same goes for the
king's letters sent to the president of Fiji or the prime minister of Haiti.
For instance, in the same day that London was hit by a terrorist attack in July 7,
2005, there was a visit of the Prince of Qatar to Morocco. The RTM news bulletin
featured as its top story the King‘s dinner reception that he organized to honor his guest.
The bulletin featured the coverage of the Prince's arrival at the airport and his meeting
with the King. The coverage entailed even the ceremonial listening to Moroccan and
Qatari national anthems. This took 30 minutes. After that came the letter the king wrote
to the Queen of England to express his condolences at the aftermath of the tragic event,
and only after that did the station provide coverage of the London terrorist attack. In case
one missed the news in French, the Arabic version which broadcast immediately after the
French, repeats the full news story including the ceremonial listening to the national
anthems.
Starting 1986, RTM launched a campaign with the slogan ―attalfaza tataharak‖
(Arabic: television is moving). The campaign promised many changes in the quality and
quantity of programs. Indeed, the broadcasts went from an average of 4 to 5 hours a day
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to 12 hours a day. They began at 12 pm and ended at around 12 am midnight. The quality
of programming did not change a lot; there was simply more of the same things. The
failure to improve the quality of TV programming is partly due to the fact that the media
since Morocco's independence in 1956 were caught up in internal political struggle
between the regime and opposition political parties. Television addressed development
issues only to document and glorify the successes and accomplishments of the regime,
and at the same time to discredit the opposition.
In terms of RTM's contribution to art, the station provided a platform to
Moroccan musicians, theatre groups, and film makers. Most artistic productions that were
broadcast dealt with nationalist issues around the many national holidays. The other
productions were mainly dramas and comedies dealing with family issues, crimes, stories
contrasting modern versus traditional, and urban versus rural lifestyles. During the
Muslim holy month of Ramadan the station offers more locally produced programs,
mostly comedies.
Like in many Arab countries, television in Morocco has been largely dominated
by programs imported from the United States. Foreign films comprise the main
part of prime time every night. Overall, television is filled with foreign movies and
soap operas, which are highly popular and achieve high audience ratings
(Ibahrine, 2007). Reports from the Moroccan Culture and Communication Ministry
have indicated that there is a steady decline in the proportion of imports compared to
locally produced programs. In 1999, the percentage of local production has been
estimated at sixty percent, seventy two percent are in Arabic language.

109

To sum up, RTM's editorial choice is clear; it is the mouthpiece of the palace and
the government. Therefore, it censured many shows; it manufactured and disseminated a
unified discourse around the unity of the nation, the sacredness of the monarchy, and the
territorial integrity of the nation (involving the important issue of Moroccan southern
provinces). RTM rarely gave the microphone to an average Moroccan who had
something to say other than to those willing to say ―all is good, el am zine.‖
3. 2. 2. 2. 2M Soread 1989 – 1999. On the 4th of March 1989, Morocco
introduced the Arab world's first terrestrial pay-TV channel, 2M Soread. It began
transmission from Casablanca. Until then Moroccan television scene consisted of
one television station (Poindexter, 1991). It was established and funded by the
largest Moroccan economic conglomerate, Omnium Nord-Africain (ONA). Société
d’Etudes et de Réalisations Audiovisuelles (Soread) is the company that manages 2M
and ONA is its major shareholder.
There are many explanations as to why the government decided to issue a license to
a privately owned and commercial channel. Some argue that 2M was launched to
compete with the national channel, with the aim that competition would help
improve the quality of programming. Other arguments point to the government‘s
wish to protect Moroccan culture from the growing threat posed by foreign
satellite channels (Ibahrine, 2007). Lamnadi (1999) argues that 2M was created
because the Moroccan elite were dissatisfied with the government broadcasting system
and wanted better quality programming. He supports his argument by pointing to the fact
that the important participants and actors in the creation of 2M were the Royal Palace,
ONA, and the Ministries of the Interior and Information. The intellectual/social elite
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influenced the government's decision process, even if the public at large was not so much
asking for the creation of private television as it was demanding reforms of the public
television system (Lamnadi, 1999).
2M Soread was subscription based and needed a decoder to get clear signals. 2M
was technically unavailable in most regions of the country. Only viewers in the major
cities of the kingdom where most of the wealth is concentrated could tune to it. They also
needed to be able to afford the costly subscription (by Moroccan standard) of a little less
than thirty dollars per month. With the emergence of the satellite television in the mid
nineties, 2M started experiencing some serious financial difficulties. 2M's goal was to
attain 250,000 subscribers by 1994, a goal that was not achieved. By June 1996, 2M was
going through financial difficulties due to the fact that as an increasing number of its
subscribers cancelled their subscriptions in favor of free and often more interesting
programs on various satellite television channels. ONA, the major shareholder of the
station, withdrew from the management of 2M and sold 68% of its shares, at an
undisclosed price to the Moroccan government. The government then took over the
management of the station as part of the Moroccan Broadcasting Network.
In January 10, 1997, 2M turned public and its signals only needed a regular
antenna to be captured. This was a major event for Moroccan television viewers. 2M
brought in a breath of fresh air for most Moroccans who were unsatisfied with the
programs of RTM. 2M broke some old taboos and tackled controversial issues. The first
taboo it broke was manifested in the format of its news bulletin. Contrary to RTM, the
format was rather compact and its content was not necessarily focused on the daily
engagements of the king or the government. It addressed these issues with brevity and
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more objectivity than RTM. 2M also featured programs on what was considered then
controversial issues such as poverty, corruption, government ineffectiveness. For the first
time in Morocco's history, ordinary citizens were allowed to speak on a microphone and
tell the countrymen and the world what they thought. 2M also featured films with what is
considered in Morocco to be "obscene" sexual scenes (couples kissing, extended scenes
of affection). It established a reputation for itself as a symbol of freedom of speech in
Morocco.
Ironically the station, which came to symbolize the freedom of press, was
after 1997 under the direct control of the regime. It became a public channel and
broadcasted its programs in clear since January 11th, 1997. The takeover by the state was
carried out in the name of preserving the freedom of speech which 2M came to
symbolize. Politicians from different ideological streams supported the move ―since 2M
was seen as the only national channel open to political debates where the opposition (now
in power) could express its views‖ (Ben Cherif, 2002). The cost for this take over was to
be paid by Moroccan tax payers. ―One dollar per month has been illegally added to the
electricity bill of every household and business in the country as 2M became a free
channel, at least for those who could tune to it depending on the region where they live‖
(Ben Cherif, 2002). This was illegal and undemocratic because the parliament and the
taxpayers were never asked, it was a decision made and carried out by the government.
The introduction of this new TV tax did not and still does not seem to bother Moroccan
politicians ―who argue that the public sacrifice is a small price to pay for preserving 2M
as symbol of the struggle for freedom of speech (Ben Cherif, 2002).
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The channel's self-proclaimed function is to entertain. 2M offered a 24-hour lineup of news, documentaries, cultural, sporting and children‘s programs as well as series
and films. Before the state take-over, French language was predominant with 80% of the
programs in French. The percentage of Arabic language programs increased to reach fifty
one percent in 2001. Besides, after January 1997, the channel devoted more of its
programs to informational and educational programs like extended news bulletins, talk
shows, documentaries and TV magazines. 2M enjoyed its finest moments of popularity
among Moroccan TV audiences until the TV satellite revolution.
3. 2. 2. 3. RTM (Al Oula) and 2M 1999-2004. In 1997, King Hassan II appointed
an opposition socialist-led government. Reforming the media was a top priority for this
government. It announced from the start that it would attempt to create an open and
pluralist media environment, providing access to everyone. They insisted that radio and
television should be removed from the administration of the ministry of Communication,
and should be run by an independent organization (Ibahrine, 2007). In 2000, the minister
of Communication announced that the socialist-led government was preparing a policy
document which proposes the setting up of a media council (Al Sahifa, 2000).
What follows was the creation of the HACA in 2002. In 2004 the Audio-visual
Communication Law puts an end to the state‘s monopoly in terms of broadcasting
management by transforming Moroccan Radiodiffusion and Television (RTM) from a
subsidiary of the Ministry of Communication to the National Company of Radio and
Television (la Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision—SNRT). The SNRT
is a public company that will manage both RTM and 2M. The stations will no longer be
subject to the financial control and supervision of the ministry of Communication. RTM
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changed its name to Al Oula30 (Arabic meaning ―the first‖). Al Oula and 2M have to
grant an important portion of their programs to national productions and increase the
percentage of development oriented programs.
As a result of the liberalization of the audio-visual sector, the Moroccan
Television has also undergone a restructuring process. Morocco today has eight channels,
1) Al Oula, 2) 2M , 3) Arriadia (part of SNRT, an all sports channel), 4. Arrabiaa
(SNRT's leading education and cultural channel), 5) Al Maghribia, (SNRT's channel for
the Moroccan community abroad), 6) Assadissa, (SNRT's religious channel), 7)
Laayoune, (SNRT's regional TV designed for the southern region) and 8) Medi I Sat.
(Arabic and French service news channel).
3. 2. 2. 4. Satellite Television 1992 – 2004. During the 1990s satellite technology
changed the landscape of the national broadcast media. In 1992, it became legal to own a
satellite dish and the government tax on possession was eliminated. Since then, satellite
dishes have mushroomed on the rooftops of buildings and houses in urban centers and
villages of the country. By late 1990s, the adoption of satellite dishes became even more
widespread and pronounced. Approximately seventy percent of the Moroccan households
owned a satellite dish (Ibahrine, 2007). The "parabool" as the Moroccans call the satellite
dish, turned into a social phenomenon.
Of all the new Arab satellite channels, Al Jazeera drew much attention from
Moroccan audiences. Headquartered in Qatar, Al Jazeera was launched in 1996. Unlike
the state-owned and state-censored national television stations, Al Jazeera presented
controversial views about the governments of many Arab states. Al Jazeera exposed
30
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unethical, immoral, and illegal behavior by individuals, businesses and governments in
the Arab world. This level of freedom and independence in news reporting was
previously unheard of in many of these countries. For the first time, people in the region
had access to a free and independent source of news and commentary that was not under
the control of dictatorial regimes. Whether Al Jazeera has any effect on Arab politics and
culture remains a debatable issue. Some argue that Al Jazeera opened a platform for Arab
audiences to hold public discussions on controversial issues with a high degree of
freedom. Others argue that in the name of press freedom, Al Jazeera serves as a
mouthpiece for extremist views at the expense of moderate rational voices (Al-Hroub,
2006).
Morocco jumped late on the bandwagon of nations eager to gain a foothold in the
new Al-Jazeera era of powerhouse Arab satellite media, and launched Al Maghribia
(which translates to ―the Moroccan‖) in 2004. Its main target audience is the Moroccan
community living abroad. The channel broadcast a compilation of programs in
Arabic taken from both government owned TV stations, Al Oula and 2M. In
2007, Morocco had seven state-owned and one private satellite channels. They
use Nilesat satellite to reach the Arab world, Hotbird to reach Europe, and Telestar to
reach North America.
3. 3. Media Policy
3. 3. 1. The Constitution: 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996
The constitutional history of independent Morocco originated in a struggle
between the monarchy and the opposition political parties at the aftermath of the
independence. A series of constitutions, drafted in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996
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preserved and strengthened the monarchical nature of the Moroccan regime. The core of
the 1962 constitution remained unchanged for four decades. Article 23 stipulates that the
king was acknowledged as "commander of the faithful" (amir al-mu’minin) and his
person was declared sacred. He was both the most powerful political figure and the most
sacred religious symbol. The king could nominate and dismiss the prime minister and the
members of the government. Article 35 gave the king the right to declare a state of
emergency and to dismiss the parliament, a right the king used in 1965. The provisions
concerning the powers of the king and the monarchical nature of the regime were carried
over to the constitutions of 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996. Therefore, many legal analysts
refer to these dates as mere constitutional revisions.
The second constitution of 1970 was promulgated after a long period of social
unrest, with students, labor unions' strikes and protests. Hassan II attempted to solve the
crisis by allowing for the formation of a house of representatives. However, since the
constitution did not provide for a deadline to establish the chamber, the elections could be
delayed indefinitely. The 1972 constitution granted more legislative powers to the
chamber and the prime minister. Article 65 stipulates that the government was also to be
consulted on key issues such as declaration of war or state of emergency or constitutional
revision.
Due to an increase in criticism from both Moroccan politicians and European
human-rights activists, Hassan II undertook a process of political liberalization and called
for the promulgation of a fourth constitution in 1992 (Kepel & Leveau, 1996). The
preamble states that the kingdom is committed to improving human rights. Title VI
stipulates that a constitutional council is to be created to supervise the constitutionality of
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Moroccan politics and elections. In addition, the prime minister obtained the right to
nominate ministers, and the chamber gained the power to debate and vote on the
government's policies.
Morocco's last constitution was adopted in 1996. Hassan II wished to strengthen
the democratic and political reforms. The King needed to convince the opposition parties
to participate in government, which he called the government of alternance (Ibahrine,
2002). In the new constitution are many provisions that are meant to reinvigorate
parliamentary democracy. They state that the members of the Chamber of
Representatives must now be elected by direct universal suffrage. Article 2 states, for the
first time in Morocco's history, that sovereignty belongs to the nation. The 1996
Moroccan constitution recognizes that all Moroccan citizens are equal before the law,
that men and women enjoy equal political rights. The constitution guarantees all citizens
freedom of worship, movement, opinion and expression in all its forms, freedom of
association, public gathering, and the freedom to belong to any union or political group of
their choice within the limits of the law.
Article 9 provides that ―the Constitution shall guarantee all citizens the following:
(b) freedom of opinion, expression in all its forms, and public gathering.‖ The same
article adds, however, that ―No limitation, except by law, shall be put to the exercise of
such freedoms.‖ ―Except by law‖ is the exception that many media practitioners find
problematic. It allowed the Moroccan legislature to adopt an array of laws limiting
freedom of expression. The 2002 press code and the anti-terrorism law31 both contain
provisions that limit free speech or prohibit access to public information. They provide
31
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sanctions against any criticism of ―sacred‖ issues such as the monarchy, Islam, and
territorial integrity. The situation is complicated by the fact that certain offences– an
attack on Islam, on the institution of the monarchy or on territorial integrity – are not
clearly defined.
One area that shows the regime's close ties to the national media lies in the loyal
royalist figures who were appointed to the key positions of minister of Information and
heads of television and radio. King Hassan appointed his staunch allies as ministers of
Information: Moulay Ahmed Alaoui (1961-1965) is an advisor to and cousin of the king.
Ahmed Majid Ben Jelloun, Ahmed Snoussi, Abdelouahed Belkziz were also close allies
of the King, and Abdellatif Filali who was father in law to the king's daughter and finally
the notorious Driss Basri. The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Interior32 were
both headed by Driss Basri during the 1980s to 1990's. He was minister of Interior from
1979 to 1999 and minister of Information from 1985 to 1995.
The most encouraging signs of improvement in State -Media relations appeared in
the 1990‘s via the creation of the Consultative Council on Human Rights in 1990. In
1995, the ministry of Information is changed to the Ministry of Communication. From
1995 to 1998 Driss Alaoui M‘Daghri, a young and non-political party affiliated academic
became minister. The relationship between the regime and the mass media took a
radically different turn when the opposition and socialist led government was elected to
power in 1998. As noted above, the new government led a campaign to formulate a new
press law that promised to enhance press freedom.
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The minister of Interior is the chief law enforcement officer of Morocco. Three months after King
Mohamed VI rose to the throne in 1999, succeeding Hassan II, Basri was discharged from his ministerial
functions on November 1999. This act was symbolic and stirred, for a while, great hopes that a new
democratic Morocco was emerging. Basri exiled himself in Paris where he died of cancer in 2007.
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3. 3. 2. Press Codes: 1956, 1963, 1973, and 2002
Political traditions inherited from the colonial French have created a legal
framework that allows the government to restrict the flow of information. King
Mohammed V (1956-1961) instituted the first national press code in 1959 on the basis of
the French legal framework that had been in force under the French protectorate between
1912 and 1956. King Hassan II (1961-1999) strengthened this repressive press law by
instituting the press code of 1963 and 1973. According to these press codes, and in the
name of guaranteeing public order and insuring national security, newspapers can be
fined, suspended, or banned, and a journalist's freedom be threatened (Hidass, 1992). The
regime hardened its position vis a vis print media because the latter were too critical of
the monarch's actions. The regime stated that a compeletely free press would undermine
the country's security. Morocco reenacted colonial press laws and even added further
constraints on them (Hidass, 1992).
Morocco‘s fundamental legal basis for regulating the press stemmed from the
press code of 1959, as amended in 1963 and in 1973. Article 5 for instance states that
anyone who wants to print and publish a newspaper or magazine must have a permit from
the authorities. No publication is allowed without explicit State authorization. The press
code gives the Minister of Interior the power to seize and censor any publication. Article
21 stipulates that anyone found guilty of attacking in writing or print the person of the
king or the royal family can be imprisoned from five to 20 years and be subjected to a
fine ranging from 100,000 dhs to 1,000,000 dhs (roughly 8,000 to 80,000 US $)
(Ibahrine, 2007, p. 89).
Since Mohammed VI‘s accession to the throne in 1999, and following the reform
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of the press code in 2002, there was hope that radical reforms of Moroccan press laws
would take place, but such aspirations have not been fully realized. The new press code
still maintains prison sentences for journalists and gives the government the right to shut
down any publication "prejudicial to Islam, the monarchy, territorial integrity, or public
order."
In section II, entitled ―Délit contre la chose publique,‖ meaning literally,
―Offence against the public thing,‖ Article 41 states that anybody who offends in any
way, i.e. in writing, print, audio, video, a poster, or a speech, the king and the royal
princes and princesses will be imprisoned for three to five years and must pay a fine of
10,000 to 100,000 dhs (roughly 800 to 8000 US$). The same sentence applies to anybody
who attacks Islam, the monarchy, and the territorial integrity. The publication can be
suspended for up to three months or can be permanently banned. Article 42 stipulates that
any disturbance of the public order due to publication, diffusion, or reproduction, in bad
faith of false information, false allegations or fabricated facts shall be punished by a
prison term of one month to one year and a fine of 1,200 to 100,000 dhs (roughly 150
US$ to 8000 US$), and five years imprisonment for publication, diffusion or
reproduction of information that disturbs the moral of the military. Articles 45, 46, and 47
stipulate that defamation vis à vis the tribunal courts, the military, public administrations,
members of the government and any public person shall be punished by a prison term of
one month to one year. Article 52 protects heads of states of foreign governments, their
ministers of foreign affairs as well as members of the diplomatic envoys by punishing
any offence towards them with one month to one year prison sentence and a fine of
10,000 to 100,000 dhrs. It is important to reiterate the fact that there is no specific
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definition of ―offence‖ or ―prejudice‖ toward Monarchy, Islam, or national security.
Judges can interpret these terms any way they want.
According to Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ), two international organizations dedicated to the freedom of the press in the world,
the actions of Moroccan officials against freedom of the press have increased since 2000.
In its "Middle East and North Africa Report," the CPJ states that the government banned
three weekly newspapers, Le Journal, Al Sahiffa, and Demain in December 2000 for
publishing articles questioning Morocco's military activities in the Western Sahara and
for investigating the possible involvement of then Prime Minister Youssefi in a plot to
assassinate the late King Hassan II in 1972. Reporters Without Borders also indicated that
in 2001 the managing editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire was sentenced to three months
in jail and ordered to pay a fine of $200,000 for investigating allegations that the foreign
minister misused public funds while serving as ambassador to the United States. In 2005,
there were a record number of cases brought to court by individuals or the public
prosecutor against journalists and media outlets. The public prosecutor filed thirty one
complaints against seventeen different publications. The charges ranged from
defamation, to insulting a foreign head of state, to undermining public order, and to
publishing false information and photographs of the royal family without authorization.
In February of 2006, the editor and director of the Journal Hebdomadaire were convicted
for defamation and sentenced to a jail term and steep fines. In August 2006, Telquel33
magazine‘s director and chief editor were given two-month suspended prison sentences
and were ordered to pay damages of $110,000 to a member of parliament who sued the
33
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magazine for defamation. In 2007, the chief editor and a reporter of the weekly magazine
Nichane were charged with defamation of Islam after they reported some popular jokes
on Islam. The magazine was suspended for three months.
At the same time, the years since the succession of Mohamed VI to the throne are
the years when many taboos were broken. Ahmed Benchemsi, the director of Telquel
magazine, critiqued in one of his editorials the communication skills of King Mohamed
VI. He also published the salary and expenses of the king in one of his reports in
December 2004. None of these acts triggered an official reaction from the government. In
2006, many newspapers, magazines and even the public TVs and radios published reports
on the arrest of the chief of security of the royal palaces about his alleged connections to
a drug lord. No journalist could ever dream or imagine publishing such sensitive
information during the reign of Hassan II.
Am I free as a Moroccan? Do I feel like I can say whatever I want whenever I
want? I feel free to say anything I want as long as I do not critique the monarchy,
Western Sahara, and Islam. In my conversations in public or with my students in the
classroom, I can denounce the government corruption, police brutality, or express
disagreements with some of the King's policies. However, in the name of national
security, the police have the right to conduct a search on me, my car, and my home
without court's authorization.
It is important to note that there are more restrictions on the broadcast media
compared to print press. Besides the fact that broadcast media have been under the tight
control of the state for many decades, its liberalization did not happen until an
independent regulatory body (HACA) was put in place. For the state, TV and radio are
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too important and too influential that they must remain under strict control. While the
print press can enjoy the freedom of choosing their own editorial lines, have the luxury of
expressing their biases, being openly liberal or conservative, and as grumpy and savage
as they choose, audiovisual media are restrained by a list of laws that assign them specific
roles and functions.
3. 3. 3. High Authority for Audio-Visual Communication (Haute Autorité de la
Communication Audio-visuelle: HACA)
HACA was established under the Dahir of August 31, 2002. It is an independent
administrative body in charge of regulating the audio-visual communication sector. Its
self-proclaimed mission is to ensure compliance of the audio-visual communication
sector to the principles of pluralism and freedom of speech. HACA is the authority with
the legal power to license new private radio and television stations. HACA consists of the
Higher Council of the Audio-Visual Communication; it is a nine-member council, five of
whom are appointed by the king, including the president. The prime minister appoints
two members, and the last two members are named by the presidents of the two
Chambers of the Parliament. It also consists of the General Directorate of Audio-Visual
Communication (Direction Général de la Communication Audiovisuelle-- DGCA).
DGCA is run by the HACA‘s general director and it represents the HACA's
administrative and technical services. The DGCA includes the following services:
research and development, program monitoring, technical infrastructure, and the legal
department. The council has three major missions:


Advice: to the King, the Prime minister and government, and both chambers
of the parliament on issues related to audio-visual sector.
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Regulation: authorizes the creation of audio-visual companies, and grants
licenses and to use radio frequencies.



Control: monitors the compliance to the laws and regulations applicable to
audio-visual sector, compliance to the pluralism (in particular in the matter of
political parties access), and compliance to advertising legislation and
regulation (HACA, 2006).

HACA receives many bids from private individuals or companies seeking new
licenses. By May 2006, the Higher Council of the Audio-visual Communication
announced the results of its deliberations in connection with the granting of the first wave
of licenses to eleven new private companies, ten radio stations and one satellite television
channel. The television license was granted to Medi 1 Sat, the television affiliate of Medi
1 Radio.
Besides granting licenses, the HACA overseas the compliance of all TVs and
radios to their Licensing Obligations documents (Cahier des Charges). The Cahier des
Charges constitutes a written agreement between the HACA and broadcast media outlet.
The media outlet commits to fulfill the terms and conditions specified in the Book, and
the HACA through its mechanism of monitoring and surveillance makes sure the media
outlets comply with their own Licensing Obligations. In this section, I will first delineate
some of the key laws that regulate the broadcast media sector, and then will describe the
Licensing Obligations documents for both Al Oula and 2M.
3. 3. 3. 1. Audio-Visual Communication Law. On November 25, 2004, the
Moroccan parliament adopted the media reform law on the audio-visual communication.
The law, called the Audio-Visual Communication Law, put an end to the state‘s
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monopoly in terms of broadcasting, and provides the legal framework that allows for the
liberalization of this sector. Hence the Radiodiffusion Télévision Marocaine (RTM) will
no longer be administered by the ministry of Communication, it will become an
autonomous company with the name Société National de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision
(SNRT). 2M was already an independent entity run by its own administration, but will
now be run by the SNRT. The law assigns the public service mission and obligation to Al
Oula and 2M.
The liberalization of the audiovisual sector aims to achieve the following goals:
1. To promote freedom of the audiovisual communication and to guarantee of the
freedoms of expression and opinion
2. To adhere to the ethical standards of the profession, respect of human rights,
namely respect for human dignity, of privacy, and respect for plurality of
expressions and ideas, as well as democratic principles.
3. To strengthen and consolidate the public service function of audiovisual
communication (public radio and television), the unity of the Nation and the
protection of human rights.
4. To contribute to the socioeconomic and cultural development of the Nation
notably by encouraging development at the regional and local levels.
5. To support the development of the public sector of the audiovisual
communication and endow it with the necessary tools and resources that would
allow it to perform its public service obligations in a way that make it
competitive.
6. To incite the private sector to invest in audiovisual sector
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7. To promote national audiovisual production and give priority to national
resources and competencies;
8. To preserve the national cultural heritage and promote its richness and diversity.
9. To respect and adhere to laws and regulations regarding the protection of
copyrights and intellectual property.
In the preamble, it is stated that the general philosophy of this law is founded on
the kingdom's constitutional principles of Islam, monarchy and national unity. It is also
founded on the universal human rights. This law claims that it aims at consolidating the
nation's choice for democratic reforms, rule of law, pluralism and freedom of expression
and opinion. In the preamble the notion of responsibility is emphasized, that freedom is to
be exercised within the limits of responsibility. The king's speech of November 2002
explicitly relates the issue of freedom to responsibility: ―Freedom is fundamental to the
emergence of a high quality press, but responsibility is essential to ensure that the media
serve the public.‖ The objectives of this law are summarized as follows: to reinforce
freedom of expression and opinion; to promote democratic ideals and the respect of
human rights and pluralism; to contribute to the socio-economic and cultural
development of the nation; to promote public service broadcasting; to enhance audiovisual communication production; to encourage national production and to preserve the
national cultural heritage.
Article 3 stipulates that audio-visual communication is «free» and that this
freedom is exercised while respecting the dignity, liberty and property of other human
beings. It is also a freedom that is exercised while respecting diversity of opinions, the
country's religious values, public order, and national security. Article 4 stipulates that all
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broadcasting companies reserve the right to create their programs freely, as long they
respect pluralism and diversity of viewpoints. Article 8 stipulates that broadcasting
companies must promote Moroccan arts and culture and encourage local production,
provide objective and balanced coverage of news events while not taking sides with any
political party, ideology or doctrine. The programs must also be appealing to all regions
of the nation and must respond to the audiences‘ needs. Broadcasting companies must
also respect intellectual property and copy rights.
Article 9 states that TV and radio programs must not question Morocco's dogma,
Islam, monarchy, and Western Sahara. They must preserve neutrality and not serve the
interests of a political party, an ideology, an ethnicity, or particular economic or financial
interests. They also must not incite people to violence or terrorism, or express racist and
discriminatory rhetoric vis à vis an ethnic group, a nation, a race, or a religion. Regarding
ownership, Article 21 stipulates that any broadcasting company or a shareholder in a
broadcasting company can own or control another broadcasting company as long as
he/she/it does not exceed 30% of the shares of the new company. In other words, no one
can control more than one media outlet.
Articles 46 through 49 address the public broadcasting system, namely Al Oula
and 2M. Article 46 stipulates that public broadcasting serve the public interest of the
nation by providing public service programs that aim at educating, informing, and
entertaining the public. The broadcasters must serve the general public and design
programs that satisfy the needs of all Moroccan ethnic groups by providing programs in
Arabic and Amazigh, and promote values of democracy, tolerance, modernity and
freedom. They also must promote Moroccan arts and culture. Article 49 stipulates that
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public service television and radio must broadcast the king's speeches and activities,
debates and presentations in both chambers of the parliament, government press releases.
They also must give political parties and labor union equal access especially during
elections campaigns.
3. 3. 3. 2. Licensing obligations documents of Al Oula and 2M. The documents 34
assign explicitly the public service functions for Al Oula and 2M. In the preamble, it is
stated that the two TV stations must serve the public interest. They must ensure their
public service missions to satisfy the general public' needs for information, education,
and entertainment. They have to provide a diversified and general programming meant to
appeal to the largest audience possible. The programs have to be founded on the Islamic,
Arab, Amazigh and Moroccan civilizations, as well as on the universal human values.
The programming has to support the values of democracy, liberty, tolerance, openness
and modernity. They must promote the ideals of dialogue, national unity, respect for
individuals' thoughts and beliefs.
The TV stations must also promote the modernization process undertaken by the
government as well as the government's social and economic development initiatives.
They also must encourage ideals of civic duty, solidarity, and responsibility. They must
also provide their audiences with information on regional, national, and international
issues. They must help citizens understand issues of importance to their lives so that they
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can make informed decisions and carry out their duties as effective citizens.
The two television stations must broadcast the king's speeches and provide
adequate coverage for royal activities. They must report on the parliament's activities and
debates. They also must broadcast the government's press releases and any information
the government deems necessary. The TV stations must strive to be inclusive and appeal
to all segments of the Moroccan population. They must encourage the production of
national music and films. They must glorify the national identity and promote Moroccan
heritage and artistic creation.
Article 3 stipulates that 2M and Al Oula's programming must include the
following:
1. news and newsmagazines of political and general information;
2. TV magazines dealing with social issues;
3. educational documentaries;
4. religious programming;
5. programming on practical advice;
6. music, games, live music shows;
7. fiction and films;
8. children and youth programming;
9. sports shows.
The Licensing Obligations documents also stipulate the quantity and the
frequency of such programs. For instance, Article 9 states that the TV stations must
broadcast at least ten times a week, between 9 pm and midnight, programs devoted to
people's everyday life matters such as health, civic education, consumption, domestic
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issues, education, training, financial management, etc. Article 10 indicates that the two
TV stations must devote at least 10 hours per week for programs designed for children.
The Books do not explain the rational behind assigning this amount of time.35
With regard to advertising, Article 15 stipulates that both TV stations are
authorized to diffuse advertising messages. The advertising sequences must be
identifiable as such and separated from other programs. The sequences must not exceed
six minutes, and the total amount of time per hour is 14 minutes. Programs can be
interrupted for the purpose of inserting advertising sequences except for children's
programming.
3. 3. 4. Concluding Remarks
The language in both the audio-visual law and the Licensing Obligations
documents affirm the government‘s commitment to use television as an outside source to
support its development objectives. However, these laws, policies and regulations do not
reflect the entire nature of Moroccan media. They do not reveal, for instance, the details
of who decides what on the news content and why. The media policy tends to ―imply that
the media are freer than they really are‖ (Rugh, 2004). In the Arab world, media systems
cannot be fully understood without taking into account the specific political conditions
prevailing at the country at the time.
An examination of the legal environment shows that the principle of freedom of
expression underlies all the laws and policies. Print media, under the 2002 Press Code,
seem to enjoy a relatively higher level of freedom compared to broadcast media. Unlike
broadcast media, print media are free to choose their editorial lines, they can be openly
35
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conservative or liberal, and they do not have to comply with any norms regarding cultural
diversity or political pluralism. However, the Press Code still maintains prison sentences
for journalists and gives the government the right to shut down any publication
"prejudicial to Islam, the monarchy, territorial integrity, or public order."
There are more restrictions on the broadcast media because the Audiovisual
Communication Law assigns radio and television the role of consolidating democratic
reforms, and promoting political pluralism and cultural diversity. The law also
emphasizes that freedom is to be exercised within the limits of responsibility. However,
this Law gave the legal means for private companies or persons to acquire licenses to
establish their own radio and television stations. This Law allowed for the liberalization
of the audiovisual sector. From the Independence until 2002, Medi 1 and 2M were the
only private broadcast stations and they both were initiated by Late King Hassan II. The
following section attempts to clarify the link between Moroccan mass media and its
economic and political environments. Given the high rate of illiteracy in Morocco, the
Moroccan government controlled the production and distribution of broadcast media,
considered as the most powerful and influential of all existing media.
3. 4. Morocco’s Media System in Light of the Comparative World Media System
In order to fully understand the nature of a national media system, one approach is
to compare it to other world systems. The standard theoretical typology that is mostly
used to compare media systems at the macro-level was established in mid-twentieth
century by Siebert, Petersons, and Schramm (1956), and then subsequently developed by
other scholars (McQuail, 1994; Altschul, 1984; Hallin and Mancini, 2005; DeFleur and
Ball-Rokeach, 1990). The world media systems are normative media theories that
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prescribe what is desirable in both media structure and performance, i.e. they describe
how media ought to or are expected to operate. Structure refers to ownership, laws and
regulations, and performance refers to the actual manner in which the media carry out
their tasks (McQuail, 1994, p. 121). McQuail (1994) points out that the media are both a
product and a reflection of the history of their own society; they are ―by origin, practice
and convention very much national institutions and respond to domestic political and
social pressures and to the expectations of their audiences‖ (McQuail, 1994, p. 121).
If we examine the world media systems carefully, we will notice that they revolve
around three main issues: ownership, political influence, and the existing laws, policies
and regulations. I will borrow three concepts established by Freedom House, a non-profit
organization that promotes democracy and freedom around the world, and use them as
indicators to evaluate where Morocco's media system stands in light of the world media
systems: The legal environment, the political environment, and the economic
environment. The legal environment category includes an examination of the laws and
regulations that could influence media content and the government's tendency to use
these laws and legal institutions to limit the media's ability to operate. The political
environment category addresses the degree of political control over the content of news
media. The third category examines the economic environment for the media and it
addresses the structure of media ownership (Freedom House, 2008). Freedom House
classifies countries in three groups: Free, partly free, and not free. From 2002 and 2007,
Morocco‘s ranking swings from Partly Free to Not Free. In 2007, it was ranked as Partly
Free. It is important to note that Morocco, Lebanon and Yemen were the only Partly Free
countries in the Arab World.
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I will look at two historical periods: From 1956 to 1999, and from 1999 to 2008. I
will briefly describe the authoritarian model and explain why I argue that it fits
Morocco's media during the ―years of lead.‖36 I will discuss how Morocco‘s current
media system does not accurately fit with any of the media systems and that it has strong
overlap with authoritarian, developmental, and social responsibility media systems.
Because Morocco‘s media system exists within a continuum in a transitional
environment, I will propose a media typology or framework that appropriately describes
Morocco‘s current media system.
3. 4. 1. Comparative World Media Systems
Scholars have outlined the different roles the media play in different countries.
They categorized world media into seven media systems.37 These systems provide a set
of criteria (extent of freedom of expression, media ownership, media/government
relations etc.) which offer a conceptual framework for critically evaluating Morocco‘s
media structure and performance and for sketching the evolution of national media. I will
examine the traditional four ―theories of the press‖ and the other existing theories that
attempted to take account of other media realities across nations. The goal is to propose a
model or framework that would appropriately describe the current Moroccan media
system. Before outlining the proposed framework, however, a close look at the typologies
upon which it builds is required.
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Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm‘s (1956) Four Theories of the Press represents
the first widely recognized attempt to clarify the link between mass media and political
systems. Siebert et al. (1956) presented the world's press systems according to the Cold
War ideologies: authoritarian, libertarian, communist, and social responsibility.
3. 4. 1. 1. Authoritarian. The authoritarian media describes the media system
found in many dictatorial regimes, such as fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, and also
in some developing countries. It aims at maintaining and protecting the established social
and political order. It is characterized by censorship, licensing, and autocratic power. The
role of the media is to support the state and leadership. Within this system, media
freedom is highly restricted and no threats or criticisms of the power elite are allowed. In
terms of ownership, media is owned by monarchy, ruler, governing political party, or
private persons close to the regime (Lambeth in Merrill, 1995).
3. 4. 1. 2. Libertarian. The libertarian media arose in England in the late
seventeenth century. It stemmed from enlightenment thought and democratic ideals of
separation of church and State and an independent judiciary. The role of the media is to
help find the truth and serve as watch dog for the public interest. Media is controlled by
private owners in a free market of ideas and by courts. In this system, nothing is
forbidden from publication.
3. 4. 1. 3. Communist. The communist media is similar in many ways to the
authoritarian system; it refers to the media systems found in communist dictatorships.
The media supports the communist system, educates and mobilizes people to support the
goals and objectives of the communist party. The role of the media is to serve as the only
legitimate voice of the working class. In terms of media freedom, the media are not
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allowed to criticize communist party objectives. In terms of ownership, the guiding
principle is that media is subordinated to the communist party since it serves the ―general
good‖ of the nation. The main difference between this system and the authoritarian
system is that the authoritarian is concerned with controlling the mass media and
allowing private freedoms, while the communist aims at controlling all aspects of a
person's life (Rugh, 2004).
3. 4. 1. 4. Social responsibility. The social responsibility media stems from the
libertarian model. It is the outcome of the report of the 1947 Hutchins' Commission on
the Freedom of the Press and the criticism that the libertarian model received from within
the U.S. (Altschul, 1984; Merrill, 1995). The role of the media is to inform, educate, and
help social progress. In terms of freedom of the press, it defers from the libertarian model
in that it considers the social responsibility of the press as more important than its
freedom. A key feature of this theory is its emphasis on self-regulation via press councils,
codes of professional journalistic standards etc. In terms of ownership, it argues for
private ownership, but allows for society's intervention to assure public service. This
model was ―a series of ethically inspired decisions by owners and editors for the public
good‖ (Downing, 2007, p. 25). This system reflects many of the core values embodied in
public service broadcasting.
With the fall of the Eastern block in Europe and the emergence of new strong
economies in South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, the four theories were criticized for
their incapacity to fully match reality (Merrill, 1995). The communist world no longer
exists, the libertarian is ―more an ideal and stringent construal of standards of freedom of
speech and of the press than a description of any particular existing state system‖
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(Lambeth in Merrill, 1995, p. 3). They were also criticized for their failure to account for
the stages of development of media within countries. Countries do not just move from
communist media to libertarian media over night. What happens in-between the stages is
not accounted for, as was the case for many Eastern European countries in the early
1990‘s (Downing, 2007). They have used mostly ideological criteria which have led to
oversimplified categorizations of the world's media systems; as a result, the main
category for systematization has been the different societies' political perspective on
government-press relations. This has brought a confusion between "the actual working
principles of a given media system (and) the theoretical ideals of the system‖ (Downing,
2007, p. 26).
3. 4. 1. 5. Social Democratic. Picard (1985) added the ―social democratic‖ media
system found mostly in Western Europe. It is a category that is part of the ―free market‖
theory but is different from the social responsibility and the libertarian systems in that it
considers legitimate the government's intervention to ensure independence, access,
diversity of opinions, and public service. In this system, broadcast media are mostly
owned by the state to ensure public service.
3. 4. 1. 6. Developmental. Other scholars added other categories, the
developmental or advancing media system, and the democratic-participant system
(Altschull, 1984; McQuail, 1992, 1994; DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1990). The
developmental system is the product of the historical and ideological context of the
1960‘s. Most of the newly independent/former colonies in Africa, Latin American, and
Asia distanced themselves from the Communist East and Capitalist West alliances, and
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created their own group of Non-Aligned Nations.38 Some countries such as Taiwan and
South Korea were ruled by dictatorships for decades and managed to develop
representative governments and achieve economic prosperity (Lambeth in Merrill, 1993).
The four press systems do not account for these changes and these emerging political and
media systems.
A developmental or advancing media system describes media systems in
countries undergoing a transition from underdevelopment and colonialism to
independence and nation building. The primary task of the media is to support all
development initiatives. It aims at the development of the nation‘s economic
infrastructure. The role of the media is to help alleviate poverty, illiteracy, and ill health.
The media are instruments for education, social change, social justice, and peace. The
media are responsible for carrying out information campaigns on a variety of issues, such
as health, new agricultural methods, conservation of local resources, etc. Since the unity
of nation and its political stability are vital for the country's economic development, the
media needs to play a major role in internal political unification. Developmental media,
according the Altschull, is a vehicle for a two way exchange whereby the media help to
mediate public issues, and that the public be allowed to play a bigger role in the news
decision making process. In terms of freedom of the press, this model considers media
freedom as less important than the unity of the state. It calls for auto-censorship. In terms
of ownership, it calls for a mix of public and private ownership and allows for
governments' intervention to assure public service.
3. 4. 1. 7. Participatory. The participatory media system designates community38

Known today as the Group of 77.
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based, small scale and democratically organized media. It calls for the use of alternative
means of communication for interaction and social action in small scale settings. The
system calls for direct involvement in the everyday life of the community. Through the
use of community radio, public access video, and ICTs, it challenges the necessity to use
high-cost, centralized broadcast systems (Downing, 2007). Centralized broadcast systems
are state controlled and are conducive to top down patterns of communication. This
system favors horizontal forms of interaction and calls for public participation in editorial
decisions and policies.
3. 4. 1. 8. Summary and Critique. A more recent cross-national research by Hallin
and Mancini (2005) proposed a revised classification of the structure of media systems in
advanced industrialized societies. The authors proposed a typology that involves an
Anglo-American (liberal) model (found, for example, in USA, Canada, Britain), a
Mediterranean (polarized pluralism) model (e.g. in Italy, Spain, and France), and a
Democratic Pluralist model (e.g. Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands). Hallin and
Mancini‘s classifications were challenged. McQuail, for instance, argues that the British
system, classified as Anglo American, has a dual commercial public service media
system, the fact that makes it more in line with the North European model, given the
strong role for public service broadcasting, than with the more commercially dominant
American television market (Norris, 2008).
There is so far no general consensus on the most appropriate typology or
classification. It is important to note that none of these typologies offer an exact
description of media systems (Altschul, 1984; Merrill, 1995; Downing, 2007). What they
offer are ways of understanding media systems around the globe by relying on showing
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the major differences between them. Most systems are a mixture of elements from
different systems (Downing, 2007).
Besides the criticism waged at the four theories, all these typologies tend to focus
on news media and political content (McQuail 1994; Downing, 2007). The media offer a
variety of other contents such as music, sports, and fiction. Despite this criticism, which I
find for the most part valid, I think that these world media typologies are very useful
because they offer a set of criteria on the basis of which we can compare and contrast a
variety of media systems. They also offer the general context for understanding how
media operate within political systems. For instance, it is easy and seems righteous to
argue the importance of press freedom for any media system in any country, but once we
put the media within the political and historical context of the country, press freedom in
the libertarian sense, as noble as it sounds, may prove to be unproductive for a
developing country. Developing countries may have important priorities such educating
and informing their citizens. With scarce media outlets, developing countries may not
afford to allow entertainment to be the dominant function of the media. Some regulations
have to be in place to guarantee public service.
3. 4. 2. Morocco's Authoritarian Media System 1956 – 1999
The authoritarian media model, a model adopted by many past and present
dictatorships, assigns mass media the tasks of supporting the state and leadership
(Merrill, 1995). It is characterized by licensing restrictions, censorship of any opposing
views to the dominant regime, and autocratic power. In this system, no criticism or threat
to the power structure is permitted, and ownership of mass media is by government,
major political party, or private persons (if aligned with the regime) (Merrill, 1995).
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3. 4. 2. 1. The Legal environment. It is not difficult to see the affinity of this
model with Morocco's media model during the period known as ―the years of lead.‖ In
terms of the legal environment, the regime inherited a number of French colonialist laws
for regulating the press (Hidass, 1992). These laws were meant to suppress the liberation
movement in Morocco and censor its publications. Morocco‘s fundamental legal basis for
regulating the press stemmed from the press code of 1959, as amended in 1963 and in
1973. Article 5 for instance states that anyone who wants to print and publish a
newspaper or magazine requires a permit from the authorities. No publication is allowed
without explicit State authorization. The press code gives the Minister of Interior the
power to seize and censor any publication. Article 21 stipulates that anyone found guilty
of attacking the person of the king or the royal family can be imprisoned from five to
twenty years and be subjected to a fine for up to 100,000 US $ (Ibahrine, 2007, p. 89). In
1962, the year the first TV and radio station were launched, late King Hassan II oversaw
the writing of the first constitution which defined the role of the king, giving him broad
powers including the power to appoint ministers, governors, judges; the power to dissolve
the parliament, declare a state of emergency, and revise the constitution. With regard to
broadcasting media, they existed in a legal vacuum for more than four decades and were
not under the obligation to provide public service. In the absence of a legal framework,
the broadcast media was run and controlled by the state. Since its inception in 1962, and
although self-proclaimed a public service television, RTM was the mouthpiece of the
government and the palace. RTM's role was to promote nationalism, reinforce the
sacredness of the monarchy, and discredit communist and anti-monarchy and republican
ideologies.
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3. 4. 2. 2. The Economic environment: In terms of the economic environment, the
regime owned and controlled directly and indirectly all audiovisual media.39 The regime
owned and controlled RTM, which ran both the main TV channel40 and radio stations. In
1980 a new radio station was launched, the International Mediterranean Radio (Medi I).
Medi 1 was launched as part of a Moroccan-French partnership comprising associates
from banks and major enterprises of the two countries. The radio was an initiative of
King Hassan II and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. In 1989, 2M was
launched. The Royal Palace, the Omnium Nord Afrique (ONA) (Morocco's largest
economic conglomerate), and Basri's Ministries of the Interior and Information were the
most important participants and actors in launching 2M (Lamnadi, 1999). 2M was an
entertainment channel par excellence, it stayed aloof from the affairs of the government.
Print media were owned by the leading political parties and a few private persons.
Political parties' print publications managed to survive thanks to self censorship. Private
newspapers and magazines such as Kalima (1986-1987) and Lam Alif (1966-1988)
suffered many restrictions and were shut down by the government because they dared
discuss issues deemed sensitive. For example, Kalima was a general magazine that
existed from 1986 to 1987. In April 1987, it published a report on prostitution in
Morocco's tourism cities of Marrakech and Agadir. Two weeks later, it published another
report on homosexuality in Moroccan society. Driss Basri ordered the magazine to be
seized from the newsstands, and ordered its editor to shut down the magazine. One may
wonder how prostitution and homosexuality, as social phenomena, can be threats to
39

Medi 1 and 2M were the only private radio station and TV channel that were privately owned. King
Hassan II played a key role in launching them.
40
RTM was the only available TV stations for 27 years, from 1962, the year of its creation, to 1989 the
year when 2M was launched.
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national security.
3. 4. 2. 3. The Political environment. With regard to the political environment, it
is important to discuss the role of Driss Basri, a former chief of police, who in 1979 was
nominated by late King Hassan II as the Minister of Interior and Minister of
Information.41 Driss Basri was late King Hassan II's notorious minister in charge of
domestic security and political repression. Basri is the embodiment of the despotism and
the rampant corruption of King Hassan II's era. Basri was known as the "King's
Policeman" during his time as Interior Minister under Hassan II. The same man was in
charge of the media and the police force, a contradiction that only an authoritarian regime
can impose. Basri held the position of the Minister of Information until 1995 and the
position of interior minister until 1999 when he was removed by King Mohamed VI. This
was a sign that Morocco was heading towards democratic reforms.
During the time in which the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Information
were under the supervision of Basri, it was difficult to determine whether television
cameras were used for journalistic purposes or for policing purposes. The line between
providing information to audiences and providing information to police services was
blurred for thirty years. When TV cameras attended public demonstrations, it was not
clear whether the footage will end up in an editing room at the TV station or at the secret
service offices.
Under Basri's media regime, all media outlets were subject to the same
censorship. It did not matter whether the media outlet was owned by the government or
by private persons. When King Mohammed VI succeeded his father Hassan II in July
41

The Ministry of Information became Ministry of Communication in February 1995.
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1999, he immediately removed Basri from his functions, a symbolic move and a sign that
there was hope for a more democratic and free Morocco.
The period from 1962 to 1999 was purely authoritarian. Media professionals lived
in fear. At the time of Driss Basri, RTM journalists, management, and staff considered
themselves salaried employees of the ministry of Interior. In an interview with Mr.
Mohamed Moudden, a senior news editor and presenter and currently news director, he
said that the journalists were assigned to report on specific events, and were told the
editorial line to follow. Most of the work at RTM and its radio affiliates consisted of
writing government press releases. The journalists did not have the right to report and
interpret the events. Moudden said that he submitted four resignation letters at different
times but were never accepted. ―I felt imprisoned, I could not leave and I could not do the
type of professional journalistic work I believed in‖ (M. Moudden, personal
communication, Interview, March 10, 2008).
3. 4. 3. Morocco's Developmental Media System 1999 – 2008
Altschull (1995) argues that there is no pure system, that every media system has
degrees of freedom and control. Merrill (1995) states that all media systems can be
placed on a continuum between authoritarianism and libertarianism, or libertarianism and
social responsibility. Elements of these media systems co-exist and this is more evident
for media systems in countries undergoing a transition. The transition, in Morocco‘ case,
refers to the democratic transition Morocco has witnessed since 1997, when the socialist
led government of alternance came to power and led the government. The new
government‘s mission was to launch major reforms that aimed at promoting human
rights, civil liberties, an open and pluralist media, and the rule of law. Two years later,
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Mohamed VI became king and continued these democratic reforms.
The recent progress that Morocco witnessed regarding human rights
improvements and the recent liberalization of the audiovisual sector with its new media
policies and regulations put Morocco's media more or less in line with the philosophy of
the developmental media system. Morocco‘s transitional media systems can however still
be placed on a continuum between authoritarianism and developmental. The
developmental system does not accurately describe Morocco‘s current media system but
it represents the closest model. There are elements of the social responsibility and
elements of the public broadcasting systems in the current media system.
I will first discuss the developmental media system and apply the three Freedom
House concepts, the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic
environment, as indicators to evaluate where the current Morocco's media system stands.
3. 4. 3. 1. The Legal environment. With regard to the legal environment, the
developmental model calls for a national press policy to safeguard freedom (Altschull,
1984). It considers media freedom as less important than the unity of the State and allows
for governments' intervention to ensure public service. The Audio-Visual Communication
law of 2004 assigns public service obligations to the two major television stations in
Morocco (Al Oula and 2M). Public broadcasting must serve the public interest of the
nation by providing programs that aim at educating, informing, and entertaining the
public. The broadcasters design programs that satisfy the educational needs of all
Moroccans. Since the unity of nation and its political stability are vital for the country's
development, the media needs to play a major role in internal political unification.
Morocco's media system seems to adhere to these prescriptions. The Moroccan
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government has given important policy considerations to regulate the use of television
and radio airwaves as important outside sources for promoting its development goals.
With regard to the Press Law, as amended in 2002, and the Audio-Visual
Communication law of 2004, both laws guarantee Moroccans the freedom of expression
but they both limit this freedom by calling for respect of the dignity, liberty and property
of other human beings, and respecting the diversity of opinions, the country's religious
values, public order, and national security. The Moroccan government considers Islam,
the monarchy and the Western Sahara as the country's three major pillars. To maintain the
stability of the nation, it is therefore illegal to criticize Islam, the king, and the royal
family. It is also illegal to publish anything that challenges Morocco's territorial integrity,
in direct reference to Morocco's claims over the Western Sahara.
The elements of the authoritarian model are manifested in the heavy fines and
prison sentences that journalists are still subject to. While the government's interference
with issues related to its territorial integrity and to the Monarchy can be attributed to a
need for political stability, the government interference with issues related to libeling of
public officials or statement related to Islam can only be attributed to the persistence of
an oppressive regime. In other words, the territorial integrity and the Monarchy are
important for the country's stability, and some interference may be understood in the
name of national unity and economic development. However, the law still provides for
jail sentences and fines for journalists found guilty of libeling public officials. In
February of 2006, the editor and director of the Journal Hebdomadaire were convicted
for defamation and sentenced to jail terms and steep fines. In 2007, the chief editor and a
reporter of the weekly magazine Nichane were charged with defamation of Islam after
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they reported some popular jokes on Islam. The magazine was banned for three months
till the trials took place. In August 2006, Telquel42 magazine‘s director and chief editor
were given two-month suspended prison sentences and were ordered to pay damages of
$110,000 to a member of parliament who sued the magazine for defamation. In 2007, the
chief editor and a reporter of the weekly magazine Nichane were charged with
defamation of Islam after they reported some popular jokes on Islam. The magazine was
suspended for three months. These are clearly elements of the authoritarian media system
within the current media system.
3. 4. 3. 2. The Economic environment. In terms of economic environment,
Morocco's current media system seems to be in line with the developmental media
system. The latter calls for a mix of public and private ownership and allows for
governments' intervention to ensure public service. With regard to the print press,
Morocco is home to a large number of print publications, many of them owned by
political parties, and a growing number is owned by private persons. They are mostly
critical of the government. However, circulation is limited to about 300,000 daily
newspapers sold everyday. Most papers receive government subsidies.
Concerning audio-visual media, television is still overwhelmingly state owned
and editorially supportive of the government. With the liberalization of the audiovisual
sector, it is now technically legal to establish private television stations. There has been
some progress with regard to private radio stations which have increased from two to
eleven, five of which are owned and run by private companies. For television, only one
license was granted to Medi 1 to create its TV affiliate Medi 1 Sat. It is important to note
42
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that Medi 1 radio was launched as part of a Moroccan-French partnership comprising
associates from banks and major enterprises of the two countries. The radio was an
initiative of the late King Hassan II and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Five
other television station licenses were granted but all were for State owned television
stations since 2006. All new stations are thematic except for Laayoun station which is a
regional station in the southern province of Morocco. The other stations are Arriyadia
specialized in sports, Assadissa in religion, and Arrabia in culture. It is important to note
that Article 21 stipulates that any broadcasting company or a shareholder in a
broadcasting company can own or control another broadcasting company as long as
he/she/it does not exceed 30% of the shares of the new company. In other words, no
individual or company can control more than one media outlet.
3. 4. 3. 3. The Political environment. Concerning the political environment, it is
important to describe, albeit briefly, the new political environment under the reign of
Mohamed VI. Mohamed VI made the promotion of human rights one of his priorities.
One of the first major pro-human rights measures under his reign was the creation with a
royal decree of the Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2003 that investigated the
human rights violations of the past. Besides establishing the truth about the past violation,
the Commission organized public forums in 2004 to allow victims to voice their pains
and sufferings. These forums were broadcast live on Al Oula, which I consider a very
important moment in Moroccan television history. The goal of the Commission is to
facilitate the reconciliation of Moroccans with their recent past.
Another major initiative was the new Family Status Law or Moudawana. It was
decreed in 2003 to protect women‘s rights. A Freedom House‘s study (2004) on women
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in Morocco, Women’s Freedom in Focus: Morocco, praised this initiative and noted the
improvements of the status of women and their rights (Freedom House, 2004). Mohamed
VI also created the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture. The Institute‘s role is to
safeguard and promote Amazigh language and culture. Imazighen are the majority ethnic
group in Morocco, yet Amazigh culture was undermined for many years. For political
reasons, Hassan II regime identified with Arabism hence the predominance of the Arabic
culture and identity.
The developmental media system recognizes the importance of government
involvement in media. The belief in mass media as instruments of social justice and
social change implies some form of intervention. The Licensing Obligations documents
for both Al Oula and 2M are meant to reinforce these pro-human rights initiatives. They
stipulate that the programming have to respond to the needs of minorities. The
programming has to support the values of democracy, liberty, tolerance, openness and
modernity. They must promote the ideals of dialogue, national unity, respect for
individuals' thoughts and beliefs. The TV stations must strive to be inclusive and appeal
to all segments of the Moroccan population. They must also encourage the production of
national music and films. Government intervention can in fact be in the interest of the
public, and not necessarily in the interest of authoritarianism.
The political environment is certainly more open and conducive to more freedom
than it was during the years of lead. The Mohamed VI era is more democratic in form and
substance. Many taboos were broken, from reporting on the king's salary to reporting on
the arrest of high officials close to the palace. Journalists denounce corruption, and some
have called for the resignation of many powerful government and army personalities,
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something that was inconceivable during the reign of Hassan II. The last decade
witnessed an unprecedented opening of the political system in Morocco. Ahmed
Benchemsi, the director of Telquel magazine, critiqued in one of his editorials the
communication skills of King Mohamed VI. He also published the salary and expenses of
the king in one of his reports in December 2004. None of these acts triggered an official
reaction from the government. In 2006, many newspapers, magazines and even the public
TVs and radios published reports on the arrest of the chief of security of the royal palaces
about his alleged connections to a drug lord. No journalist could ever dream or imagine
publishing such sensitive information during the reign of Hassan II, without some
daunting consequences. However, the government still interferes with the content of the
media in ways that do not serve the country's democratic transition and its image abroad.
According to Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ), two international organizations dedicated to the freedom of the press in the world,
the actions of Moroccan officials against freedom of the press have increased since 2000.
In its "Middle East and North Africa Report," the CPJ states that the government banned
three weekly newspapers, Le Journal, Al Sahiffa, and Demain in December 2000 for
publishing articles questioning Morocco's military activities in the Western Sahara and
for investigating the possible involvement of then Prime Minister Youssefi in a plot to
assassinate the late King Hassan II in 1972. Reporters Without Borders also indicated that
in 2001 the managing editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire was sentenced to three months
in jail and ordered to pay a fine of $200,000 for investigating allegations that the foreign
minister misused public funds while serving as ambassador to the United States. In 2005,
there were a record number of cases brought to court by individuals or the public
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prosecutor against journalists and media outlets. The public prosecutor filed thirty one
complaints against seventeen different publications. The charges ranged from
defamation, to insulting a foreign head of state, to undermining public order, and to
publishing false information and photographs of the royal family without authorization.
Regardless of the media policy and the margin of freedom it may permit, there are
features of the old regime that re-emerge unexpectedly as their cultural and institutional
foundations turn out to be more resilient. Features of the old regime are manifested in the
organizational culture of some media outlets, especially those traditionally run and
controlled by the state. RTM's news coverage offers two appropriate examples. On the
same day that London was hit by a terrorist attack on July 7, 2005, there was a visit of the
Prince of Qatar to Morocco. The RTM news bulletin featured as its top story the King‘s
dinner reception that he organized to honor his guest. The bulletin featured the coverage
of the Prince's arrival at the airport and his meeting with the King. The coverage entailed
even the ceremonial listening to Moroccan and Qatari national anthems. This took thirty
minutes. After that came the letter the king wrote to the Queen of England to express his
condolences at the aftermath of the tragic event, and only after that did the station provide
coverage of the terrorist attack. In case one missed the news in French, the Arabic version
which airs immediately after the French, repeats the full news story including the
ceremonial listening to the national anthems.
On a Saturday morning of April 26, 2008, a fire broke out in a mattress factory in
a sub-urban neighborhood in Casablanca, killing fifty five workers and injuring dozen
others. RTM reported on the story in the main prime time evening news at 20:00 only
after reporting on the royal activities. The king presided over a ceremony of a signature
150

agreement, had a meeting with his aunt Princess Lalla Amina to congratulate her on
becoming a member of the Advisory Board for the International Special Olympics
committee, and finally had a meeting with the local authorities of the city of Meknes to
discuss the city's rehabilitation programs. The last King-related story was about his
condolences to the fire victims and his instructions to the authorities to investigate the
causes of the tragedy. These stories took twenty four minutes. The ten minutes coverage
of the fire consisted of a description of what happened, using testimonies from witnesses,
fire fighters, and the survivors. Most of the coverage addressed the causes of the tragedy
and heroic role of the firefighters. The coverage also included the visit of the Minister of
Interior to the scene.
The independent press severely critiqued the coverage of the channel of what they
called a national tragedy and by so doing, challenged the ―holiness‖ of the royal
engagements. They expressed the humiliation the average Moroccan felt when they saw
their public television give priority to routine activities over human tragedy.
The legal, economic and political environments are certainly more open and
conducive to more freedom than they were during the years of lead. There is still more
work to be done with regard to the media policy and the organizational culture in
formerly state-run media institutions. The law still provides for jail sentences for
journalists, and the Audiovisual Communication Law has too many restrictions on what
private radio and TV stations can and cannot do. State run television seems to be stuck in
the old regime, and it seems that resistance to freedom and democracy emanates more
from within the media institutions and less from without. Media policy can improve but
the remnants of the old regime still persist.
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3. 5. Conclusion: A Proposed Model for Morocco's Media System
I developed a tentative model that visually describes the current media system. It
is an unstable media system that seems to be swinging back and forth from
developmental to authoritarian. The media in Morocco during Hassan II regime (19611999) seems to fit the authoritarian model. The recent progress that Morocco witnessed
regarding human rights improvements and the recent liberalization of the audiovisual
sector with its new media policies and regulations put Morocco's media more or less in
line with the philosophies of the developmental media system. Morocco‘s transitional
media systems can be placed on a continuum between authoritarianism and
developmental.
For the sake of clarification I propose a simplified model of the current Moroccan
Media system. This model points to the overarching presence of authoritarianism in the
Moroccan media system, but also points to the recent changes in the role and function of
media.
Figure 3. 1. A Proposed Model for Morocco's Media System

Legal, economic, and political environments

Authoritarian

Morocco‘s Media
system

Developmental

Legal, economic, and political environments
Source: Authors‘ Fieldwork, 2008.
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This chapter provided a historical review of radio and television. It
reviewed the major stages of their development, with a particular focus on television.
Second, it examined the history and current status of media policy in Morocco.
The chapter also answered the question of what media system best describes Morocco's
media during the periods 1956 – 1999 and 1999 – 2008. It described the governmentmedia relationship in light of the world media systems, and the role of Moroccan
broadcast media in the processes of nation-building and the democratic transition
period.
In order to better understand the nature of the Moroccan television public
broadcasting system, the next chapter will investigate the contents of the programs of Al
Oula and 2M. This study will help shed more light on the nature of the media system. It
will address the public service function of Moroccan public broadcasting. Focus will be
one the principle of universality of appeal and in particular on access to and participation
in public television. Access and participation refer to the demographic characteristics of
hosts and guests of the programs, the language used in the programs, the availability of
means of feedback, the thematic location (Urban versus rural themes).
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Chapter Four: Content Analysis
4. 1. General Introduction
As noted in Chapter Three, since 2002, the Moroccan government has given
policy considerations to regulate the use of television as an important outside source for
promoting its development goals. In 2004, the Audiovisual Communication Law assigned
public service obligations to the two major television stations in Morocco: Al Oula and
2M. The two stations have to increase the percentage of development oriented programs
and grant an important portion of their programs to national productions. Based on the
theoretical analysis in Chapter Two, the public service broadcasting principles will serve
as the criteria on the basis of which the public service function of Al Oula and 2M will be
evaluated. The focus of the content analysis will therefore be on the principle of
universality of appeal, and in particular on the questions of access to and participation in
public television, including the provisions for minorities. Contrary to developmental,
participatory, and public service theories of television, the contents of the two public
service television stations do not seem to allow for access and participation. My major
hypothesis is that television programming decisions in the two public stations seem to be
influenced by the elite upper-middle class, who want more entertainment and have less
need for educational programs than their rural and urban-poor counterparts. The two TV
stations seem to promote a cultural agenda that benefits only a small privileged segment
of Moroccan society and seems to shy away from, if not prevent, the possibility of
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allowing the concerns and perspectives of the poor and marginalized to be highlighted.
It is important to note that audiences are active interpreters of media texts
(Croteau & Hoynes, 2003, p. 269). The notion of active audiences is both a critique of the
notion of an all-powerful media, and an expression of faith in the intelligence and
autonomy of people. While my content analysis points to some facts about Moroccan
public service television and to their potential effects on Moroccan audiences, an
examination of the audience‘s interpretive activity remains essential, because it is in the
process of audience reception that media texts acquire their full meaning (Croteau &
Hoynes, 2003, p. 270).
4. 2. Methodology
Content analysis is one of the best known and most widely utilized research
methodologies in the study of mass communication (Berger, 2000, p.173). Content
analysis is traditionally a quantitative research endeavor. Berelson (1952) describes it
as a ―research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the
manifest content of communication‖ (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Berg (2007) defines content
analysis as a ―careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular
body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings‖ (Berg,
2007, p. 303). However, users of content analysis have debated whether analysis
should be quantitative or qualitative. Some insist on the quantitative nature of
content analysis (Silverman, 1993; Neuendorf, 2002). Others argue that
communication cannot be limited and confined to numerical measurements (Berg, 2007;
Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). They call for a blend of both qualitative and quantitative
analysis. Wright (1986) defines content analysis as ―a research technique for the
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systematic classification and description of communication content according to certain
usually predetermined categories. It may involve quantitative or qualitative analysis, or
both‖ (in Berger, 2000, p. 173).
Content analysis addresses manifest and latent content. Manifest content are the
elements in the text that are ―present and countable‖ (Berg, 2007, p. 308). Quantitative
analysis is very effective in coding manifest attributes of texts. Latent content is the
symbolic and underlying message and needs interpretive reading and examination (Berg,
2007, p. 308). Because this study attempts to understand the potential manifest and latent
meanings of television programming and their potential effect on the development role of
the Moroccan public service television, both quantitative and qualitative analysis will be
used.
4. 2. 1. Quantitative Content Analysis
Before making decisions on the categories to be investigated, the sampling
method, and the unit of analysis, I conducted a pretest content analysis of twelve locallyproduced television programs. They represent a variety of shows meant to educate
audiences on issues of economy, health, and politics. The initial sample consisted of
twelve shows from both public TV channels that were broadcast at different times from
January 2006 to January 2008.43 This preliminary data collection and analysis informed
the subsequent data collection decisions. This technique allows for the refinement of the
categories to be investigated in the content analysis, and for making informed decisions
regarding sampling.
43

As noted in Chapter I, in November 2004, the national media reform law assigned public service
obligations to the two major television stations, but it was not until January 2006 that the two public
stations were committed to these obligations.
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The categories that the content analysis will investigate are access and
participation, which constitute the foundation of the first principle in public service
broadcasting: universality of appeal. Universality of appeal means that the TV shows
must cater to the different tastes and interests of all the segments that constitute society.
The operational definitions of access and participation are as follows. In the preliminary
data collection and analysis, I observed that most participants (either as hosts or guests)
in the television shows are males from urban centers, in particular the country's capital
Rabat and the economic capital Casablanca. Access then means the extent to which
regular citizens from all regions of Morocco have a chance to express their views on
public television. Participation refers to the opportunities of the public to participate in
the production of content. Participation looks at whether there are means whereby
audiences can give feedback to the television shows and to other audiences. To have
access to and be able to participate in public television requires language skills. Access
and participation entail the following sub-categories: the demographic characteristics of
hosts and guests of the TV shows, the languages being used in the television shows, the
availability of means of feedback, and the thematic location (urban vs. rural themes
discussed). The quantitative analysis will then consist of investigating the manifest
content of the programming. The operational definitions of the four sub-categories are:


The demographic characteristics of hosts and guests of the TV shows: They
include gender, geographic location, and lifestyle.



The language used in the programs: they include the use of darija,44 Modern
Standard Arabic, French, Amazigh, or any combination of them.

44

Darija is a variation of Arabic and is a dialect spoken in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It has a few

157



The availability of means of feedback: they include phone calls and text
messaging. E-mail feedback is not counted considering the high percentage of
computer illiteracy in Morocco (estimated at 90% according to the Ministry of
Communication, 2006)



Thematic location refers to whether the themes discussed in the show relates
to urban or rural issues.

4. 2. 1. 1. Sampling. Sampling is the process of systematically selecting that
which will be examined during the course of the study. The sample consists of all locally
produced shows in both public stations over the span of one year, from January 2007 to
January 2008. The reason why I choose to work on the period between January 2007 and
January 2008 is that, after the launching of the National Initiative of Human
Development, both stations witnessed a remarkable increase in development programs
that aim to support the government's developmental goals and to foster its projected
democratic reforms.45 Besides, in November 2004, the national Audio-visual
Communication Law assigned public service obligations to the two major television
stations, but it was not until January 2006 that the two public stations were committed to
these obligations. The content analysis will focus on the period from January 2006 to
January 2008, in particular on the second half of this period to make sure that the public
television stations have started to carry out their public service obligations.
The sample includes all the shows that are broadcast during three main time
vocabulary words from Amazigh, French and Spanish. It is an oral language, not used in writing. The
official languages are modern standard Arabic and French.
45
This period includes two irregular television seasons: the summer (June through August) and the Muslim
holy month of Ramadan (Mid-September to Mid-October). Some shows do not air in the summer.
Ramadan is a month of fasting where the audiences‘ eating habits are disrupted, the fact that affects
primetime placement. Therefore, some shows either did not air or were placed outside of primetime, and
were therefore excluded from the sample.
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blocks, pre-prime time (19:00 - 20:30), prime time (20:30 – 23:00), and post prime time
(23:00 – 00:00). Primetime witnesses the highest ratings and is therefore more significant
in terms of audience exposure. This sample size consists of seventy eight shows. The
shows are locally produced, non-fiction, and they deal with such development themes as:
education, politics, economy, culture, and society. They include talk shows,
newsmagazines, documentaries, game shows, reality-based shows, debate shows, and
practical advice shows. It is important to note that other foreign and locally produced
drama and fiction shows (e.g. television series, films, and sit-coms, and music) and sports
programs (e.g. live concerts or soccer games) are broadcast during prime time and are
excluded from the sample.
The unit of analysis is the television show. I analyzed a total of seventy eight
shows. The shows were broadcast daily, weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly. The following
table illustrates the breakdown of the sample:
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Table 4. 1. Breakdown of TV shows Sample
Frequency
Daily
Weekly
Bi-weekly
Monthly

Number of TV shows
by frequency
2
14
6
9

Systematic sampling
by TV show46
10
2
2
2

Number of TV shows
aired per year
71247
51448
12049
6650
Total:

Total of the
sample size
20
28
12
18
78

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.

I sampled ten daily shows, two weekly, two bi-weekly and two monthly shows. Two
shows are daily bringing the total to twenty shows. Fourteen shows are weekly bringing
the total to twenty eight shows. Six shows are bi-weekly bringing the total to twelve.
Finally, nine shows are monthly bringing the total to eighteen. Therefore the total number
of shows that I viewed and analyzed is seventy eight shows.

46

The sampling was systematic and then randomly selected ten of the daily shows, and two of the weekly,
biweekly, and monthly shows.
47
The total number of shows aired during the year: 365 multiplied by 2 daily shows.
48
The total number of weekly shows per year; nine shows did not air for twelve weeks during the two
summer months of July and August and Ramadan; one show aired in July through September; one show
aired only in July and August; two shows aired all year; (see table 1, and table 2).
49
The total number of bi-weekly shows per year; Four shows did not air during the two summer months of
July and August.
50
The total number of monthly shows per year; 2 shows did not air during the two summer months of July
and August.
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Table 4. 2. Breakdown of TV shows by TV station: Al Oula
Program

Frequency

Length

Number of shows
aired

Number of shows
analyzed

Istehlek bla ma tehlek

daily

5 min

356

10

Hiwar

weekly

1h 30min

40

2

Moudawala

weekly

52 min

40

2

100% Chabab

weekly

52 min

Oussar wa Houloul

weekly

52 min

Kadam dahabi

weekly

52 min

51

52

40
52

12

53

2
2
2

Lalla Laârossa

weekly

1h 30min

8

2

Tifaouin

bi-weekly

52 min

20

2

Macharif

bi-weekly

24 min

20

2

Echo Eco

bi-weekly

52 min

20

2

Macharia/ Entreprendre

monthly

52 min

10

2

618

30

TOTAL

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.

51

The show aired all year.
The show aired July through September 2007.
53
The show aired during July and August 2007.
52
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Table 4. 3. Breakdown of TV shows by TV station: 2M
TV Show

Frequency

Length

Number of shows
aired

Number of shows
analyzed

Sihatouka Koula Yawm

daily

10 min

356

10

Majallat Al Barlamane

weekly

24 min

40

2

Rihanat Moujtamaa

weekly

24 min

40

2

Tiyarat

weekly

24 min

40

2

Challengers

weekly

1h 30min

1054

2

Challenger Innovation

weekly

1h 30min

55

7

2

Macharif

weekly

24 min

20

2

Islam Soulouk wa Mouamalat

weekly

24 min

52

2

Generation

weekly

52 min

48

2

Abwab El Medina

weekly

52 min

40

2

Diwan

weekly

52 min

40

2

Eclairage

bi-weekly

52 min

20

2

Marocains du Monde

bi-weekly

52 min

20

2

Moubacharat Maakoum

bi-weekly

1h 30min

20

2

Maroc en Mouvement

monthly

52 min

10

2

Moukhtafoun

monthly

52 min

10

2

Grand Angle

monthly

52 min

10

2

Entre les Lignes

monthly

52 min

656

2

Tahqiq

monthly

52 min

10

2

Toubkal

monthly

52 min

10

2

TOTAL

819

48

SUB TOTAL

1437

Percentage of the analyzed shows

78
5.42 %

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.

4. 2. 1. 2. Coding. In terms of coding, researchers generally adopt existing coding
schemes that were established by other researchers. Sometimes, they have to develop
their own coding schemes especially for research on categories that have not yet been
coded before. In order to obtain coder reliability, Berger (2000) points out, one must
provide operational definitions for the ―various activities in the text that are to be coded‖

54

The show aired February 2nd through April 6th.
The show aired from April 13 to May 25th, 2007.
56
This show, described by 2M‘s website as monthly, aired only six times in 2007.
55
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(p. 183). As noted above the operational definition of the four activities are:


The demographic characteristics of hosts and guests of the shows: They
include gender, socioeconomics, education, and geographic location.



The language used in the programs: they include the use of darija, Modern
Standard Arabic, French, Amazigh, or any combination of them.



The availability of means of feedback: they include phone calls and text
messaging. E-mail feedback is not counted considering the high
percentage of computer illiteracy in Morocco (estimated at 90% according
to the Ministry of Communication, 2006).



Thematic location refers to whether the themes discussed in the show
relates to urban or rural issues.

To measure these activities, twelve variables were used. ―ID‖ refers to the
television station being analyzed: Al Oula and 2M. ―Prog‖ refers to the actual television
show to be analyzed. They are thirty-one television shows, eleven from Al Oula and
twenty from 2M. ―Genre‖ refers to the genre of the show; they include Talk show,
Newsmagazine, Documentary, Game/quiz show, Reality show, Practical advice show,
Public Affairs, and Debate show. This variable is measured qualitatively. I used the
television stations grids to assign genres to the shows. ―Theme 1 & 2‖ refer to the
theme(s) that the show addresses. They include politics, economy, education, culture,
society, family, religion, youth, women, environment, health, and sport. This variable is
measured qualitatively. ―Length‖ is the variable that deals with the length of the
television show: the shows were either 24 minutes, 52 min, less than 10 min or more than
52 min.
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The most important variables are gender, lifestyle, language, and thematic
location. The variable of ―gender‖ refers to the gender of the participants in the show, the
ones who participated by speaking and expressing an opinion or a point of view. This
variable is measured. It refers to whether the standard of living being portrayed, talked
about, or shown as part of the TV show is that of the Moroccan elite or the average
Moroccan. I divided the elite into two broad categories, Francophone and Arabophone
elite. What distinguishes these two elite groups is the use of language: Modern Standard
Arabic or French. Since the average Moroccan uses darija, the use of Modern Standard
(MS) Arabic and French are elite choices, not those of the average citizen. ―Language‖
designates the use of MS Arabic, French, darija, Tamazight and a combination of any
two of these. What is meant by ―combination‖ is the situation where the show features
participants that use different languages. For instance, some would use MS Arabic, while
others use French. In this case, the show would usually have two hosts: one speaks MS
Arabic, the other French. ―Thematic location‖ refers to whether the theme discussed in
the show relates to urban or rural issues or a mix of both. ―Urban issues‖ deal with topics
related to urban life such as real estate projects, transportation, etc. ―Rural themes‖ mean
topic exclusively meant for residents in rural areas, such as issues of soil and water
conservation, the use of fertilizers, schooling in rural areas etc. By a ―mix of urban and
rural themes,‖ I mean issues related for instance to marketing of agricultural products or
migration problems which involve both urban and rural matters. This variable is
measured qualitatively. Finally, two softwares were used for data computing, data
collection and analysis: Microsoft Excel and SPSS. (See Appendix A for the quantitative
content analysis data results in SPSS.)
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4. 2. 2. Qualitative Content Analysis
Content analysis is primarily a quantitative research endeavor, but it requires
some qualitative analysis as well (Berelson, 1952). Macnamara (2006) argues that ―in
many cases, in-depth analysis of selected content using qualitative research methods is
required to fully understand the potential meanings of media texts‖ (Macnamara, 2006).
However, precise methodology for qualitative content analysis is poorly defined. McKee
(2004) points out that there is an odd lacuna at the heart of cultural studies of the media.
He argues that although textual analysis is the central methodology, and yet there is no
straightforward published guide as to what it is and how it is done (McKee, 2004). The
work of Miles and Huberman (1994), Denzin & Lincoln (1994), and Silverman (1993)
have informed research procedures for qualitative text analysis. These methods which are
applicable to analysis of media content include text analysis, rhetorical analysis, narrative
analysis, discourse analysis, interpretative analysis and semiotic analysis (Macnamara,
2006).
I will use interpretive analysis because it is the approach that is most likely to give
the best answers to the research questions. Interpretive content analysis will help uncover
and capture the essence of the television programs in so far as their contents relate to
development. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that ―the hallmark of qualitative
research is that it goes beyond how much there is of something to tell us about its
essential qualities (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 215). The unit of analysis is the
locally-produced television shows. They include news bulletins, talk shows,
newsmagazines, documentaries, game shows, and television series. These shows address
the themes of education, politics, economy, culture, and society.
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4. 2. 2. 1. Sampling. Sampling for qualitative analysis is different than sampling
for quantitative analysis where statistically valid formulae are required. Miles and
Huberman (1994) argue that sampling strategies for qualitative research should be driven
by a conceptual question, not by concern for ―representativeness‖ (p. 29). For instance,
since qualitative research is meant to investigate certain issues or themes in detail,
random or even representative sampling methods may not capture the desired themes and
may not therefore yield to useful results. However, sampling for a qualitative study does
not and should not simply be drawn at the researcher‘s whim. According to Miles and
Huberman (1994), a strong research design and analytical approach will incorporate more
than one of the sampling strategies. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest three techniques
which can be used together to yield rich results in qualitative analysis:


Selecting apparently typical cases;



Selecting confirming and disconfirming cases;



Selecting extreme and deviant cases.
The selection of all these cases occurs after some portion of data collection and

analysis has already been completed. Some patterns emerge that make obvious the fact
that there are shows that confirm the hypothesis of this analysis, and shows that do not.
Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I selected one confirming case to lend richness and
depth to patterns emerging from data analysis, and one disconfirming case that does not
fit emergent patterns or allow for rival explanations. Finally, I include two extreme cases
in order to develop a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study.
4. 2. 2. 2. Description of Data. By choosing a combination of
confirming/disconfirming and exceptional examples for this study, this content analysis
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can explore the boundaries of the data and identify the range of views including typical,
discordant and extreme cases. The sampling approach proposed by Miles and Huberman
allows exploration of discourse at various points. Sample size is an important concern in
qualitative research. Typically, researchers continue sampling until they achieve
informational redundancy or saturation. This means, they reach the point at which no new
information or themes are emerging from the data. The sample consists of four television
shows, two from each public service television station: two confirming cases, one
disconfirming, and one extreme case.
4. 2. 3. Conclusion
The description of the television shows is an important starting point for this content
analysis. This description is guided by some considerations and questions:
1. What are the duration and genre of the show?
2. Who hosts the show?
3. What happens during the show?
4. What are the themes addressed in the sampled shows?
The second step consists of a descriptive task to display the results of the
quantitative analysis in terms of descriptive statistics, and an analytical task to delineate
and discuss the findings. This last section will focus on the interpretive analysis of the
contents of four shows.
4. 3. Description of the Television Shows
4. 3. 1. Al Oula Shows
Lalla Laaroussa (Darija: her highness the bride) is a ninety minute prime time
weekly show that airs on Saturdays at 21:20. The show is in darija and takes place inside
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the studio with a live audience. The show is hosted by a popular film and television actor,
Rachid El Ouali, and a TV host Rachid El Idrissi. This show is currently in its third
edition. The shows I analyzed were taken from the second edition. Here is the premise of
the show: five newly married couples are selected to participate in a three months long
competition to win a luxurious wedding ceremony, a free honey moon trip, and a new
furnished apartment, all paid for by Al Oula. The five newly wed couples are living with
their parents and could not afford their dream wedding ceremony, honey moon, and
obviously an apartment. These couples are from low socio-economic backgrounds, all
living in urban areas, Fez, Khenifra, Essaouira, Oujda, and Salé. The mothers in law also
participate in the show.
The competition consists of quizzes and games. The couples are asked questions
to test how much they know about each other, and trivia questions about Morocco's
history, music, films, etc. The show also includes music performances from pop
Moroccan bands.
Oussar wa Houloul (Arabic: Families and Solutions) is a 52 minute talk show
aired weekly on Fridays at 21:00 and hosted by Ms. Fatima Kheir. The show uses a mix
of MS Arabic and darija. It takes place inside the studio without a live audience. It
consists of a discussion about family issues such as matrimonial relationships, juvenile
delinquency, education, etc. The host invites one or two specialists such as a
psychologist, a social worker, or officials from a ministry, depending on the topic being
discussed. The guests also include private citizens concerned with the topic such as
patients, parents, and children (if necessary). The show is in darija and speaks in plain
terms about the issues. The host introduces the topic and then invites the guests to define
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the problems and speak about their own experiences. The show is centered around the
guests, not the host.
The shows that I analyzed discussed the issues of adolescence and children of
divorce. In both shows, the host introduces the topic, and then asks three couples to speak
about their teenage children and the problems they face. They identified drugs, rebellion
against all forms of authority, and difficulties in communication as the problems they
face. The specialist was a psychologist, Dr. Ibrahim Ibrahimi, who commented on the
stories of the parents.
The second show, about children of divorce, consisted of the same format. Three
single mothers and one single father were asked to tell their stories; and a psychologist
(Dr. Ibrahim Ibrahimi) and a female representative of the ministry of Family commented
on the parents' stories.
Moudawala (Arabic: Deliberation) is a fifty-two minute weekly reality-based
show that airs on Thursdays at 20:10. The show uses a mix of MS Arabic and darija. It is
hosted by Dr. Rachida Ahfoud, a university law professor. The show aims at raising
awareness about legal issues, with a focus on the new family code, Moudawana, a legal
text that gave new rights to women in matters of divorce, custody, and child support. The
show consists of an introduction by the host, then the fictional re-enactment of the court
case, then a commentary by the host. Ahfoud‘s introductory presentation takes place
inside a studio where she introduces the court case, then the re-enactment in a fictional
form which involves the re-enactment of the court hearings, and finally the host's
commentary. The court cases are based on true events; they are taken from the courts‘
archives, and have been ruled on by a court of law.
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The first show I analyzed dealt about the problem of divorce. It talked about a
newly married man who fell in love with another woman and decided to divorce his first
wife. The show demonstrated the effects of the new Moudawana, Family code, on the
judges‘ decisions. The second show dealt with the story of a fist fight that turned bloody.
The two young men involved used knives to settle their fight, the fact that led to the
hospitalization of one of the men. The show portrayed the story and then the court
hearings. The scenes in the court room were also enacted. The show demonstrated in a
very simple language the intricacies of the legal system in Morocco. It also portrayed a
positive image of the Moroccan legal system.
Al Kadam Addahabi (Arabic: the Golden Foot) is a ninety minute weekly reality
television show that airs during primetime Friday evening. The show is in darija and MS
Arabic and consists of a soccer competition meant to discover new young soccer talents.
The show travels to all major cities in Morocco to offer the opportunity for all young
people to participate in the local competitions leading to a final list of seventy five
players. These players benefit from a training camp for six weeks leading to the selection
of thirty two players. The latter participate in one of two teams that play a final game.
The show takes place at the training camp, and portrays the daily life of the
participants, the training, the meetings, and the decision of the judges at the end of each
day and at the end of each major phase of the show. The moment of the judges‘ decision
is supposed to be the climax of the show. This is an all male show, all the participants,
the hosts, the trainers and the judges are men. Famous soccer players attend as guests
meant to inspire the young participants, they also participate as coaches.
100% Chabab (Arabic: 100% Youth) is a weekly twenty four minute show. The
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show is in darija and addresses youth issues such as music, arts, and sports. The show
focuses on urban youth mainly from Casablanca, Rabat, Meknes, Marrakech, and Fez. It
consists of briefly introducing a young artist and letting him/her speak about his/her
experience. The music of the artists is played as background. Many of the shows that I
viewed dealt with rap, hip hop music, and dj-ing. Many Moroccan youth are attracted to
these new styles of music and the show tries to highlight this phenomenon. Young people
speak spontaneously about their lives and experiences.
The shows I analyzed introduced the rappers, Massinissa from Rabat, J-O from
Casablanca, new rap bands Maktoub3lina from the city of Meknes and Bad Mic from
Rabat, DJ Red Dog from Rabat.
Tifawin (Amazigh: Lights) hosted by Khadija Rachouk, is a fifty minute weekly
documentary. It is in MS Arabic. The show deals with Amazigh cultural productions in
literature, poetry, story telling, music, theatre, and painting. The show takes the viewers
to different parts of Morocco, urban and rural, and tries to get the viewers closer to an
understanding of the richness of Amazigh cultural productions. The documentary speaks
primarily via a male voice (a voice over) that comments on the images and the
personalities. The voice over is in MS Arabic. The show also speaks through live
testimonies of Amazigh artists and cultural critics, and they speak either in MS Arabic or
Amazigh.
One of the shows that I analyzed was part of four episodes about a pop music
band called Izenzaren. The show started off with showing the lead singer, Abdelhadi
Igout, visiting his village, greeting his family and old friends. In the mean time, the
narrator talked about the departure of this musician from his village and about his music
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experience abroad. The show then featured a testimony of a cultural critic who spoke in
MS Arabic. He talked about the band members and the friendships that tied them up
together. The rest of the show consisted of an interview with the lead singer Abdelhadi
Igout. In-between these segments, the show used some of the band's songs as background
music for images of the lead singer, his village, and the band.
Entreprendre (French: Business Undertaking) is a monthly fifty-two minute show
hosted by Abdelkamel Sabbari. It is in French. The show takes place inside the studio
without a live audience. The show consists of two segments: a short documentary about
the topic and a panel discussion. Two to three guests are invited to speak. The first show I
analyzed dealt with citrus farming. The documentary was about a modern farm that
specializes in exportation of citrus to the European Union. The guests were an
agricultural engineer, a government official, and a representative from the Regional
Bureau of Agricultural Investments. The second show was about marketing agricultural
products in the Moroccan market. The short documentary was about the difficulties many
small farmers find in selling their products at local markets. The focus was on the middle
men who buy directly from the farmers at low prices and sell the products at the local
markets at high prices. A representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and a member
of the Chamber of Commerce of the capital Rabat debated the issues.
Macharif (Arabic: prospective) is a twenty-four minute weekly show hosted by
Yassine Adnane. It is in MS Arabic. The show takes place inside the studio without a live
audience. It is a talk show where the host invites one of Morocco's literary figures and
discusses with him or her a cultural or literary issue that appears in one of the guest's
newly published book. The discussion can also be on a problematic issue in the cultural
172

or literary life in Morocco. The last segment of the show is devoted to introducing the
viewers to the latest books in the market. The show claims that it aims to narrow down
the gap between the general public and the literary circles by using a language that is
more accessible and understandable. Although the show addresses itself to the cultural
and literary elite, it also aims at reaching out to students. Another aim of the program is
to promote Moroccan books and to promote the habits of reading. The shows I analyzed
featured authors Laila Chafie and Mohammed El Maazouz.
Hiwar (Arabic: dialogue) is hosted by Moustapha Alaoui, one of the most senior
journalists in Al Oula. It is a live ninety minute bi-monthly show. The show takes place
inside the studio with a live audience. The Moroccan political elites are invited to answer
questions from the host and three journalists on current political issues. Heads of political
parties, labor unions, and members of the government are asked to explain their positions
to the large public on a variety of issues. The show uses a mix of darija and Arabic. The
first show that I analyzed invited the head of the Islamist political party, Party of Justice
and Development, Mr. Azzedine El Atmani. The second show hosted Mr. Thami El
Khiari, General Secretary of the Front of Democratic Forces.
Stahlak blama t’hlak (Arabic: Consume Wisely) is a five minute daily advice
show on everyday consumption hosted by Mr. Driss El Iraqi. The show takes place inside
the studio without a live audience. The host speaks directly to the camera. The show is in
darija. It gives advice on how to manage one‘s budget, what kind of tooth brush or
electric bulbs to buy, how to clean one‘s fridge, etc. The ten episodes I analyzed dealt
with the following issues: types of tooth brushes, how to save money in one‘s electricity
bill, the danger of extensive use of cell phones, how to purchase a safe gas heaters,
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changing car coil, cleaning air-conditioner's filters, maintenance of silver ware,
pedestrian safety, how to get rid of batteries safely, children's car seats, and different
types of sun screens.
4. 3. 2. 2M Shows
Toubkal (the name of the highest summit in the Atlas Mountains) is a fifty-two
minute monthly show about travel and tourism in Morocco. The show is in French. It is a
documentary that each month covers an area in Morocco and the activities that a tourist
may undertake. The show features a voice-over narration in French interrupted by
commentaries from the tourists. The two episodes I analyzed are part of a series of
episodes entitled ―Toubkal: from the Valley of Ziz to the Old Gardens of Rabat.‖ The
first episode portrayed the Valley of Ziz in the southern desert of Morocco; it consists of
palm groves and small gardens. A group of French tourists are shown horseback riding
while the narrator talks about the beauty of nature and at times the tourists comment on
their experience and their feelings. In the second show, the camera moves to Rabat,
Morocco‘s capital, to talk about the old gardens in the city. The French colonizers built
the ―modern‖ part of the city and they wanted it to have many green spaces. The show
portrays what is left from the old gardens; it features the areas where the old gardens
existed, and the gardens that still exist.
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Grand Angle (French: Broad Viewpoint) is hosted by Reda Benjelloun is a
monthly fifty two minutes TV documentary that addresses social, political and cultural
issues in Morocco. The show starts off by an introduction in French to the themes
addressed in the episode. The show then consists of footage with voice over and
testimonies. The voice over of the footage is in French but the testimonies are mostly in
darija and are subtitled in French. The themes addressed are pedophilia in Morocco,
prostitution, Moroccan immigrants' experiences abroad, etc. The first show I analyzed
dealt with the new life of former government ministers. It dealt with their experiences
after their terms as government ministers ended. The second show addressed the unique
experiences of three young Moroccan. The first one overcame his physical handicap and
writes poetry. The second was an immigrant in Spain who realized his dream of
becoming a banderillas. The last one was also an immigrant; he lived in France and
managed to realize his dream of becoming a clothing designer.
Mokhtafoun (Arabic: the Missing) is hosted by Adil Benmoussa. It is a monthly
fifty-two minute TV documentary devoted to helping families find their relatives who
have disappeared. The show organizes its episodes based on the reasons for and the
nature of the disappearances: disappearances of minors and teenagers, disappearances
amongst handicapped people, disappearances of illegal immigrants, etc. It addresses a
handful of disappearance cases. A segment of the show is devoted to family members
making calls for whoever might have seen their relatives, they hold a picture of their
relative and plead for information on their relatives. The host and the voice over both use
MS Arabic.
The first show I analyzed deals with children out of wed locks. Mothers abandon
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their children because they cannot afford to raise them. The show talks about the reunion
of a young woman with her family. She was abandoned by her mother at the age of six
and managed to find her mother's and grand parents' home at the age of twenty-four.
The second show talks about the experience of three men who left their homes in
their villages to find work in the city or overseas. The show also features a reunion of
deaf and mute child with his family after fourteen years of separation. Hicham Ennouari
left his small village in Ben Ahmed and ended up living in the city of Taroudant where a
family adopted him.
Moubacharatan Maakoum (Arabic: Live on Air with You) is hosted by Jamaa
Goulehcen. It is a bi-weekly talk show of ninety minutes. The show takes place inside the
studio with a live audience. It is devoted to discussions about current social, political,
economic and cultural events and issues in Morocco. The guests are chosen depending on
the topic under discussion, usually involving academics, activists, social workers, and
government officials. On very few occasions, the guests involve some ordinary citizens.
The discussion is mostly in Moroccan darija and Arabic. The show addresses issues like
the legislative elections, political parties, intellectual property, labor conditions in the
agricultural sector, hooliganism in Moroccan sports, women's rights and the new
Moudawana, etc. The panel consists of five to seven participants. Before the discussions
start, the show runs a short documentary on the issue of the day. Later in the show, the
show features testimonies of regular citizens from various cities commenting on the
issue. The panel is asked to comment on both the documentary and the testimonies.
The first episode I analyzed dealt with the new changes in the political scene in
Morocco. In preparations of the 2009 elections, political parties were working on creating
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new coalitions and this triggered many questions. A panel of three political parties‘
members, two political analysts, and one journalist debated the issues. The second
episode dealt with the phenomenon of drugs in high schools. A panel of two school
administrators, two local associations‘ representatives, a journalist, and a psychologist
debated these issues.
Al Islam, soulouk wa mouamalat (Arabic: Islam, Behaviors and Transactions) is
hosted by Moustapha Samadi. It is a weekly twenty-four minute advice show that aims at
educating viewers on various aspects of Islam. The show takes place inside the studio
without a live audience. It focuses on showing what behaviors good Muslims should
display at work, at home, and in society in general. The show consists of a presentation
by Samadi of the topic. This part of the show is in Arabic. The second segment of the
show consists of answering viewers‘ email questions. Alhassan Attalib, a young religious
scholar, provides answers and advice in darija. The first show I analyzed dealt with the
issue of honesty and the second dealt with the issue of a husband's responsibility vis à vis
his wife.
Challengers, hosted by Mr. Thami Lghorfi, is a ninety minute reality-based TV
show that aims at promoting the spirit of entrepreneurship among Moroccan youth. The
show takes place inside the studio with a live audience. The show encourages young
Moroccans to initiate business projects. The show helps candidates make their project
more coherent and potentially more profitable by setting up meetings between candidates
and successful Moroccan business people as well as banking and accounting experts,
consulting and communication agencies. Major banks and companies offer funding to the
top ten projects.
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I analyzed the third edition of spring 2007. The show first traveled to eight
Moroccan cities and one European city, Paris. The candidates must be under 35 years and
must have a project. Out of 2500, twenty one candidates were selected for the final
rounds. The candidates stayed in Casablanca for one week, and underwent some tests and
interviews. The twenty one candidates participated in the semi finals and five were
selected to participate in the finals where they all passed before a jury live on television.
The show consisted of seven short daily summaries of five minutes to show the different
local competitions in various cities and the daily activities the participants undertook in
Casablanca. The short summaries aired from March 1 to April 6, 2007.
The episodes I analyzed were the semi finals and the final which took place on
March 23, 30 and April 6, 2007. They were broadcast live for ninety minutes on Friday at
21:30. The show consisted of a discussion on the various business projects by a panel of
business men and women, communication, banking and accounting experts. The
candidates were asked questions by the jury at the end of which they were asked to give a
brief presentation to convince the jury and the audience that their project was good. There
were two winners, one selected by the jury and one by the audience. The live audience
and the viewers at home could vote for their favorite candidate, and could determine the
winner by sending cell phone messages. The show used both French and darija. The jury
was made up of five men. Out of the twenty one semi finalists, four were women. Out of
the five finalists, one was a woman.
Challenger Innovations has a similar format. It is also hosted by Mr. Thami
Lghorfi. The show takes place inside the studio with a live audience. The show consists
of seven short daily summaries of five minutes over the span of one month (October
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2007), and three live prime time shows of ninety minutes. Out of 600 applicants, eighty
were pre-selected to defend their projects before a jury made up of five men. Ten were
selected to participate in the semifinal and the final. The jury in the finals was made up of
three men. Of the ten semi finalists, one is a woman, and the three winners were all men.
Maroc en Mouvement (French: Morocco in Motion) is a fifty-two minute monthly
newsmagazine. It deals with entrepreneurship in Morocco. Each episode talks about the
experiences of three or four successful business ventures. In the same spirit as
Challengers, it tries to inspire and motivate youth to take charge of their future and carry
out business projects. The show consists of three to four documentaries on business
ventures. Besides the narration, the show features testimonies of the owners of the
businesses and their partners. The first show I analyzed talked about Lahcen Ahansal, a
marathon champion (Marathon des Sables), who is working on creating a company on
sports events management. The second story was about Youssef Dakhamat who started
off with a small business of renting camels to tourist; he was successful and managed to
expand his business and build his own hotel. Both Ahansal and Dakhamat‘s stories
highlighted the fact that new entrepreneurs should stay tied to their origin and land. The
last two stories were about two winners of the 2006 edition of Challengers, Abdelkrim
Mostalih and Rachid El Aouad. The show gave audiences an update on their projects and
showed their success.
The second show I analyzed tells the story of three projects. The first is an update
on the project of the winner of the 2005 edition of Challengers, Mustapha Essafi. His
project consists of making environment friendly smoke filters, called ―Eco-filters.‖ His
project is now a reality. The second story is about a women‘s cooperative created in 2005
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named ―Al Ofoq.‖ It was created by twenty women and its major activity is the raising
and selling of rabbits. The last story is about Youness Boudiane, a passionate surfer, who
created his own surfing company.
Rihanate Moujtamaâ (Arabic: Challenges of a Society) is hosted by Mohamed
Amrani. It is a weekly twenty-four minute TV debate show that addresses everyday
Moroccan social issues. The show takes place inside the studio without a live audience. It
is in Arabic and involves two guests and the TV host. Issues discussed are tied to the time
of year the show is on. For instance, in September, the issues addressed are linked to
preparations for school year. In July and August, the show addresses issues like how
Moroccans organize their vacations, and Moroccan immigrants return to their home
country, etc. The first show I analyzed dealt with the issue of global warming. The
guests were Mr. Abdellah Mouqssid, an international expert in climatic changes, Mr.
Mustapha Chhalli, a consultant, and Mr. Naoufal Belghazi, a journalist in the daily
l’Economiste. The second show dealt with the Moroccan government's decision to add
one hour for daylight saving. The guests were Mr. Abderrahim El Hafidi, a high official
from the Ministry of Energy, Water and the environment, Mr. Driss Benali, a university
professor, and Mr. Samir Chaouki, Director of the daily newspaper Al Massae.
An Al Osra (Arabic: about the Family) is a twenty-four minute monthly talk show
hosted by Ms. Meryem Faraji. The show takes place inside the studio without a live
audience. It deals primarily with family issues such as marriage conflicts, wedding
planning, adolescence, working mothers, etc. The show uses a mix of darija and Arabic.
The host introduces the topic and then invites the guests (families, single parents) to
define the problems and speak about their own experiences. The host invites a specialist,
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a psychologist, a social worker, an official from some ministry to comment on the guest‘s
stories. The first episode I analyzed dealt with the issue of communication within
families. Is there dialogue between the family members? Who do some families resolve
their conflicts in courts? Can families educate their children on the principles of dialogue
from an early age? These questions were discussed among three families and two
communication university professors. The second show dealt with the issue of working
mothers. The show first discussed the difference between women who choose to work to
further their professional careers, and the women who must work to provide for their
families. The show focuses on the mothers who are the sole providers for their children.
They are either divorced or married to unemployed husbands.
Tahqiq (Arabic: Investigation) is a monthly fifty-two minutes show. It is a
newsmagazine that deals with various social issues. The narration is in MS Arabic while
the testimonies of interviewees are either in darija, MS Arabic or French. Issues
discussed are: drug addiction, religious discourse in Morocco, pedophilia, women's
rights, Moroccan immigrants and racism, etc. The first episode I analyzed dealt with the
issue of Moroccan brain drain. Many highly educated and skilled Moroccans chose to
leave the country for better money and better working conditions. The show interviewed
some of these immigrants in France and Germany. The second show addressed the issue
of women wearing the Muslim veil. The show defined this phenomenon as new and
interviews some women who chose to wear veil and some who did not. The show also
featured the experiences of five women: a housewife, a banker, a business woman, a
student, and a secondary school teacher.
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Eclairages (French: illumination) is hosted by Nadia Hachimi. It is a monthly
fifty-two minute debate show devoted to economic, environmental, educational, and
social issues. The show is in French with no Arabic subtitles. It takes place inside the
studio without a live audience. The show consists of two segments: a short documentary,
then one on one discussion with a guest. If the show deals with two topics, which it
usually does, then the two segments are repeated. The guests are usually CEOs of some
big companies, economic consultants, or high government officials. The show deals with
issues such as alternative medicine, new agricultural productions, the state of public
transportation, water preservation, Moroccan NGOs, investment in Morocco, etc. The
first show I analyzed deals with two issues: after school programs and the business of
selling gold plates. The second show dealt with the topics of luxury skin treatments and
the used car market.
Diwan (Arabic: Record) is hosted by Mokhtar Benabdellaoui; it is a weekly
twenty-four minute debate show that deals with literary issues. The show takes place
inside the studio without a live audience. The language used is Arabic. The show‘s goal
is to introduce audiences to the recently published books. The guests are a book author
and one or two literary critics. The show consists of the host introducing the book and the
author, and then inviting the authors to present his/her book. The critic is then asked to
comment on the books. The second part of the show consists of giving homage to an
author who died and who had published literary books. At the end of the show, the host
reads a list of new published books. The first show I analyzed introduced the book Nidam
Azzaman Al Arabi by Redouan Salim. The show gave homage to an author, Abdellah
Ibrahim, who died in 2005 and introduced and discussed many of his books. The guests
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were the author Redouan Salim, and two university professors Damia Benkhouya and
Mohamed Mazouz. The second show was about the author Hassan Amilli and his book
Le Djihad Marin dans l’Estuaire de Abou Regrag. The show gave homage to Mohammed
El Manouni, a historian.
Tiyarat (Arabic: Waves) is hosted by Mr. Abdessamad Benchrif; it is a weekly
twenty-four minute TV debate show that addresses Moroccan everyday political issues.
The show takes place inside the studio without a live audience. Issues of economic
development, Moroccan expatriate communities and their relations with Moroccan
governmental bodies, implementation of socially oriented policy, Middle East peace
process – all these issues are covered in Tiyarat. The show is in Arabic and involves two
guests and the TV host. The show features discussions among representatives of political
parties, government ministries, and NGOs. In the first show I analyzed, the host invited
Mr. Ismael Alaoui, General Secretary of the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) to
discuss the aftermath of the legislative elections of September 2007. The second show
hosted Mme. Latifa El Abida, the Secretary of State in charge of Education to discuss the
2007 alarming World Bank report on education in Morocco.
Sihati Koula Yaoum (Arabic: My Health Every Day) is a five minutes daily
advice show on health related issues hosted by Ms. Meriem Saad. The show takes place
inside the studio without a live audience. It is in Arabic. It addresses issues of hygiene,
nutrition, sleep disorders, benefits of sports, children‘s health, etc. The show consists of
the host speaking directly to the audience about the issues. The shows I analyzed dealt
with the following issues: how to eat balance meals, the influence of sleep on
productivity, bad eating habits, how to manage stress, skin care, breast feeding, eye care,
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child safety, fitness, and teen obesity.
Abwab Al Madina (Arabic: the Doors of the City) is a fifty two minutes weekly
documentary about a city in Morocco hosted by Mr. Said Bel Fakir. It deals with the
history of the city, the economic, cultural and tourism potentials of the city, the customs
of its inhabitants, and the cities' current problems. The show is in Arabic, and some
testimonies are either in darija or French (with Arabic subtitles). The show consists of
three major segments. The first segment consists of an interview with the mayor of the
city. The second segment is about a trip in the city where the host tries to prove that a
visit to any city does not cost more than 100 dhs (8 US$). The host uses the local
transportation to visit many monuments, buys a gift from a local handcraft shop, and has
lunch. The idea is to promote national tourism for all segments of the Moroccan
population by showing them all the monuments and proving that it does not cost much to
see so many places. The last segment deals with other interviews with tourism officials,
local hotels owners, and keepers of typical tourist sites. The idea here is to inform
viewers about any potential itineraries. The episodes I analyzed covered the cities of
Rabat and Safi.
Generation, hosted by Mr. Samid Ghailan, is a weekly twenty-four minute talk
show. The show takes place inside the studio with a live audience. It addresses primarily
youth music. The show focuses on urban youth mainly from Casablanca, Rabat and
Marrakech, and Fez. Many of the shows that I viewed dealt with rap, hip hop music, and
dj-ing. It consists of five main segments: an interview with a band or a singer, then the
listing of the top ten songs announced by a female co-host (Halima), a second interview
with a young artist or successful young entrepreneur), then a segment on internet news
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and new video games announced by a female co-host (Ismahan). The last part is devoted
to a music video of guest band or singer.
The first show I analyzed was a devoted to a Lebanese-Canadian rap singer
Massari. The interview took the major part of the show. The top-ten list was announced,
together with the internet news and the video games update. The second show analyzed
featured a rap band Kelma, made up of six young men and one young woman. The band
talked about their last album that became a sound track of a new film. The show also
featured Saïd Arsalan, the winner of the third edition of the show Challengers in 2007
who was asked to give an update on his project. Finally the show featured three students
from a private school that organized a goodwill event in favor of 600 orphans.
4. 4. Quantitative Content Analysis
The first principle of public service broadcasting is universality of appeal. This
principle refers to the extent to which the television shows cater to the different tastes and
interests of all the segments of society. The quantitative analysis consists of examining
the manifest content of the television shows. The areas that I investigated relate to issues
of access to and participation in public service television. Access and participation refer
to the gender and geographical location of the hosts and guests of the television shows,
the languages used, the availability of means of audience feedback, attending to urban
versus rural themes, and the portrayal of the average versus elite lifestyles. Based on the
content analysis results, Al Oula and 2M restrict access to and participation in public
service television to only the male, urban, wealthy and highly educated classes of
Morocco.
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4. 4. 1. Representation of Gender
The content analysis of the television shows confirms my hypothesis that women
are misrepresented in Moroccan public service television. The television shows of both
stations featured more men than women, with 70.7% of men and 29.3% of women. For
Al Oula, the percentage of female participants is 23.3% compared to 76.6% for male
participants. For 2M, the percentage of female participants is relatively higher with
33.4% compared to 66.7% for male participants. According to the Haut Commissariat au
Plan--Moroccan Census Bureau‘s statistics of 2004, women make up 50.7% of
Morocco‘s population, while men constitute 49.3%. Though women make up more than
half of Morocco's population, less than one third of the hosts and guests featured on
television are women.
Of the 78 shows analyzed, thirty three do not feature women, compared to only
one show that does not feature men. The latter is the daily show Sihatouka Koula Yawm
(Your Health Everyday), a five minutes daily show about health and hygiene issues. The
thirty three shows comprise a variety of daily, weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly shows and
they address issues of the economy, politics, sports, and education. Besides, Al Oula's
Hiwar and 2M‘s Moubachatan Maakoum, two highly rated prime time live shows, did
not feature women. They are both debate shows on politics and current events and are
highly respected because they are the first live uncensored shows in Moroccan television
history. All the five participants in Hiwar and the six participants in Moubacharatan
Maakoum are men, and they are from Rabat and Casablanca.
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Figure 4. 1 Representation of gender
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Figure 4. 2. Representation of gender in Al Oula shows
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Figure 4. 3. Representation of gender in 2M shows
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4. 4. 2. Use of Language
The results show that 35% of the shows use a mix of darija and Arabic, 17.9%
use French alone, 15.4% use Modern Standard Arabic alone, 15.4% use darija, 10.3%
use a mix of darija and French, and 2.6% of the shows use a mix of Tamazight and
darija. It is important to note that while the use of a mix of darija and Arabic has the
highest percentage 35%, it is followed by the use of either Arabic or French with 33.3%.
What is even more striking is that the number of shows that use French alone is higher
than the number of shows that use darija alone or Arabic alone. Seven shows use French,
while six use Arabic and only two use darija alone. It is important to note that the
percentage of language use defers between the two stations. Al Oula‘s content uses darija
more than 2M. 40% of the content is in darija, and 26.7% use a mix of Arabic and darija,
while only 6.7% of the content is in French. Most of 2M‘s content is a mix of Arabic and
darija with 41.7%, 25% is in French (compared to 6.7% for Al Oula), 20.8% is in Arabic,
and 12.5% is a mix of French and darija. 2M does not offer a show in darija alone.
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The choice of language restricts access to and participation in public television for
a large portion of Moroccan society. The choice of language allows access and
participation for only the wealthy and highly educated classes of Morocco. Moroccans
speak darija, a derivative of Arabic, in their everyday life, but both public service
television stations mainly use formal Arabic and French. In 2004, 43% of the Moroccan
population aged ten and above are illiterate (Haut Commissariat au Plan, Moroccan
Census Bureau, 2004). The illiteracy rate is at 60.5% in rural areas and 29.4 in urban
areas, 54.7% among women and 30.8% among men. Half the literate population, 28.5%
of the Moroccan population aged ten and above, knows how to read Arabic and French.
19% or one third of the literate population knows how to read and write Arabic alone
(Haut Commissariat au Plan, Moroccan Census Bureau, 2004). French and Arabic are
the languages of the elite.
Figure 4. 4. Use of language
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Figure 4. 5. Use of language in Al Oula shows
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Figure 4. 6. Use of Language in 2M shows
2M Language Use
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4. 4. 3. Availability of Feedback
In terms of availability of means of feedback and the opportunities of the public to
participate in the production of content, the results show that the overwhelming majority
of shows do not offer the means for audiences to give feedback. For Al Oula and 2M,
89.7% of the shows do not offer the opportunity of audiences to send feedback. It is
important to note that feedback includes only the possibility of making phone calls,
sending cellular phone text messaging directly to the show, or conducting street
interviews. E-mail feedback, which many shows provide, is not counted considering the
high percentage of computer illiteracy in Morocco (estimated at 90% according to the
Ministry of Communication, 2006). For Al Oula, none of the shows offer means of
feedback. For 2M, 16.7% of the shows offer their audiences means of feedback. Two
types of feedback have been identified: cellular phone text messaging and street
interviews. Both forms of feedback are not used to obtain feedback on the quality of TV
shows. They are used to get audiences opinions on the theme(s) being discussed in the
television show. There are no TV shows that use the phone as a mean of receiving
feedback from its audience. There are four shows in 2M that use feedback:
Moubacharatan Maakoum, Challengers and Challenger Innovation (use both text
messaging and street interviews), and Mokhtafoun (uses street interviews only).
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Figure 4. 7. Availability of feedback
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4. 4. 4. Geographical Location
The results show that 21.5% of the participants in the television shows were from
Rabat, 31% were from Casablanca, which means that 52.5% of the participants are from
the country's capital Rabat and the economic capital Casablanca. It is important to
mention that Al Oula‘s headquarter is in Rabat and 2M‘s is in Casablanca. Both stations
have regional offices in the major cities of the country. Morocco‘s population is 29.8
million. Casablanca‘s population is 3.6 million and Rabat‘s is 2.3 million. The population
of these two cities represents 19.80% of the overall Moroccan population, yet 52.5% of
the participants in the two TV stations is from Rabat and Casablanca.
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Figure 4. 8. Geographical location of participants 1
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Figure 4. 9. Geographical location of participants 2
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4. 4. 5. Urban and Rural Themes
With regard to the extent to which the television shows address urban and rural
themes, the results show that 70.5% of the shows address urban themes, while 29.5% deal
with issues related to a mix of rural and urban themes, and 0% dealt with issues
exclusively related to rural issues. For Al Oula, the percentage of shows that address
urban issues is 56.7%, compared to 43.3% for a mix of urban and rural themes, and 0%
for rural themes alone. For 2M, the percentage of shows that address urban themes is
79.2%, and 28.8 for a mix of urban and rural themes, and 0% for rural themes alone.
55.1% of Moroccans live in urban areas while 44.9% live in rural areas (Haut
Commissariat au Plan—Moroccan Census Bureau, 2004).
It seems like unless a rural theme has some relevance or connection to an urban
issue, it does not get covered by the two public service television stations. Besides, the
issues of concern to rural areas residents do not seem to be worthy. As a result, poverty,
illiteracy, ill health and low incomes in rural Morocco are unseen, unacknowledged, and
unattended.
Figure 4. 10. Representation of urban versus rural themes
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4. 4. 6. Portrayal of Lifestyle
Portrayal of lifestyle refers to whether the standard of living being portrayed,
talked about or shown as part of the TV show is that of the Moroccan elite or the average
Moroccan. I divided the elite into two broad categories: arabophone and francophone.
What these two groups have in common is that as hosts or guests, they are always dressed
up in Western clothing, business like attire for both males and females. What
distinguishes these two elite groups is the use of language: Arabic and French. The use of
Arabic and French are elite choices. The average Moroccan uses darija. Results show
that 24.4% of the shows featured a lifestyle that belongs to the francophone elite and
32.1% to the arabophone elite. This means that 56.5% of the shows featured Moroccan
elites‘ lifestyles and 33% of the shows featured the average citizens‘ lifestyles. Al Oula
portrayed less elite lifestyle than 2M. 63% of the lifestyles portrayed belong to average
citizens, 33.3% to the elite lifestyle, 13.3 francophone and 20% arabophone. 2M
portrayed more elite lifestyle with a total of 70.8% elite lifestyle, 31.2% Francophone and
39.6% arabophone. The average lifestyle portrayed is 16.7%.
The themes discussed when the elite lifestyle is portrayed on public television
deal with issues that are not of concern to the majority of Moroccans. For instance, 2M
show Eclairage, a francophone elite show, addresses topics such as home interior design,
weight loss, and cosmetic surgery. For the average Moroccan, weight loss is a problem
because of lack of food, not because of the risks of obesity, blood pressure, and heart
failures. What is most significant is not so much the amount of elitism that is portrayed,
but the bitter taste the topics may leave in the average Moroccan's mouth as they see their
own public service television so detached from their lives.
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Figure 4. 11. Portrayal of lifestyles
Lifestyle

Elite
Elite/Average
Average

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.

Figure 4. 12. Portrayal of lifestyles in Al Oula shows
Al Oula Lifestyle

Elite
Elite/ Average
Average

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.
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Figure 4. 13. Portrayal of lifestyles in 2M shows
2M Lifestyle

Elite
Elite/Average
Average

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, June-July, 2008.

4. 4. 7. Discussion of Findings:
The content analysis findings substantiate the hypothesis that the two public
service television stations do not allow for access or participation for the majority of
Moroccans and limit the access and participation to only a small urban elite minority. As
noted in Chapter Three, the Audiovisual Communication Law and the Licensing
Obligations documents of both TV stations assign public service obligations whereby the
two TV stations must satisfy the general public' needs for information, education, and
entertainment. They have to provide a diversified and general programming meant to
appeal to the largest audience possible. The stations must contribute to the socioeconomic
and cultural development of the Nation notably by encouraging development at the
regional and local levels. The Licensing Obligations went even further to specify the need
to help citizens understand issues of importance to their lives, so that they can make
informed decisions and carry out their duties as effective citizens.
With TV shows that portray male dominance with 70.7% of the guests being
males, and urban dominance with 70.5% of the shows addressing urban themes, and
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52.5% of the shows‘ guests being from Rabat and Casablanca, it is very difficult to see
any affinities between the goals set and the means used to achieve those goals. Besides,
one of the least used languages (15.4 %) by the TV shows, i.e. darija, is the very
language that most Moroccans use.
Television is the most important source of information for the majority of
Moroccans. Considering the percentage of illiteracy in Morocco, this majority is made up
of large numbers of non-literate or marginally literate individuals who live out their lives
in print-scarce environments with few or no reading materials in their homes. Inequalities
in television access involve, borrowing some commonly used phrases in academic and
popular writing about the Internet, a skills divide and a content divide (Chadwick, 2006).
The skills divide refers to the ability of TV audiences to understand and use TV contents
to further their social advancement. The content divide refers to the extent to which the
TV audiences‘ cultures are adequately reflected in the TV contents.
While physical access to television is available, the TV shows do not present their
contents in a way that requires the language skills the TV audiences already have. The
shows‘ contents demand skills or competencies that TV audiences do not have. The fact
that the contents of TV shows communicated in darija, a language spoken by all
Moroccans, are less than those communicated in French, a language spoken by a small
minority, is indicative of the distance between the TV contents and their target audiences.
The content divide reinforces the skills divide and creates a vicious circle of
exclusion (Chadwick, 2006). Even if the TV shows create more relevant content, the
audiences would likely be uninterested and unmotivated in acquiring the skills since there
is little awaiting them on TV. The percentage of Morocco‘s rural population is 44.9, and
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yet not one single show deals exclusively with rural issues, and only 29.5% of the shows
contents deal with a mix of rural and urban themes. It is worth mentioning here that
70.5% of the shows address urban themes. Therefore, for a rural person, it is not
interesting to learn the skills since issues that matter to him or her are not portrayed on
TV anyway.
Catering to the urban elite tastes and needs projects an undemocratic social order.
It is undemocratic in the sense that it limits the possibilities of television to play the
development role it is supposed to perform, and limits the possibilities for participation in
public discourse. Television gives legitimacy to what it shows. For instance, if most
people featured on television are from urban centers, wear suits and ties, and speak
Arabic or French, this would present the average Moroccan with the list of things he or
she doesn't have: to speak French and Arabic and to look a bit Western, or at least not to
look aroubi (rural person). Many people feel more comfortable in their djellabas and
traditional hats or turbans (Ennaji, 2005). Many feel comfortable speaking their own
dialect, be it Amazigh or darija. French and Arabic, because of their extensive use in
media, seem to have acquired more credibility than darija and much more than
Tamazight (Ennaji, 2005). Instead of broadening public debates, a function that the public
service mandate imposes, television seems to create a narrow space where only a few can
participate. For instance, some shows rarely feature women and rarely feature
participants from cities other than Casablanca and Rabat. Al Oula‘s shows: Hiwar, Eco
Echo, Entreprendre, Macharif. 2M‘s shows include Majalat Al Barlaman, Diwan, and
Tiyarat.
Finally, public service broadcasting is accountable to its audiences, and it
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emphasizes the significance of the public control, rather than government or private
interest control. The accountability principle implies that the audience can demand that
the media provide content that is important and significant to them. Given the fact that
feedback mechanisms are absent, it is not clear how TV stations can determine the
success of their mission. None of the shows allow for audiences‘ feedback on the quality
of the programs. It remains to be seen in Chapter Five whether TV producers use other
mechanisms (such as focus groups) to obtain audiences feedback.
4. 5. Qualitative Content Analysis
This qualitative content analysis supplements the quantitative analysis. It attempts
to uncover and capture the essence of the television programs in so far as their contents
relate to development. The sampling method is used to explore the boundaries of the data
and identifies a range of TV shows that include confirming, disconfirming and extreme
cases. By choosing a combination of confirming/disconfirming and extreme examples,
this study provides the reader with a clearer idea of the type of shows the two TV stations
offer. I will analyze four different TV shows. The first show is a confirming case; it is a
2M documentary Toubkal that confirms the study‘s hypothesis that the two TV stations
seem to promote a cultural agenda that benefits only a small privileged segment of
Moroccan society. The second is a disconfirming case; it is an Al Oula‘s special program
on the Equity and Reconciliation Commission‘s (Instance d'Equité et Reconciliation)
(IER) public hearings. Finally, the third and the fourth shows are extreme cases and show
the extent to which both television stations are distant from their public service mandates.
One case is a popular and highly rated prime time 2M sit com Rbib (Arabic: the Step
Son), and the other consists of two examples from Al Oula‘s prime time evening news.
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4. 5. 1. Confirming Case
Toubkal is a fifty-minute monthly documentary about travel and tourism in
Morocco. It is a documentary that each month covers an area in Morocco and the
activities that a tourist may undertake. The episodes take place in remote areas of the
Atlas Mountains. The show portrays typically a group of French tourists riding their dirt
bikes through villages in the Middle Atlas Mountains, or engaged in other activities such
horseback riding, hiking, or mountain climbing. The narrator is a French speaking male
with a low pitched voice. The tourists also comment on their experiences and on the
beauty of the landscape.
What is significant is how Moroccans living in those areas of the Atlas Mountains
are portrayed. First, the viewer does not have to be a cultural or media critic to see the
contrast between the sophistication of the tourists‘ equipments and lifestyle, and the plain
and elementary lifestyle of the Moroccans. The Moroccans featured in the show are most
often barefoot malnourished children standing by their homes and gazing at the tourists,
old women carrying large piles of wood, and teenage girls walking their mules to fetch
for drinking water. They do not speak; they just stare at the camera and at the tourists and
see what seems to be a reality beyond their reach pass through their village. While the
narrator speaks of the beauty of the landscape, or the tourists comment on the pleasures
of their undertaking, the Moroccans do not speak, they are just there. The show portrays
Moroccans as part of the landscape; they are no different than the beautiful pastures
tourists admire, or the purity of the air they breathe. Moroccans are portrayed as part of
Mother Nature, as props in the documentary and as human backdrop in the tourists‘ photo
albums.
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This show is broadcast during prime time in Moroccan public service television
and is meant to propose touristy itineraries exclusively for the foreign nationals and the
Moroccan French speaking elite. What adds more disgrace to Moroccan identity is the
fact that the narrator either does not make any effort or simply cannot pronounce Arabic
sounds properly. Sounds like ―h‖ or ―q‖ or ―r‖ are unpronounced leaving popular names
such as ―Mohamed‖ to be pronounced like ―Moa‘ med.‖ It is indeed a disservice to the
culture and identity of Moroccans to see their authentic names being mispronounced by a
French speaking narrator in their own public service television. It is important to note that
Morocco was a French colony from 1912 to 1956.
4. 5. 2. Disconfirming Case
Al Oula aired a special program on a newly created bureau of investigations,
called Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance d'Equité et Reconciliation)
(IER). King Mohamed VI created this commission in 2003 to investigate the state and
police abuses of the old regime and the past human rights violations that took place in
Morocco from 1956 to 1999 (a.k.a. the years of lead). The IER‘s mission is to answer
questions about Morocco‘s past, and to study the causes that allowed for such abuses to
happen. Morocco can then use these lessons to build a stronger, open and more
democratic future.
The IER looked into cases of political prisoners and missing persons. It organized
public hearings in different provinces in Morocco. The public hearings were an
opportunity for many of the victims of State abuse to voice their pains and sufferings.
These hearings were broadcast live on Al Oula. The public hearings offered an
opportunity for former prisoners to testify. The relatives of those who were killed in jail
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or disappeared were also given the opportunity to speak about their ordeals. Some of the
most striking stories were those of the political prisoners of the infamous jail of
Tazmamart. Tazmamart refers to a prison that was built in the early seventies to shelter
the fifty eight military officers for allegedly participating in the July 1971 and August
1972 coups d'etat. Marzouki (2001), one of the prisoners, described it as ―hell on earth,‖
and would make Guantanamo prison facilities look like a five star hotel. The prisoners
were thrown there and forgotten for eighteen years with a bare minimum of food and no
medical attention (Marzouki, 2001). Of the fifty eight prisoners, only twenty eight
survived. The jail was closed in 1994 after international pressure, and the public hearings
allowed its residents and their relatives to speak live on television about their ordeals.
Clearly the public hearings were a moment of national therapy: looking at the
issues that stigmatized the nation, ruined its image abroad, and instilled dreadful fear
amongst its citizens. It was an historic moment, a moment of looking at the past with
sober eyes. The live broadcast was a moment of therapy for a nation that endured abuse
for many years, and now finally is given the chance to tell its story to itself and to the
future generations. The public hearings were broadcast live on Al Oula, and there were
many debate shows devoted to it in both Al Oula and 2M.
4. 5. 3. Extreme/Deviant Case # 1
The sit com Rbib (Arabic: the Step Son) tells the story of a family whose life
changes with the arrival of the step son from the father's previous marriage. The father
(Ismael) is a wealthy businessman. The mother (Aida) is a housewife from a wealthy
family. She spends her days shopping, hanging out in rich people's clubs, and in beauty
parlors. The daughter (Fatine) is a smart teenager, managed to get in a prestigious
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business school; she is always in conflict with her mother. The son (Mustapha) is a
teenage boy who studies at a French school. Both Mustapha and Fatine live a western
lifestyle, and seem disconnected from their own Moroccan culture and traditions. The
step son (Alwane) is a young adult, unemployed, and always looking for means to make
easy money. The maid (Ghizlane) is a young woman who is obsessed with the idea of
marriage and thinks that marriage will get her out of her condition. The guard/gardener
(Bahloul) is a young man who finds satisfaction in serving the home owners.
What is significant in this sitcom is the representation of domestic violence. Many
episodes of this show reproduce and normalize images of domestic violence. Ismail, the
father, screams at the maid and pushes her around for not ironing his shirt. Alwane, the
step son slaps Fatine, his sister, for seeing her talking to her boyfriend at a bus stop. None
of these acts get punished in the sitcom. Besides, the jokes‘ punch lines in the sit com are
most of the time meant to demean a person for not being rich enough or poor enough, not
being smart enough or beautiful enough. The gardener‘s name is Bahloul, which in
Arabic means ―a retard.‖ In most scenes, he is subject to humiliation and ridicule. As an
audience we are supposed to laugh at his ―hypothetical‖ weaknesses.
In one episode, a neighbor gets punched in the face by her husband, and comes to
Ismail‘s house for safety. Paradoxically, instead of calling the police, Aida tries to
console the wife but also explains to her that a woman‘s place is in her husband‘s home
and that divorce is shameful. Ismail and Alwane try to convince the husband that physical
violence is not an appropriate act. The solution to this ―crime‖ was to appease both
partners and talk them into reconciliation. The abusive husband does not go to jail, the
abused wife gets an apology and has no guarantees that the abuse will not happen again.
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These acts of violence, both physical and emotional, find their excuses in the
sympathy audiences feel for the two characters. The characters of Ismail and Alwane are
the ones audiences sympathize and identify with. Ismail is the hard working caring father
who spends countless hours worrying about providing for his family. He is also a
religious person, who mentions Allah all the time. He also plays the role model of a
father who accepts the responsibility of re-uniting with his son. Alwane is the step son
who lived in poverty all his life and had just found a new home where he tries to balance
between his duties as the older brother and the unwanted guest. The show portrays as
normal a reality where people get away with abuse. The television sitcom Rbib
normalizes domestic violence, propagates and glorifies social injustices.
4. 5. 4. Extreme/Deviant Case # 2
With regards to the fourth case, Al Oula's news coverage offers two appropriate
examples. On the same day that London was hit by a terrorist attack on July 7, 2005,
there was a visit of the Prince of Qatar to Morocco. The Al Oula news bulletin featured as
its top story the King‘s dinner reception that he organized to honor his guest. The bulletin
featured the coverage of the Prince's arrival at the airport and his meeting with the King.
The coverage entailed even the ceremonial listening to Moroccan and Qatari national
anthems. This took thirty minutes. After that came the letter the king wrote to the Queen
of England to express his condolences at the aftermath of the tragic event, and only after
that did the station provide coverage of the terrorist attack. In case viewers missed the
news in French, the Arabic version, which is broadcast immediately after the French,
repeats the full news story including the ceremonial listening to the national anthems.
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On Saturday morning of April 26, 2008, a fire broke out in a mattress factory in
Issassfa, a poor sub-urban neighborhood, in Casablanca, killing fifty six workers and
injuring dozen others. Al Oula did not report the story until the main prime time evening
news at 20:00. The news bulletin started with the royal activities. The king presided over
a ceremony of a signature agreement, had a meeting with his aunt Princess Lalla Amina,
to congratulate her on becoming a member of the Advisory Board for the International
Special Olympics committee, and finally had a meeting with the local authorities of the
city of Meknes to discuss the city's rehabilitation programs. The last King-related story
was about his condolences to the fire victims and his instructions to the authorities to
investigate the causes of the tragedy. These stories took twenty-four minutes. The ten
minutes coverage of the fire consisted of a description of what happened, using
testimonies from witnesses, fire fighters, and the survivors. Most of the coverage
addressed the causes of the tragedy and the heroic role of the firefighters. The coverage
also included the visit of the Minister of Interior to the scene. The cause of the high
number of deaths was due to the fact that the workers were locked up inside the factory.
There were no exit doors open, let alone emergency fire escape exits. According to the
TV news report, the factory management had a policy of locking up the factory to prevent
workers from stealing.
The independent press severely critiqued the coverage of the channel of what they
called a national tragedy. They expressed the humiliation the average Moroccan felt when
they saw their public television give priority to routine activities over human tragedy. The
royal activities are always meaningful and therefore newsworthy because royal decisions
affect all Moroccans. Yet for Al Oula to present them as more newsworthy than the tragic
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death of fifty-six Moroccans makes the royal activities lose their credibility. Clearly Al
Oula discredits the very holiness they try to instill in the royal engagements.
4. 5. 5. Discussion of Findings
As a cultural critic, I have come to understand and study television from a cultural
studies perspective. In a most general level, television is a technology, a social, economic,
cultural, and ideological institution (D‘Acci, 2004, p. 374). As a technology, it produces
electronic images and sounds; as a social institution, it produces viewers and helps in
their socialization process; as an economic institution, it produces consumers; as a
cultural institution, it produces programs and schedules that tell people who they are,
where they are, and when they are; and as an ideological institution, television provides
norms, values and rules that tell viewers what to consider as acceptable and what to
consider as unacceptable (D‘Acci, 2004, p. 374).
As a cultural and ideological institution, television offers viewers images, frames,
and descriptions that they use to make sense of the world around them. Television
provides information about relationships and lifestyles, offers numerous kinds of
prescriptions or guidance, and produces programs that represent gender, class, and nation.
The notion of television representation, considered to be the primary function of
television, invokes the notion of something standing in for something else. It conjures up
the idea that whatever electronic image or scene we see on TV is a portrayal or substitute
of something happening in real life (Hall, 1997). Embedded in the above statement is the
social constructivist view of meaning and representation. There is a material world out
there but it is socially meaningless. It is the language system that social actors use that
gives it meaning and therefore a sense of existence. Social actors use linguistic and other
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forms of expression to communicate meaningfully about the world (Hall, 1997, p. 25).
The language system can consist of verbal sounds, photographic images, marks on a
canvas, or electronically or digitally produced dots on a screen. All these systems allow
us to construct and convey meaning and allow others to read and interpret these meanings
in roughly the same way. Their primary function is mediation.
A number of studies were conducted on how television constructs such themes as
gender, race, class, and ethnicity (Gilroy, 1991; Hall, 1997; hooks, 1990; Dyer, 1994).
Researchers differentiate between social construction of, for instance, gender as it
happens as part of people‘s primary and secondary socialization and the construction of
gender as it is represented on television screens (and other socialization apparatuses such
as film, literature, and art) (D‘Acci, 2004; McQuail, 2002). For instance, as part of his
primary socialization, a boy at some point in his life starts adopting the behaviors of men
around him, behaviors he would consider to be completely natural. (It is important to note
that social constructionists believe that there is no such thing as a real manhood out there
in nature and that masculinity is a social construct made possible through human
interactions and use of symbolic systems such as language, film, comic art). Some argue
that the representations of masculinity on television serve to reinforce and strengthen the
primary socialization. What is implied here is that the difference between the two forms
of socialization is fundamental and that primary socialization, directly connected to the
material world, is more profound. Others argue that it is the socializing agencies like
family, schools, churches that buttress media representations.
The power of television, as a cultural and ideological institution, lies in the fact
that there are important elements in the material world that only television (newspaper,
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magazine, film, radio, and internet as well) represents and makes meaningful. The
concept of nation is primarily a television representation/construction.57 I derive a sense
of what Morocco is through exposure to various cultural representations, the most
important of which is done by television. Like most Moroccans, I never visited the royal
palace, nor have I visited the prime Minister‘s office or the parliament. Most Moroccans
have never attended the official celebrations in the Capital of Independence Day or of the
enthronement of the king, but they all watched these defining moments and these
symbolic institutions on television. Our knowledge and interpretation of Morocco‘s
national symbols and how we come to imagine our country have very little to do with our
primary socialization or our everyday social reality. Television is the primary source of
representation of our national identity.
According to Richard Hoggart, member of the British Pilkington Committee on
Broadcasting and the Broadcasting Research Unit, one of the great benefits of public
broadcasting of is that ―it allows a nation to speak to itself‖ (in Stacey, 1998, p. 29). The
focus here is on shows that give a sense of national identity and that tells the public, ―this
is who we are today.‖ In other words, an important and vital function of television is to
help society understand itself. Considering the confirming and the extreme cases outlined
above, the two public service television stations give an appalling sense of national
identity. When television news considers royal activities as more newsworthy than a
human tragedy of the Issasfa‘s magnitude, when television portrays Moroccans living in
the rural areas of the middle Atlas as props in the documentary, television communicates
and actively constructs an unusual national identity. Moroccans seem to be defined as less
57

I am not referring here to Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as an ―imagined community.‖ My
focus here is on how we as citizens of this ―imagined community‖ come to perceive it.
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human than the wealthy tourists and their lives as less important than routine royal
activities. Besides content, what is also communicated is the nature of the relationship
between a nation and its citizens, a relationship based on disrespect and contempt. (I do
not claim that this interpretation represents the correct interpretation of these two TV
events, rather it is one possible reading among others, and an examination of the
audience‘s interpretive activity remains essential for media texts to acquire their full
meaning.) If television is to become an important actor in Morocco's development,
television producers and decision makers need to be aware of the kinds of social
constructs they disseminate each day to their audiences. The danger in portraying
Moroccan national identity the way the two public service television stations do is that
they provide images, frames, and descriptions on the basis of which national identities
and national symbols are constructed and defined.
The show Toubkal is a manifestation of the cultural legacy of colonialism. It is
also the continuation of the orientalist legacy of portraying the orient as, in the words of
Edward Said, an exotic place with ―exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes,
remarkable experiences‖ (Said, 1978, p. 97). Said's main thesis in his seminal book
Orientalism is that the Orient is a western discourse that consists of a constellation of
false assumptions, and that this discourse represents the dominant discourse about the
Orient. He also adds that it has persisted till today and has framed much of the western
discourse on Islam and the Arab world. The Orient is Europe's greatest colony and
represents one of its most recurring images of the Other. Said argues that the Orient also
helped define Europe by functioning as its ―contrasting image, idea, personality,
experience‖. Like early orientalist writings, 2M through Toubkal represents this
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contrasting image. It portrays the European (French) as the progressive, the explorer
(invader), and the intelligent, and it represents the orient (Moroccans) as a lower breed, as
the emotional, the mysterious, the passive, and the irrational. It was the 18th and 19th
century Europeans who carried out these symbolic constructions with the aim to justify
colonization of North Africa and the Middle East region. Toubkal and many other shows
in the two public service television stations are carriers of the same distorted, dismissive
and racist discourse, a discourse that constructs the 21st century Moroccan national
identity.
The use of French language in the show Toubkal (as well as other shows) is a
manifestation of the cultural legacy of colonialism. The mispronunciation of Moroccan
names is an indication that the curse of colonialism has still not been dispelled. Said
argues that to restore the formerly colonized nation, or what he calls the ―imprisoned
nation,‖ a national language (and culture) is central. Said refers to Benedict Anderson,
who argued that the first European nations emerged because print capitalism ―gave a new
fixity to language‖ and ―created unified fields of exchange and communication below
Latin and above the spoken vernaculars‖ (Said in Singh and Johnson, 2004, p. 97). In
order to construct a national identity, a unified language has to be in place. Using French
is like opening what Said calls the ―scars of humiliating wounds‖ (p. 96). Said, in an
interview, argued that none of 22 Arab countries have an information policy that dispels
this orientalist vision. All of them are dictatorships and need the support of the West and
they try to avoid challenging the West's misrepresentations. The Arabs keep themselves
collectively in a subordinate and inferior position to the West the fact that fulfils the
expectations that the West has of the Arabs (Media Education Foundation, 2009).
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The apparent distance between Al Oula and 2M and their public service mandates
may be traced to an utter lack of understanding, on the part of television producers, of the
relationship between the television texts and the world they represent and understanding
the processes by which the meanings of these texts are constructed. A TV text that
represents an identity or state of being is a text that represents a particular conception of
power and responsibility. Television producers seem to be either oblivious or indifferent
to the impact TV representations may have on viewers‘ perceptions. Chapter Five will
look into these suppositions and assess their validity.
To conclude, this qualitative content analysis showed that the contents of Al Oula
and 2M greatly hamper the attainment of their public service mandate and their desired
objectives. Thus, because there seems to be a lack of vision about what public service
means, because TV producers seem to be assigned to produce programs for which they
are not trained and/or fail to employ the necessary external input, and because frequent
evaluation of the programs seems to be non-existent, the result is not likely to be what the
public service mandate intended.
4. 6. General Conclusion
Access and participation are the major corner stones for the use of television for
development. Moroccan public service television is in clear violation of its public
broadcasting mandate, i.e. to appeal to all segments of Moroccan society, to offer
opportunities for assess and participation to its audiences, to stay detached from
government interest, and to cater to national identity and community. The two stations
seem to marginalize and dis-empower the very audiences they claim to serve. The two
public television stations construct on a daily basis an undemocratic social order by
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acting as media by the elite and for the elite and by narrowing down the possibilities of
participation for the underprivileged and the poor segments of Moroccan society.
The two public television stations contribute to the reproduction of an
undemocratic social order by misrepresenting women, poor classes, and some ethnic
minorities. Catering to urban and elite tastes does interfere with the government‘s
commitment to using public television for development purposes. If television is to
become an important actor in Morocco's development, television producers and decision
makers need to be aware of the kinds of social constructs they disseminate each day.
Based on the theoretical analysis in Chapter Two, the concept of public service is
the benchmark against which all media systems are assessed (Napoli, 2001). Public
service broadcasting implies that programming decisions should never reflect the
interests of small groups but rather the interest of the population as a whole. McQuail
(1992) argues that a wide range of normative criteria can be embedded in the concept of
public interest, criteria such as freedom, diversity, competition, pluralism, access,
participation, and objectivity (McQuail, 1992). The content analysis results show that
programming decisions do not take into account the interests of the Moroccan population
as a whole, and that criteria such as diversity, pluralism, access, and participation are
virtually absent from the two public service television stations. They appear to be more in
line with the modernization approach where communication and information flow in a
top-down fashion with little or no regard to the receivers' feedback.
Chapter Five will focus on production and will try to uncover some of the reasons
behind the dissonance between the public service mandate and the TV stations' contents.
The production study will be mainly based on the results of the content analysis. The
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chapter will examine the current choices undertaken by the TV producers in the two
public service TV stations. In-depth interviews with media executives will help obtain
insights on the reasons behind this appalling discrepancy between the television's public
service mission and the contents it offers audiences. Focus will be on examining the
constraints in production processes that may influence content. The study will look at
both political and economic constraints; it will address the issues of state ownership and
the degree of political control that may limit TV producers' ability to operate. All
interviewees will also be asked specific questions pertaining to the role of television in
development. The interviews will also unveil whether there is a clear vision for the role
of television in development.
As noted in the introduction, it is important to point out that audiences are active
interpreters of media texts (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003, p. 269). The notion of active
audiences is both a critique of the notion of an all powerful media and an expression of
faith in the intelligence and autonomy of people. While my content analysis points to
some facts about Moroccan public service television and to their potential effects on
Moroccan audiences, the audience‘s interpretive activity remains essential because it is in
the process of audience reception that media texts acquire their full meaning (Croteau &
Hoynes, 2003). Chapter Six is an audience reception study that examines this interpretive
activity through assessing the opinions of television viewers on the quality of Moroccan
produced programs and their perceptions on the public service provided by the two TV
stations.
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Chapter Five: Production Study
5. 1. Introduction
Chapter Three provided a thorough examination of the legal, economic and
political environments where broadcast media operated since 1956, the year of Morocco's
independence. I described the government-media relationship during the periods of
1956 – 1999 and 1999 – 2008 in light of the world media systems. 58 The chapter
addressed the issues of ownership and degree of legal and political control over the
content of news media and the government's tendency to use laws to limit the media's
ability to operate. The media system during the period from 1956 to 1999 was
authoritarian. The broadcast media performed the tasks of supporting the state and
leadership. It was characterized by licensing restrictions, censorship of any opposing
views to the dominant regime, and autocratic power. The progress that Morocco
witnessed since 1999 regarding human rights improvements and the recent liberalization
of the audiovisual sector put Morocco's media more or less in line with the philosophies
of the developmental media system. I pointed out that the legal, economic and political
environments were more open and conducive to press freedom than they were during
―the Years of Lead.‖ There was, however, still a need for more progress with regard to
the media policy and the organizational culture in formerly state-run media institutions.
The law still provides for jail sentences for journalists, and the Audiovisual
58

1956 is the year Morocco got its independence from France. The year 1999 is the end of the Hassan II
era. The period between 1999 – 2008 is the current Mohamed VI‘s era.
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Communication Law has some restrictions on what radio and TV stations can do. In State
run television, features of the old regime re-emerge unexpectedly as their cultural and
institutional foundations turn out to be more resilient. It seems that resistance to freedom
and democracy seems to emanate more from within the media institutions and less from
without. For instance, Al Oula's news bulletins still give priority to routine royal activities
over more newsworthy events.
In the conclusion of Chapter Three, I stated that Morocco‘s transitional media
systems could be placed on a continuum between authoritarianism and developmental.
The developmental media system recognizes the importance of government intervention
in media. The Licensing Obligations documents assign explicitly the public service
functions for Al Oula and 2M. In the preamble, it is stated that the two TV stations must
serve the public interest. They must ensure their public service missions to satisfy the
general public' needs for information, education, and entertainment. They must provide a
diversified and general programming meant to appeal to the largest audience possible.
According to the developmental media system, government intervention can in fact be in
the interest of the public, and not necessarily in the interest of authoritarianism.
Chapter Four demonstrates that government intervention in the two public service
television stations has not so far served the interests of the general public. The content
analysis findings point to the fact that there is an appalling discrepancy between the
television's public service mission and the contents it offers audiences. The two stations
seem to marginalize and dis-empower the very audiences they claim to serve. Moroccan
public service television is in clear infringement of its public broadcasting mandate, i.e.
to appeal to all segments of Moroccan society, to offer opportunities for assess and
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participation to its audiences, to stay detached from government interest, and to cater to
national identity and community.
Chapter Five is a continuation of Chapters Three and Four. It will focus on
production and will try to uncover some of the reasons behind the dissonance between the
public service mandate and the TV stations' contents. The chapter will examine the
current choices undertaken by the TV producers in the two public service TV stations. Indepth interviews with media executives will help obtain insights on the reasons behind
the discrepancy between the television's public service mission and the contents it offers
audiences. I will first review the literature on media production theories. Second, I will
describe the methodology used in this study. Finally, I will delineate and analyze the
findings.
5. 2. Theory
In media studies, one of the prevailing practices in thinking about production has
been to focus on the economic and political forces that influence the media industry
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Marris & Thornham, 1996;
Schiller, 2000; Croteau & Hoynes, 2003). Political economy theorists have examined
how political and economic constraints limit and bias content production and distribution.
The scholars in the Marxist tradition consider media content as an instrument of control
and of the reproduction of the social order. In their book Manufacturing Consent: the
Political Economy of the Mass Media, Herman and Chomsky (1988) put forward a
propaganda model that provides a framework for understanding and analyzing how
mainstream US media work and why they work as they do. The basic argument consists
of saying that the US media are firmly entrenched in the market system and that they and
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their funding sources are profit seeking businesses. They point out that the media
consistently operate on the basis of particular ideological premises and depend on elite
sources for both information and funding. As a result the media participate in propaganda
campaigns that serve the interests of the elite. Herman (2000) quotes political scientist
Thomas Ferguson who contends that the major media, ―controlled by large profitmaximizing investors do not encourage the dissemination of news and analyses that are
likely to lead to popular indignation and, perhaps, government action hostile to the
interests of large investors, themselves included‖ (Ferguson in Herman, 2000, p. 103).
Herman and Chomsky identify five structural forces that function as information
filters and that greatly influence media choices: 1. ownership; 2. advertising; 3. sourcing
(the reliance of the media on information sources provided by government, businesses,
and the "experts"); 4. flak (as a means of disciplining the media); and 5. anti-communism
ideology (as a national religion and control mechanism). These elements interact with
and reinforce one another (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Herman (2000) notes that the
model is ―a model of media behavior and performance [italics in the original], not of
media effects‖ (Herman, 2000, p. 103).
Herman and Chomsky‘s propaganda model as well as other political economy
studies gained respect in Europe and Canada but were largely ignored in the US (Baran &
Davis, 2006). While the political economy has been a dominant approach, other
approaches have also been used to shift the focus to the micro aspects of media
production. Cultural studies theorists were skeptical about the power of the elite to
advance hegemonic forms of culture. They focused instead on how average people
interpreted and resisted these dominant forms of culture. In their review of the literature,
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Whitney and Ettema (1994) cite researchers such as Schudson (1989) and Dreier (1982)
who moved away from the strictly political-economic approach that relates the economic
structure of the media directly to the political content of the news and entertainment.
They argued research should also focus on the individual and organizational processes
that influence or shape production (Whitney and Ettema, 1994, p. 172).
Whitney and Ettema's review also shows that many of the studies conducted and
the research questions asked on media production focused on the relationship between
news production and the political environment. From studies on gatekeeping studies
(Shoemaker, 1991) to Patterson (1980), Gans (1979), Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin's
(1980) work, all addressed the interface between the news media and the political process
(Whitney & Ettema, 1994, p. 159). These studies looked mainly at the issues of
journalists' values and biases and the issues of under-representation of women and
minorities in newsrooms. Other studies looked at television producers of entertainmentoriented programs (Cantor, 1971, 1987; Newcomb, 1982; Tunstall, 1993). Cantor's
(1971) landmark study on television producers investigated the autonomy TV producers
have ―to determine the content of the television entertainment programs,‖ and the
processes they go through to get their programs on the air (Cantor, 1971, p. xvi). Cantor's
study was focused mainly on TV fiction productions.
These studies managed to examine and describe various aspects of the behavior
and performance of Western countries media systems where the media are private and
formal censorship is absent. In Arab countries where ―the levers of power are in the
hands of a state bureaucracy,‖ to use Herman and Chomsky‘s phrase, mass media are
seen simply as a support system for the authoritarian regimes and as serving the end of
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the dominant elite. As I noted in Chapter Three, because Morocco is in a state of
transition from an authoritarian media system to a developmental system, the ―levers of
power‖ are still firmly in the hands of the State. A political economy approach to
studying television production (of Al Oula and 2M) in Morocco will not reveal some
hidden forces of structure that may constrain television production. The forces of
structure are the State because the State owns the television stations and controls the legal
body (HACA) that regulates them.
However, it is important to avoid falling into the trap of oversimplifications
whereby the media that operate in non-democratic societies are seen simply as State
instruments for promoting a narrow set of government-sanctioned images and messages.
What this perception implies is that media professionals are indentured servants with no
agency. While these assumptions are partly valid if we apply them to the way Al Oula
functioned during the ―Years of Lead,‖ where the stations‘ journalists, reporters,
management, and staff were considered salaried employees of the ministry of Interior.59
Most of the work at Al Oula TV and its radio affiliates consisted of writing and
disseminating government press releases.
Western assumptions that media in developing and non-democratic countries are
subject to political and economic bondage overlook their plural and diverse
character and the internal cultural dynamics of these countries. As I noted in
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Ministry of Interior is the government ministry in charge of the police force and internal security. Driss
Basri, a former chief of police, was nominated by late King Hassan II as the Minister of Interior and
Minister of Information in 1979. Basri was late King Hassan II's notorious minister in charge of domestic
security and political repression. Basri is the embodiment of the despotism and the rampant corruption of
King Hassan II's era. The same man was in charge of the media and the police force. Basri held the position
of the Minister of Information until 1995 and the position of interior minister until 1999 when he was
removed by King Mohamed VI. This was a sign that Morocco was heading towards democratic reforms.
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Chapter Three, the recent progress that the country witnessed regarding human rights
improvements and the recent liberalization of the audiovisual sector with its new media
policies and regulations put Morocco's media more or less in line with a developmental
media system. It is an unstable system that swings back and forth from authoritarian to
developmental system, but the political and legal environments after 1999 became
certainly more open and conducive to more freedom than they were during the years of
lead. Many taboos were broken, from reporting on the king's salary to reporting on the
arrests of high officials close to the palace. To understand television production requires a
nuanced approach, based on uncovering multiple layers of ambiguity that address not
only the economic and political environments but also the individual and organizational
processes in production.
This study adopts Croteau and Hoynes‘ (2003) sociological and critical
framework whereby the researcher looks at media production as a result of the social
processes that take place within an institutional structure, and not solely as the result of
the interaction between media production and the larger political and economic forces.
The sociological perspective emphasizes the tension between individual agency of media
producers and the structural constraints of the media organization, the media industry,
and the larger social context. Croteau and Hoynes (2003) argue that while political and
economic forces constrain the media, the actions of the media producers and executives
do not follow inevitably and directly from structural constraints. They add that despite
working under these structural constraints, media producers still make some choices on
how to produce and distribute the final product. There is a need then to ―make sense of
the dynamic tension between the forces of structure, which shape but do not determine
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behavior, and the actions of human beings, who make choices but are not fully
autonomous‖ (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003, p. 121).
Chapter Five is a continuation of the arguments made in Chapters Three and Four.
The Chapter investigates the extent to which the media actors, i.e. television producers,
interpret and respond to the constraints of both the media organizations and those of the
larger economic and political environments. It investigates the views of TV producers on
the media policy and the ways in which it liberates and/or constrains them. TV producers
were asked questions about their own perceptions of their audiences' educational level
and language skills; and whether there are feedback mechanisms that allow them to know
their audiences‘ opinions and satisfaction levels.
5. 3. Methodology
A standard and common definition of interviewing is that it is ―a conversation
with a purpose‖ (Berger, 2007, p. 89). The interview is probably the most widely
employed method in qualitative research. I used in-depth semi-structured interviews (also
called semi-standardized interviews) whereby I used a list of questions (see Appendix B)
that covered some specific topics but had some leeway to change the order of the
questions and to adjust the level and type of language.60 I used both French and darija
depending on the preferred or spoken language of the interviewees.
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I also asked follow up questions to get more clarifications on the answers given. In many instances,
although the answer was unclear, I decided to stop the line of questioning because the interview would then
turn into a debate on what concepts such as culture (high or low as opposed to William‘s ―whole way of
life‖), or press freedom (as a human right or as relative state of existence linked to historical circumstances)
mean. The interview would also turn into a debate whereby the goal would shift from collecting
information to changing the minds of the interviewees.
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While conducting semi-structured interviews as a methodology does not lead to
generalizable results, it offers the opportunity to distill media professionals‘ personal
experiences and insights (Berger, 2007). Interviews are an effective method for the type
of research questions being asked. The purpose is to gain insight into the decision making
processes in the two TV stations as well as obtain some narratives that describe the
possible constraints on production.
I interviewed four employees from 2M and two employees from Al Oula. From
2M, I interviewed Mr. Reda Benjelloun, the producer of the monthly show Grand
Angle,61 and associate director of the news service. Mr. Jamaa Goulehcen is the presenter
and co-producer of the bi-weekly live debate show Moubacharatan Maakoum,62 and the
director of the Amazigh edition of the news. Mr. Salahdine Ghomari is a journalists/news
anchor and member of the Moroccan Union of Journalists. Fatima El Ouadi was one of
the first female reporter and news anchor in 2M (1990 -2002); I interviewed her
when she was working as an external communication officer at Al Akhawayn
University. From Al Oula, I interviewed Mr. Mohamed Moudden, a senior news
director and producer; he worked for Al Oula for more than 35 years. The second
interviewee from Al Oula is Mrs. Fatima Kheir, presenter and co-producer of the show
Oussar wa Houloul.63
In the present research, I used a convenient sample because it was difficult to gain
access to TV executives and producers. I tried to talk to the directors of the TV stations
and many other executives, and they either showed no interest in doing the interview, or
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For a description of this show, see section 4. 3. in Chapter Four.
For a description of this show, see section 4. 3. in Chapter Four.
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For a description of this show, see section 4. 3. in Chapter Four.
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never returned my numerous calls and email requests. I made an appointment with the
few who responded favorably. I met all of them in their respective offices except for Ms.
Fatima El Ouadi and Mr. Mohamed Moudden who I met in a conference room at Al
Akhawayn University. The first worked at the time at Al Akhawayn, the second was in a
visit to the campus. All the interviews lasted from one hour to one hour and fifteen
minutes. All interviews took place between March 2008 and January 2009, except for the
interviews conducted with Reda Benjelloun (June 2006) and Fatima El Ouadi (November
2005).
Table 5. 1. List of interviewees
Interviewee
Mr. Mohamed
Moudden
Mrs. Fatima Kheir

Mr. Reda Benjelloun

Mr. Salahddine
Ghomari
Ms. Fatima El Ouadi

Mr. Jamaa Goulehcen

Function
Senior news director and
TV producer at Al Oula
(1978-present)
Presenter and co-producer
of the show Oussar wa
houloul at Al Oula (2000present)
Producer of the show
Grand Angle and vice
director of information in
2M (1999-present)
Reporter and news
presenter at 2M (2001present)
Reporter and news
presenter at 2M (19902002)
Reporter and co-producer
of the show
Moubacharatan Maakoum
(2002-present)

Location
Conference room at Al
Akhawayn University

length
1 h 15 min

Date
March 10, 2008

Mrs. Kheir's office, Al Oula,
Rabat.

1 hour

January 3, 2009

Mr. Benjelloun‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 h 15 min

June 16, 2006

Mr. Ghomari‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 h 15 min

April 10, 2008

Conference room at Al
Akhawayn University

1 h 15 min

November 2005

Mr. Goulehcen‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 hour

March 16, 2008

Source: Authors‘ fieldwork: November, 2005; June, 2006; March, April, 2008; January, 2009.

I took notes during the interviews. All the interviewees refused to be tape
recorded. Immediately after each interview, I go over the notes with the interviewee to
confirm that all the main points are included in the notes, and to invite corrections and
additional comments. Then I carefully examined the notes of all interviews and looked
for key themes and issues raised in the discussions.
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5. 4. Findings
This section delineates the major themes that emerged from the six interviews. For
the sake of clarity, I isolate six themes:
1. Responses to the results of the quantitative content analysis
2. The use of language in the TV shows
3. Mechanisms of feedback and perceptions of audiences
4. The editorial policy of Al Oula
5. The legal constraints on television production
6. The political constraints on television production
It is important to mention some facts and dates. Al Oula was established as
Radiodiffusion et Television Marocaine (RTM) on March 2nd, 1962. 2M was launched on
March 4, 1989. From 1989 to 1997, 2M was subscription based pay TV and needed
decoder to watch it. After January 11 1997, 2M became available for all audiences and
only required the aerial antenna to capture its signals. From 1962 and 1989, the only TV
channel available for Moroccans was Al Oula (known then as RTM).
5. 4. 1. Responses to the Quantitative Content Analysis Results
All the interviewees expressed concern for the disproportionate representations in
terms of gender, languages, and themes, but they were not surprised by those numbers.
For them, because the new public service mandate is only two years old, the TV stations
cannot yet be accountable. Mrs. Kheir, Presenter and co-producer of the show Oussar wa
houloul, said that the audiovisual communication law was new, and that it had only been
two years that the HACA started overseeing the compliance of Al Oula and 2M to their
Licensing Obligations. Mr. Moudden, senior news editor at Al Oula, and Mr. Ghomari, a
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2M reporter and news anchor, both undermined the research results arguing that it was
very normal that such discrepancy between the TV stations and their public service
mandates would occur. They argued that the two TV stations needed time to adjust to the
new political and legal environments and that it was unfair to evaluate their work only
two years after the new policies were in place.
Mr. Benjelloun, producer of the show Grand Angle, added that other changes
needed to happen for public broadcasting to become more efficient. He said that there
were many characteristics of the old regime that needed to change before the two TV
stations could perform their public service functions. Journalists and reporters still had
major difficulties to access information. He said that in Morocco ―information, which is
an essential element in any media work, is not a right but a privilege.‖ He said that even
for state-owned TV stations, reporters and journalists did not have access to government
information. ―Many government officials believe that information is a personal property
and that giving it away is giving away pieces of their power,‖ he said, ―we depend on
what they (government officials) are willing to disclose, not on what we want to
uncover.‖ Mr. Benjelloun also said that many production decisions were made on the
basis of whether there was enough information about some issues. He said that public
service television would become more efficient only if the State strongly reinforced the
right to information principle.
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5. 4. 2. The Use of Language in the TV Shows
The responses point to the fact that the use of darija in TV programming is not as
simple as it may seem. For many, it is a political decision that needs to be taken at the
highest level of the State. Morocco‘s Constitution says that Arabic is the official language
of the nation. Darija is spoken by all Moroccans and yet is not recognized as a language;
it is not used in legal documents nor taught in schools. Mr. Ghomari said that the debate
over the choice of language was also a debate on identity, culture and religion. He said
that advocates of darija were considered advocates of secularism and Western hegemony.
―Arabic is not just a language,‖ he said, ―it is also a sacred entity because it is the
language of Islam and of the Quran.‖ Promoting darija at the expense of Arabic means
permanently undermining Arabic. On the other hand, advocates of Arabic link language
use with identity and authenticity, and they consider preserving Arabic as a way of
preserving Moroccan Islamic and Arab identities.
I asked a follow up question on the use of Arabic in the national news and that
most Moroccans may not understand such important information. Many interviewees
responded by saying that they were aware of this problem and that unless a decision was
taken by the State, there was nothing they or the TV management could do about this.
Ms. El Ouadi said that advertisers in the past few years had been using darija as their
main language of communication on radio, TV and also in print ads. She also mentioned
the example of the Egyptian television news and how they managed to use a language
that was somewhere between modern standard Arabic and their spoken vernacular. She
believes that such an attempt is also possible in Morocco.
Mr. Moudden offered a different response. He said that the use of standard Arabic
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and French were choices by Al Oula, and there were no attempts as far as he knew to
change this. The goal in Al Oula has always been to raise the cultural standards of the
audience, he said, to push the audience to rise up to a higher level of thinking and
knowing. ―If we use darija we are in fact lowering down our cultural standards,‖ he said.
He argues that Moroccans should embrace higher levels of cultural expressions and that
darija was not the right language for such expressions.
On the use of French language, the responses were unanimous. On the one hand,
they praised the fact that the use of French had decreased to accommodate more non-elite
audiences. Today only 40% of the programming in 2M is in French compared to 80% in
its first six years. On the other hand, the interviewees said that almost half the staff in Al
Oula and 2M was trained to use French in broadcasting, and, as Mr. Ghomari said,
―unless they get fired, management needs to keep them busy.‖ Mr. Ghomari also added
that Morocco was a French protectorate for forty four years and that the French cultural
influence provided much of the framework for Morocco‘s media and press systems,
including the bilingual nature of its media. He said that there was also a
considerable number of French speaking nationals and foreign residents who
could not understand Arabic, hence the need to offer programming in this
language.
5. 4. 3. Mechanisms of Feedback and Perceptions of Audiences
All interviewees said that they made general assumptions about their audiences
and that they lacked research data on the demographic profiles and household data of
their national TV audience. They were aware of the rate of illiteracy and the level of
education of their average audience members, but they all said there were limits to what
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they could do with this information. Mr. Goulehcen said that in his show Moubacharatan
Maakoum, he made sure to always use darija. He said he instructed his guests to do the
same so that his show could reach the widest audience possible. But most of his guests
used Modern Standard Arabic. He speculated that this might be due to the fact that
Modern Standard Arabic and French had been the dominant broadcasting languages and
people might find it difficult to change that. Mr. Ghomari said that he was aware of the
fact that most of his viewers may not understand the news, but he assumed that viewers
discuss the news at home and that eventually, through these interactions and through the
power of images on screen, information would reach everybody. He stated, however, that
news bulletins could only be presented in either Arabic or French and that such decision
must be taken from the State or upper management.
All the interviewees agreed that there were no mechanisms of receiving feedback
from the audiences, let alone mechanisms whereby audiences would be invited to
contribute to production of content. Mr. Benjelloun, a 2M producer (2001-present), said
that the only feedback TV producers received was from relatives and people they
personally interacted with. Mr. Goulehcen added that there was no scientific study on
audiences that could be useful for deciding what language to use and what level of
language complexity, or data that showed, for example, what 20 or 30 years old males
with certain educational background watched and when. The current audience research
addressed issues that were of interest to advertisers and that was still in its infancy.64
They only monitor audience ratings in five major cities: Rabat, Casablanca, Fez,
Marrakech, and Tangier. Mrs. Kheir, Mr. Ghomari, and Mr. Benjelloun said that the clues
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Mr. Goulehcen refers here to Marocmetrie, a ratings analysis firm, which was launched in
July 2006.
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that they and other TV producers received about the success or non success of their
programs were from their conversations with cab drivers, grocery stores keepers, and
people they encountered in the streets. ―There is a strong need for such research but
unfortunately they don't exist,‖ Mrs. Kheir said.
5. 4. 4. The editorial Policy of Al Oula
I asked Mr. Moudden and Mrs. Kheir about the current editorial policy of Al
Oula. I told them that the new mission statement of the SNRT (released in 2006) did not
refer to the station being at the service of the royal palace, and yet the news bulletins
were still primarily devoted to the King's activities. Mr. Moudden responded that since its
inception, Al Oula had functioned as the mouthpiece of the palace. While this function
and role were still valid till today, the way Al Oula interprets them had changed since
1999, the year of the enthronement of King Mohamed VI. He said Al Oula still referred
to King Mohamed VI as ―His Majesty King Mohamed VI May Allah glorify him,‖ and it
still gave priority to his activities and to those of their highnesses the princes and
princesses of the royal family. ―It does not matter to us what the public think of these
issues, that's how we choose to present the news, and this editorial policy did not and will
not change,‖ he said, ―we have been doing this for a very long time.‖ However, he argued
that the channel changed its editorial policy in many ways in the other programs that they
produced. In the past, during the years of lead the channel used to prevent the average
Moroccan from speaking on the TV microphone and saying what he or she had in mind.
When an average Moroccan was given the microphone, it was for them to make a nice
comment about the way things were, otherwise his or her comments were edited out. The
channel also used to focus on mainstream culture, the Fassi and Rbati cultures. ―Today,‖
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Mr. Moudden said, ―we give more time to other sub-cultures and we portray everyone's
lifestyle.‖ Mr. Moudden referred to documentary shows such as Aji Tchouf,65
Moudawala, and Oussar wa Houloul. They all portray a variety of lifestyles and people
from all walks of life from urban and rural areas and from all parts of Morocco. Aji
Tchouf, for instance, consists of filming typical days of low income craftsmen and allows
them to narrate their own stories. The main and only narrators of the show are the
participants themselves. For Moudden, these shows are representatives of the new
direction Al Oula took after 1999.
5. 4. 5. The Legal Constraints on Television Production
The interviews all pointed to the historical fact that in the absence of a legal
framework, the broadcast media existed in a legal vacuum for more than four decades
and were not under the obligation to provide public service. They all said that this
vacuum and lack of laws and regulations tightened, rather than loosened, the constraints
on broadcast media. Al Oula documented and glorified the successes and
accomplishments of the monarchy. The regime used the broadcasting system as an
important communication vehicle to promote its policies. Mr. Moudden, senior news
director and producer at Al Oula, recalls that in the 1960‘s, King Hassan II mobilized
radio and television for political awareness and education, such as the preparations for the
country‘s first general elections and constitutional referendum. For instance, in the
campaign for the 1962 referendum of the constitution, the regime distributed television
sets in public cafés to inform the public about the constitution and to mobilize them to
vote. On the question of why television was not used for education and development, Mr.
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Aji Tchouf is a show that was not analyzed in the content analysis because it did not air during
primetime. Aji Tchouf aired on Sundays at 13:30.
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Ghomari and Mr. Goulehcen pointed out that it was important to bear in mind that the
1960's through the early 1980's were decades of struggle between the regime and
opposition political parties. To ensure the stability and unity of the nation, the regime had
to maintain strict control over its broadcast media. There was no time for the regime to
think of any use of the media outside self-promotion.
On the creation of 2M, the interviewees agreed that it was a personal initiative of
King Hassan II (1961-1999), and that it was also created in a legal vacuum. On Saturday
March 4, 1989, 2M SOREAD was launched as the first private channel in Morocco and
the Arab world. It was the State, the Royal Palace, the Omnium Nord Afrique (ONA)
(Morocco's largest economic conglomerate), and Basri's Ministries of the Interior and
Information that were the most important participants and actors in launching 2M. Mr.
Benjelloun, a 2M producer said that 2M was an entertainment channel par excellence; it
stayed distant from the affairs of the government and the public. The target audience for
the channel was the Francophone elite of the urban centers mainly of Rabat and
Casablanca. Most of the programs were imported programs from France and the U.S.
Before the state's take-over in January 1997, French language, the language of
the economic and political elite, was predominant with 80% of the programs in
French. Mrs. Kheir recalls that unlike Al Oula (RTM) which devoted some of its
programs to awareness campaigns on a variety of issues, and devoted a significant
amount of time to news and documentaries, 2M devoted most of its programs to
entertainment. As Mr. Ghomari put it, ―2M was the channel by the elite and for the elite.‖
For the interviewees, the major policy change occurred in 2002 when the State
established the High Authority for Audio-Visual Communication (HACA) in August 31,
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2002. HACA drafted an Audio-visual Communication Law that provided the legal
framework for the liberalization of this sector. The Moroccan parliament adopted the
reform law on November 25, 2004. The law assigned public service obligations to the
two major television stations in Morocco (Al Oula and 2M). For Mr. Moudden, what was
most significant for him was the fact that the Audio-visual Communication Law put an
end to the state‘s monopoly in terms of broadcasting management by transforming Al
Oula from a subsidiary of the Ministry of Communication to the National Company of
Radio and Television (la Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision—SNRT).
The SNRT is an independent government entity that manages both Al Oula and 2M.The
stations are no longer be subject to the financial control and supervision of the ministry of
Communication. For Mr. Moudden, who worked for Al Oula (RTM) while under the
control of both the ministries of Information and Interior, ―this is as liberating for us as
the Fall of the Berlin Wall was for residents of East Berlin.‖
Another important change in the legal environment is the Licensing Obligations
documents (Cahiers de Charge). The Licensing document constitutes a written
agreement between the HACA and broadcast stations. The radio and TV stations commit
to fulfill the terms and conditions specified in the documents, and the HACA through its
mechanism of monitoring and surveillance makes sure the media outlets comply with
their own obligations. For Al Oula and 2M, their licensing obligations entailed a mandate
on providing public service. There were, however, divergent views on how important
these policy changes are.
For Mr. Moudden, these changes were very promising and came at a time when
Morocco needed them the most. For him, the new political environment in Morocco after
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the enthronement of King Mohamed VI required new media policies to accompany the
political changes. The new policies were very positive and unlike the obscure legal
environment of the past, Mr. Moudden said that they provided clear guidance to decision
makers in both TV stations.
Mr. Benjelloun, who referred to the cahier de charges (HACA‘s Licensing
Obligations document) as ―cahier de décharges‖ (décharge meaning garbage in French),
said that the new media policy did not affect production and that many producers in 2M
did not bother to look at this cahier de charges. He said, ―it actually does not help to look
at the cahier de charges because it is quite unclear what exactly it expects us to do. The
directions we're getting from the cahier de charges are ambiguous and confusing. There
are basically no internal criteria on what programs to broadcast. TV producers suggest
programs and if it has generally clear goals that don't in general conflict with the general
philosophy of 2M, then it goes through. As you can see I used the word ‗general‘ three
times in a sentence, this simply means that there are no clear directions on what to do or
not do.‖ He added that the new policy included the three main foundations of the country:
God, nation, and King. It clearly stated the fact that journalists must abide with the idea
that Islam was the religion of the nation, that Western Sahara was Moroccan, and that the
King was a sacred entity, and that these three issues must not be violated under any
circumstance. He added that in order to produce meaningful television programs that
could enlighten the audience, it was important that these constraints be lifted.
All the interviewees expressed major concerns with the non-existence of courts
of law specialized in press and media law. Journalists are tried in penal courts where the
penal law is used. In cases of defamation, Mrs. Kheir said, journalists were assumed to
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have acted in bad faith. The penal court would not accept the claim that a journalist may
have committed a professional mistake.
5. 4. 6. The Political Constraints on Television Production
According to Mr. Moudden, the period from 1962 to 1999 was purely
authoritarian. Media professionals lived in fear. Al Oula‘s (RTM) reporters, management,
and staff considered themselves salaried employees of the ministry of Interior. He added
that the journalists were assigned to report on specific events, and were told the editorial
line to follow. Most of the work at Al Oula and its radio affiliates consisted of writing
government press releases. The journalists did not have the right to report and interpret
the events; they were not doing the work they were trained to do. Mr. Moudden said that
he submitted four resignation letters at different times but were never accepted. ―I felt
imprisoned, I could not leave and I could not do the type of professional journalistic work
I believed in.‖
When asked about the political constraints that may hinder the work of reporters
today, Mr. Moudden said that today there was no censorship within the station and that
the problem they faced at Al Oula was that reporters and journalists were not aware of the
amount of freedom they had. They practiced auto-censorship and refused to address
sensitive issues. When asked about the three taboos ―King, Western Sahara, and Islam,‖
and how it is still forbidden by law to address them outside the guidelines imposed by the
State, he said that these were the foundations of our country and it would be ―foolish and
irresponsible‖ to raise any questions about their legitimacy.
In his response to the same question on political constraints today, Mr. Benjelloun
referred to the work done by the Justice and Reconciliation Commission (l'Instance de
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L'Equité et Reconciliation IER).66 He said that the State seemed to be willing to turn the
page on the ―Years of Lead,‖ on political imprisonments, on the oppressive, illegal and
undemocratic practices. He added that ―at the same time many of the people responsible
for those illegal acts are still in power; so it is very difficult to walk a straight line here.
They would say 'yes' to freedom of the press and the media, and at the same time they
impose on us some obligations vis à vis their programming contents, and be unclear on
what these obligations are.‖ In his view, ―the government officials want to push forward
liberalism and democracy but they also want to keep things the way they are, at least they
are unclear about how far they want to go.‖
Mr. Benjelloun raised an important question of what would be considered a
violation of the sacredness of the King. He said that some people thought that referring to
King Mohamed VI as M6 was a violation of his sacredness, while he personally used it as
―a term of endearment.‖ Calling him M6 meant love for the King and respect for his
closeness to his subjects. He added that ―some people think that reporters must always
have to refer to him as ‗His Majesty King Mohamed VI may Allah glorify him,‘
otherwise they would not be showing respect to his sacred personality.‖ Mr. Benjelloun
gave the example of a documentary series Parcours d'Ailleur that 2M produced on
Moroccan immigrants. In one episode, a Moroccan immigrant from Italy who was from
the city of Fez mentioned her Fez origins and she praised many things about Fez like its
cuisine, fashion, arts, etc. She added this old saying in Morocco that if a man wanted to
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The Justice and Reconciliation Commission investigated the human rights violations of the past. Besides
establishing the truth about the past violation, the Commission organized public forums in 2004 to allow
victims to voice their pains and sufferings. These forums were broadcast live on TV, which I consider a
very important moment in Moroccan television history. The goal of the Commission is to facilitate the
reconciliation of Moroccans with their recent past.
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get married, the best choice he could make was to choose his bride from Fez. She added
that even King Mohamed VI chose his wife from Fez. Mr. Benjelloun said, ―we received
many phone calls and emails about this from people complaining about the fact that the
program spoke about King Mohamed VI as an ordinary person, and that this was a
violation of the King's sacredness. As you can see, it is difficult to draw a line on what is
and what is not a violation of the King's sacredness.‖
Mr. Benjelloun admitted that other than addressing the three taboos, there was
more freedom than ever before. ―We choose themes and we do our best to offer
audiences both sides of any story. We try to give viewers enough perspectives so that
they can come up with their own opinions and views on issues.‖ He cited the themes he
covered in his show Grand Angle, such as pedophilia, political prisoners, the infamous
prison of Tazmamart,67 religious fundamentalism, Jewish festivals in Morocco, and
conditions in Moroccan prisons. He said, however, that ―each time there are unhappy
people out there who either accuse us of being too daring or not daring enough. There are
lots of sensitive issues but even more sensitive people.‖
Mr. Benjelloun said that what bothered him the most was not the freedom they
may or may not have, it was the fact that no action ever ensued after airing a particular
program. He gave the example of a 2M program that addressed the problem of mental
health hospitals in Morocco. The program showed the miserable state of the hospitals and
the shameful conditions where the patients lived. The show gave some compelling
numbers and facts, such as the fact that these hospitals could now host less people and
67

Tazmamart refers to a prison that was built in the early seventies to shelter the fifty eight military
officers for allegedly participating in the July 1971 and August 1972 coups d'etat. This prison represents a
dark episode in Morocco's human rights record.
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offered them less services than in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. Mr. Benjelloun said that he
expected a government official from the ministry of health to resign, or that government
programs for these mental health hospitals would be launched, but nothing happened.
Mr. Goulehcen, like Mr. Ghomari and Mrs. Kheir, praised the new era as more
free. He gave the example of his own show Moubacharatan Maakoum as an indication of
the freedom he enjoyed and the few constraints they still suffered from. Mr. Goulehcen
said that the show was a live show devoted to discussions about current social, political,
economic and cultural events and issues in Morocco. ―Live shows are a risky business,‖
he said, ―especially that the show is not an entertainment show and that the topics of
discussions are mainly on politics.‖ For the upper management to agree to support such a
show must be seen as a major achievement in terms of freedom of expression. Topic of
discussions included human rights in Morocco, state and local governance, and tobacco
and drugs consumption. He added that he did not get any instructions from top
management on how to address any of these issues, but that he was always careful about
choosing the guests ―who would not say stupid things or act in ways that may jeopardize
the show.‖ I asked him two follow up questions on the impact of this auto-censorship on
the quality of the program, and on the reasons why the show never dealt with the three
taboo subjects (monarchy, Sahara, and Islam). On the first question, he said that he did
not see choosing ones‘ guests carefully as auto-censorship but as an attempt to provide
his viewers with a televised public debate where civility and respect reigned. On the
second follow up question, he said that these three subjects were ―the no-go zones‖ and
this was clearly stated not only in the Licensing obligations and the Audio visual
Communication Law but also in the nation‘s Constitution. He said that he addressed the
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Western Sahara issue but he made sure none of the guests held an opinion that was
different from the one held by the State. Mr. Goulehcen, like many other interviewees,
praised the new era as more free but also agreed that for more efficiency in television
production, the legal and political constraints needed to be lifted.
Mr. Ghomari argued that the question of political constraints needed to be looked
at from a broad perspective. He said that there was as much of it at 2M as there was
anywhere else in the world. Western media outlets cannot also be totally free; there are
restrictions on their work too. They do not for example question the legitimacy of the war
on terrorism, they also consider many Western values as universal values, and they
cannot challenge capitalism or liberal democracy. ―When we cover the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict or the Iraq war, we can choose to use terms ‗martyrs‘ or ‗suicide bombers‘ to
refer to the Palestinian or Iraqi militants while Western news outlets can only use the
term suicide bombers or terrorists. If we deem the act as legitimate we refer to them as
martyrs, when we don‘t we use either suicide bombers or terrorist.‖ When asked the
follow up question on the limited scope of freedom Moroccan reporters had when it came
to critiquing government performance, Mr. Ghomari responded that Morocco was now in
a state of transition from an oppressive regime to a democratic one and that whatever
political constraints may exist today would slowly disappear.
5. 5. Discussion of Findings
The interviewees all confirmed the fact that the major forces of structure in
Moroccan television production had been the State and the Palace. Before 1999,
television functioned as a support system for Morocco's authoritarian regime for 38 years.
The regime used television mostly for propaganda and entertainment purposes at the
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expense of other functions and services. After 1999, the new political environment under
the reign of King Mohamed VI made the promotion of human rights one of his priorities.
The legal environment had to change to accompany the political reforms. While these
changes (the creation of HACA and the new Audio-visual Communication law) allowed
for the liberalization of the sector and the creation of new TV and radio stations, they had
until now failed to exert and wield significant changes in the contents and the public
service function of the two television stations.
The interviewees agreed that it was too early to judge the performance of the two
TV stations. The responses stressed the idea that television production in Morocco could
not be seen in isolation from its history. Al Oula and 2M were instruments in the hands of
the regimes for many years and the impact this situation had on the organizational culture
of each institution was enormous. The views of the actors in the television industry seem
to vary according to seniority. For Mr. Moudden who worked for more than 35 years at
Al Oula and who experienced first hand the oppressive regime during the ―Years of
Lead,‖ the current condition of television production are ideal and are free from all kinds
of constraints, be they political, economic or legal. He seems to have worked in an
oppressive environment for so long that he embraces the current conditions without
questioning them. For instance, because Al Oula rarely if ever allowed regular citizens to
use the TV microphones for decades, the fact that Al Oula now produces shows that
allow for such access is, for Mr. Moudden, revolutionary. Therefore, he would not accept
to change other important editorial policies such as the newsworthiness values used in Al
Oula‘s news rooms. For him, the holiness of the royal activities is non-negotiable. For
him, there is no contradiction in a statement that says journalists are free and yet cannot
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address the three ―sacred‖ pillars of the nation: King, Islam, and Western Sahara.
Younger producers believe that the recent changes are positive but that progress is
still needed. They recognize that the legal and political (economic) environments are
certainly more open and conducive to more freedom than they were during the ―Years of
Lead,‖ but that there is still more work to be done with regard to media policy and
political freedom. They believe that the Audiovisual Communication Law is vague and
that the Licensing Obligations documents do not entail detailed instructions on how the
two TV stations can perform their public service function. They also expressed major
concerns with the fact that the law still provides for jail sentences for journalists and
reporters and that the penal court system is still used for media–related court trials.
In the discussions on the use of language and the availability of audience
feedback, the interviewees expressed incapacity to act from within the television
institutions to change any of these things. They refer to the State as the sole entity that is
able to dictate a change in language or in availability of feedback. On the question of
language for instance, the response is that using darija as the main language of the TV
programs is a political decision that needs to be taken at the highest level of the
State. For Mr. Ghomari, a debate over the choice of language is also a debate on
identity, culture and religion. To use darija in the news to facilitate understanding
would be considered defiant to the powers that be.
In most instances during the interviews, the interviewees either refer to the state
and to the management of the Stations as the real decision makers. The interviewees used
passive voice statements where the implied/absent actors are the State or some entity
from above. The responses all point to the top down nature of decision making within
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television organizations. The producers seem to rely on decisions made at an ad hoc
basis. There seems to be an absence and lack of agreed upon principles on the basis of
which TV programs are produced. Decisions on production are made on a case by case
basis without adhering to any set principles.
The interviews also point to the presence of fear amongst TV producers. The fact
that television functioned as a tool of an oppressive regime for many years seems to have
shaped much of the cultural and institutional foundations of the television industry. These
cultural and institutional foundations became part and parcel of the organizational culture
of these TV station. This is more evident in Al Oula than it is in 2M. With the exception
of Mr. Benjelloun who questioned the three taboo subjects (Islam, Monarchy and
Western Sahara), all the other interviewees either provided more justifications for why
they must remain taboos as the case of Mr. Moudden shows, or expressed a wish that
political freedoms should improve. The undemocratic and repressive features of the old
regime still impact how media producers perceive their work and perceive the margins of
freedom they may or may not have.
The TV producers seem to perceive themselves more as patriotic citizens who
must be mindful of their responsibility to the State rather than as media professionals
with a mission to serve the public interest. The State is still the major force of structural
constraints on the two public service television stations. The State controls the economic,
political, and legal environments. The attitude of the TV producers vis à vis their
profession is understandable given the transitional and unstable nature of the Moroccan
media system. The elements of authoritarianism are still present although there are signs
that there is a movement towards a more developmental media system.
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5. 6. Conclusion
This study managed to draw some important insights on how actors in the
Moroccan television industry interpret and respond to some aspects of the political and
legal environments. It demonstrated the top down nature of decision making within
television organizations. It showed the extent to which features of the old regime
impacted how media producers perceived their work and perceived the margins of
freedom they may or may not have. The fact that television functioned as a tool of an
oppressive regime seem to have shaped the cultural and institutional foundations of the
television industry. These cultural and institutional foundations are resilient and they
resist much of the current legal and political changes.
Therefore, unless the State lifts the legal and political constraints on the two TV
stations, unless revisions are made to the Licensing Obligations, unless a clear mission
statement for the role of public service broadcasting, Morocco‘s recent media policy
reforms will continue to be a varnish. Underneath lies the same old State-controlled
broadcasting system.
I must admit the fact that this production study failed to achieve some of the goals
it has set for itself. The relatively small quantity of the interviews and the quality of the
responses were not rich enough to provide concrete answers to all the questions. An
ethnographic approach might be a better suited methodology for such research questions.
The researcher must immerse him or herself in the television institutions to get a better
understanding of the production processes. The organizational cultures in Al Oula and
2M seem to entail many of the answers to the questions this study has. Uncovering the
shared meanings, the common perceptions, the implicit theories of the role of media
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within these organizations would certainly provide much of the needed information.
Another important piece in the large media puzzle is how audiences interpret
media contents. Addressing audience reception helps tackle the research questions from
both ‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of both the
broadcasters and the audience. The following chapter is an audience reception study that
assesses the opinions of television viewers on the quality of Moroccan produced
programs and their perceptions on the public service provided by the two TV stations.
The goal is to obtain the opinions and insights of TV audiences with regard to what
public service television they may (or may not) want.
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Chapter Six: Audience Reception
6. 1. Introduction
Television is one of the most important sources of information for the majority of
Moroccans. Considering the percentage of illiteracy,68 there are large numbers of nonliterate or marginally literate individuals who live out their lives in print-scarce
environments with few or no reading materials in their homes, but have easy and regular
access to television. In Chapter Three, I noted that the Audiovisual Communication Law
and the Licensing Obligations documents assign Al Oula and 2M a public service role
whereby the two TV stations must satisfy the general public's needs for information,
education, and entertainment. They must provide a diversified and general programming
meant to appeal to the largest audiences possible. The stations must also contribute to the
socioeconomic and cultural development of the nation notably by encouraging
development at the local and regional levels. The Licensing Obligations went even
further to specify the need to help citizens understand issues of importance to their lives
so that they can make informed decisions and carry out their duties as effective citizens.
In Chapter Four, however, the content analysis findings point to the fact that there
is an appalling discrepancy between the television's public service mission and the
68

In 2004, 43% of the Moroccan population aged ten and above are illiterate (Haut Commissariat au Plan,
Moroccan Census Bureau, 2004). The illiteracy rate is at 60.5% in rural areas and 29.4 in urban areas,
54.7% among women and 30.8% among men. . The illiteracy rate for Moroccan citizens of 15 years and
older is estimated at 26.7% for males, and 61.7% for females; for citizens of 15 to 24 years old, the rate is
estimated at 22.6% for males and 38.7% for females, according to the 2003 UNESCO Institute for Statistics
(2003).
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contents it offers audiences. Moroccan public service television, the content analysis
found, was in clear infringement of its public broadcasting mandate, i.e. to appeal to all
segments of Moroccan society, to offer opportunities for assess and participation to its
audiences, to stay detached from government interest, and to cater to national identity and
community. The findings also show that while physical access to television is available,
the TV shows do not present their contents in a way that requires the language skills the
TV audiences already have. The fact that the number of TV shows in darija, a language
spoken by all Moroccans, is less than those using French, a language spoken by a small
minority, is indicative of the distance between the TV contents and their wide audiences.
This audience reception study assesses the opinions of television viewers on the
public service provided by the two television stations. The television viewers this study
focuses on are of lower income and lower educational backgrounds. Besides the fact that
they constitute the majority of the Moroccan population, they are also the ones most
concerned with the developmental role of the public service television stations. Although
the content analysis shows that the contents of the locally produced programming target
the urban elites as their main audience and project the life-styles and values of the elite, it
is very important to examine the views and opinions of the TV audiences. One cannot
assume, on the basis of the content analysis alone, what the nature of the relationship
between TV viewers of lower income and educational backgrounds and their public
service television might be.
It is important to reiterate the fact that this dissertation conceives the audiences as
active interpreters of media text messages (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003). The notion of
active audiences is both a critique of the notion of an all powerful media and an
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expression of faith in the intelligence and autonomy of people. While my content analysis
points to some facts about Moroccan public service television and to their potential
effects on Moroccan audiences, the audience‘s interpretive activity remains essential
because it is in the process of audience reception that media texts acquire their full
meaning (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003).
This chapter examines the opinions of television viewers on the quality of the TV
programs and their perceptions on the public service provided by the two TV stations.
The focus is on the extent to which the television viewers understand the contents of the
TV stations, and the extent to which the TV programs represent the viewers' lifestyles and
concerns. The study will also examine the expectations the television viewers may have
of their public service television.
6. 2. Theory
A survey of the literature on television audience analysis shows a rich variety of
approaches that drew from functional, psychoanalytic, critical, interpretive and semiotic
theories (Morley, 1992). The variety of approaches and strategies of research can be seen
as ―a series of oscillations between perspectives‖ that stressed the power of the text (or
message) and their effects on audiences, and perspectives that stressed the interpretive
activity of audiences as well as their social characteristics and environment (Morley,
1992, p. 46). The media effects model, which influenced the modernization theory of
development, conceives the mass media as having the magic bullet effect and the
audience as passive recipients. The media are thought to have the power to inject their
audiences with particular messages which will trigger particular behaviors from the
audiences. Morley argues that this position was held by both critics from the Right and
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the Left. The Right saw the media as a major contributor in the breakdown of traditional
values, and the Left saw the media as a major instrument of indoctrinating consumerist
values and false consciousness (Morley, 1992). The theoretical discussion in Chapter
Two pointed out that this position and view on communication and audiences were held
by both the modernization theories and the neo-Marxist theories of development. One of
the most influential representatives of the neo-Marxist perspective is the Frankfurt School
of Social Research. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer maintain that the mass media
are instruments of mystification, indoctrination, and social control. They argue that the
same instrumental rationality that gave birth to fascism, in terms of its ability to
manufacture consent, can also be used by capitalist states, via the proliferation of mass
communications, to turn citizens into mere consumers, from active free participants into
passive spectators. Both the modernization theory and the neo-Marxist theories shared
the premise that audiences were passive and powerless.
Other perspectives emerged such as the functional theories, generally described as
―the uses and gratifications‖ approach, that addressed the sociological questions of how
audiences use the media and what audiences do with that use. The focus in this approach
is no longer on what media do to people but rather on what people do with the media.
Halloran points out that ―we must get away from the habit of thinking in terms of what
the media do to people and substitute for it the idea of what people do with the media‖
(Halloran in Morley, 1992, p. 51). Other perspectives were the psychoanalytic theories
that drew from Marxism and semiotics, and looked at the relationship between the textual
representation (in a broad sense) and the construction of gendered identities (Morley,
1992).
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Stuart Hall's audience research in the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies
took forward insights that have emerged from all these perspectives. His
encoding/decoding model is considered as the model that ―set the basic conceptual
framework for the notable boom in studies of media consumption and the media
audiences during the 1980s‖ (Morley, 1992). Hall took from the effects model its basic
understanding of communication as a process whereby messages are sent and received
with some effects (Alasuutari, in McQuail, 2002). Hall's approach also took from the uses
and gratifications theory the idea that audiences are active interpreters of media texts. He
moved away from the stimulus-response model which conceived messages or texts as
packages that senders throw to receivers. Hall points out the ―the television programme is
not a behavioural input, like a tap on the knee-cap‖ (Hall in McQuail, 2002, p. 303). He
proposed instead an interpretive framework whereby the message is encoded by a
program producer and decoded by an audience member and that the message sent and the
one received may not be the same message (Alasuutari in McQuail, 2002). The message
consists of signs and symbols as well as of a system of codes that both message producers
and receivers share. For Hall, the effect a message may have, within this semiotic
framework, depends on particular interpretations of the signs and symbols (McQuail,
2002).
An important element in the process of interpretation is the code. Codes are
interpretive frameworks which are used by both producers and interpreters of texts.
Codes can be verbal and they include knowledge of phonological and syntactical codes
and these must be shared by senders and receivers for understanding to occur. Codes can
also be behavioral codes such as protocols, rituals, role-playing, games, etc. The semiotic
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analysis of any text or practice involves considering several codes and the relationships
between them. In understanding even the simplest texts we draw on a repertoire of textual
and social codes.
It is important to note Charles Morris' division of the semiotic field into three
branches: semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics. The interpretation of signs and codes of
media texts involves these three levels (in Littlejohn, 2002). This distinction is important
for an understanding of the notion of decoding. The first level is the level of semantics
and it refers to the relationship between signs and things, or signs and what they stand
for; this level is concerned with the literal meaning of signs. Second, the level of
syntactics refers to the formal or structural relations between signs (for example, in the
case of language this would include syntax and grammar). The third level is pragmatics
and it refers to the relation of signs to their actual use in everyday life, and to the way
people mold signs in their everyday interactions. When senders and receivers share
semantic and syntactic codes, they can understand the literal meaning of their messages.
Pragmatic codes require more than knowledge of language itself. They require
knowledge of how signs are used among particular groups within given situations
(Littlejohn, 2002). A sign that says ―open‖ on a store window is not asking passersby to
open the store; it informs them that the store is open for business. The first reading is
based on knowledge of semantics, but the second reading is based on knowledge of how
the word ―open‖ is used in everyday life.
Hall's key concepts, encoding and decoding, lie in the realm of pragmatics. He
defines encoding and decoding as ―differentiated moments within the totality formed by
the communicative process as a whole‖ (Hall in McQuail, 2002, p. 303). Encoding
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involves the institutional practices and routines of a given TV station that provide
conditions of production. Decoding involves both the understanding of a media text as
well as the evaluation and interpretation of its meaning with reliance on relevant codes.
Morley, one of the leading researchers who employed Hall's model in an
influential analysis of the television show ―Nationwide‖ audience, sums up the premises
of Hall's encoding/decoding model:
1. The same story or event can be encoded in more than one way.
2. The message always conveys more than one potential "reading". Messages
propose or "prefer" one particular reading over others, but the messages can
never become wholly closed around one reading: a television text remains
polysemic (i.e. capable of conveying a variety of interpretations).
3. Decoding and understanding the message is also a problematic practice, no
matter how transparent and "natural" this act may seem. Messages encoded
one way can always be decoded in a different way (Morley, 1992).
For Hall, encoding is done in such a way as to produce a preferred meaning of the
text. TV producers rely on a wide range of socially shared codes to make the text
amenable to that preferred reading and interpretation. A dominant or hegemonic
reading/viewpoint is one that ―(a) ... defines within its terms the mental horizon, the
universe of possible meanings of a whole society or culture; and (b) ... carries with it the
stamp of legitimacy—it appears coterminous with what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for
granted', about the social order‖ (Hall in McQuail, 2002, p. 307). Because TV texts are
polysemic, they invite alternative readings of the text. Besides what Hall calls the
dominant/hegemonic reading where the reader accepts the preferred reading, Hall argues
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that members of the audience may also operate within a negotiated or an oppositional
reading. A negotiated reading, for Morley, means that an audience member accepts the
preferred reading but at the same time modifies it in a way to reflect his or her own
interests, position, or experience. Oppositional reading is anti-hegemonic and it involves
the process whereby the audience member rejects the frame of the preferred reading and
brings an alternative frame of reference. Hall says that in this reading, the audience
member ―detotalises the message in the preferred code in order to retotalise the message
within some alternative framework of reference. This is the case of the viewer who
listens to a debate on the need to limit wages, but also 'reads' every mention of 'the
national interest' as 'class interest'‖ (Hall in McQuail, 2002, p. 308). It is important to
emphasize the fact that these three readings are moments of decoding that lie in the realm
of pragmatics. In other words, the audience members' interpretations of the television text
are beyond the levels of semantics and syntactics. The audience members understand the
literal meanings and whether their readings are dominant, negotiated, or oppositional
depend on the connoted meaning (and pragmatic codes) of the text.
This audience reception study will use these theoretical tools to look at the
interactions of the Moroccan audiences members with the television contents of the two
public service television stations, Al Oula and 2M. This study will not look at the
audiences' understanding or interpretation of any particular television program or show.
The focus will be on the relationship between television messages, as they are ―encoded‖
by the television producers, and the ways in which these messages are interpreted or
―decoded‖ by the Moroccan audiences.
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It is important to note that this study adopts McQuail's (1983) definition of
audience as citizens with civic responsibilities and ―as deserving fair and honest reporting
and representation from the press‖ (McQuail, 1983, p. 110). McQuail's perspective draws
attention to the notions of citizen's rights and responsibilities and the political dimension
of audience activities and participation in the public sphere.
6. 3. Methodology
Addressing audience reception helps tackle the research questions of this
dissertation from both ‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of
both the broadcasters and the audience. To cover all segments of Moroccan society
requires addressing all segments of a multicultural society characterized by different
ethnic, linguistic, and geographic characteristics, including urban, sub-urban, and rural
communities. As Morley rightly puts it, ―I hold all questions of methodology to be
ultimately pragmatic ones, to be determined according to the resources available and the
particular type of data needed to answer specific questions‖ (Morley, 1992, p. 13).
Accordingly, I will use focus groups as a standalone data-gathering strategy to
understand television viewers‘ opinions vis à vis the two major public television stations
in Morocco.
Focus groups are interviews designed for small groups of usually six to twelve
distinct individuals. The group is formed by an investigator who leads the discussion on a
particular topic or topics (Berg, 2005). Participants in the group are encouraged to share
their thoughts, feelings, attitudes and ideas on certain subject. Focus groups are used
because they allow the researcher to obtain great deal of information during each focus
group session (Morgan, 1997).
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Focus groups are the most useful method for answering this study's research
question for the following reasons. Focus groups are efficient in obtaining in-depth
understanding and insight of people's opinions and attitudes and in collecting rich data in
participants' own words. Besides, they help gain access to private thoughts and feelings
(Morgan, 1997). They allow respondents to talk freely and to choose descriptions and
categories that are significant to them (rather than to the researcher); i.e. they enable "the
members of the target population to express their ideas in a spontaneous manner that is
not structured according to the researchers' prejudices" (Bertrand, Brown & Ward, 1992,
p. 199). Finally, they are good for obtaining data from people with low levels of literacy.
―When pursued as a self contained research technique,‖ Morgan points out, ―focus groups
demand the same attention to detail as any other mean of data collection‖ (Morgan, 1997,
p. 33).
6. 3. 1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Focus Group Interviews
As a data collection strategy, focus groups have many advantages, as various
sources in the literature point out (see e.g. Morgan, 1997; Edmund, 2000; Hagan, 2006).
Focus groups are highly flexible in terms of duration, number of groups and participants
etc. In relatively short periods of time, one can gather a large amount of information from
potential large groups of people. Important insights can be generated on related but
unanticipated topics as they may emerge in the course of the group‘s discussion. The
existing literature also identified some disadvantages. The results obtained are not those
of the individual participants but those of the whole group. Some participants may be
dominant and may steer the group‘s responses, unless the moderator interferes. Finally, it
is important to be cautious about the manner in which the results obtained from focus
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groups are used.
6. 3. 2. Sampling Focus Group Participants
The participants in the focus group discussions constitute a purposive sample of
the target population (Lederman, 1990). As a non-probability sample, purposive sampling
is occasionally used as a sampling method in qualitative research (Berg, 2007). Given the
nature of the research question, researchers rely on their expertise about some group of
people to identify subjects who represent that population (Berg, 2007). For this study, the
decision to select the focus groups participants was based on the fact that people of lower
income and lower educational backgrounds are the main focus of both national and
international development programs and initiatives. As I mentioned in Chapter One, the
NIHD and the national media reforms that followed it are meant to address the needs of
those who lack access to basic social services such as, health, education, water,
electricity, etc. They also represent a large segment of the television viewers that are most
concerned with the developmental role of the public service television stations. This
group‘s assessment and perception of the public service provided by the two television
stations are of utmost importance and are necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the
investigation under study.
I contacted the participants via the local associations. I meet them after they finish
participating in one of the associations' activities: literacy classes or workshops on
computer skills. My choice of the local associations is only a mean to reach the
participants. Being involved in local associations is not considered part of the desirable
attributes in focus groups participants. In fact, I ask them to introduce me to their family
members and their neighbors who do not take part in local associations‘ activities.
255

6. 3. 3. Framing Focus Group Participation
The invitation to the focus groups is done through a one-on-one meeting with
each potential participant. I tell them that I am a university researcher working on a
project about the two main Moroccan television channels, and that I am interested in
collecting information on their perceptions of the two public television stations. I show
them my university ID and explain that this is university research and that it is not
government sponsored research. Such assurance is necessary as government-related
activities are looked at with suspicion. I inform them that the purpose of the research is to
collect information about what they think of the contents of the TV programs. I do not
use the term ―quality‖ of the program, I just say contents of the programs.
Because of the results of the content analysis, one of my main concerns was that
the participants would use the focus group sessions as a place where they would vent
their frustrations about the two TV stations. I was aware that this assumption may
influence how I ran the focus groups, so I made sure, in case none of these feelings are
expressed, that I did not ask questions that may provoke them. I made sure that the
participants clearly understood the purpose of the invitation, that the purpose is to share
their opinions about the programs of the two TV stations. I inform them that all
participants are encouraged to share and express their opinions and views even when they
are in disagreement with others participants. I also remind them that the focus group is
not intended to be an exercise where participants try to persuade each other of their own
points of view, but rather a platform where they share their views and opinions.
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6. 3. 4. Focus Groups Demographics
The demographic characteristics of the participants in the groups are as follows:
women and men aged eighteen to forty years old, illiterate or semi-literate, average to
low income. The groups were divided up in terms of gender, age, and locality. There are
a total of ten focus groups, made up of eight to twelve individuals each.
The focus groups participants by age, gender, education, and marital status:
Table 6. 1. Focus Group participants by age, gender, and education
Focus
Group
FG. 1

Women/
Men
W

Age

Education

Number of
participants
12

31 - 40

All illiterate

FG. 2

W

18- 26

4 elementary school level, 6 illiterate

10

FG. 3

W

18 - 22

6 elementary school

6

FG. 4

W

26 - 32

4 elementary, 3 middle, 1 high school

8

FG. 5

W

20 - 34

All illiterate

6

FG. 6

M

30 - 38

8 elementary school, 3 middle school

11

FG. 7

M

22 - 35

10 elementary, 2 middle school

12

FG. 8

M

25 - 40

2 high school, 8 middle school

10

FG. 9

M

19 - 32

9 middle school

9

FG. 10

M

19 - 40

2 middle school, 6 illiterate

8

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, May, July, 2007; June, December, 2008.

6. 3. 5. Focus Groups Sites
The focus groups consist of Moroccan television audiences that reside in suburban and rural areas. Sub-urban areas are poor neighborhoods located at the outskirts of
the city. Six focus group sessions were conduced in the area close to Al Akhawayn
University in the Province of Ifrane. Timmedikine is a poor suburban neighborhood in
Ifrane where low income residents live. I used the local elementary school (school
Annasr) for the meeting. Azrou is fifteen-minutes drive (18 kilometers) west of Ifrane. I
know the members of a local youth association and I used their meeting room for the
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focus groups. For the rural area, I used Dayet Ifrah, a rural community that is 20 minutes
drive north east of Ifrane. I used the local association to meet with the participants.
Two focus groups were held in Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, 32
kilometers east of Tangier in the north of Morocco. I chose this rural area to get a sense
of what people from other rural areas think of the TV stations under investigation.
Khmiss Anjra is a small community of 14,700 inhabitants (Census Bureau, 2004). I also
used the local association for contacts and for meetings. The last two focus groups were
conducted in a suburban neighborhood in Casablanca. Karian Toma is located in Sidi
Moumen, one of the poorest communes in the suburbs of Casablanca. Inhabited by
170,000 inhabitants, the commune is infamous for its shanty towns and dusty wasteland
of low crumbling houses. Karian Toma was home to several of the suicide bombers who
killed 45 people in downtown Casablanca on May 16, 2003. This was the deadliest
terrorist attack in Morocco since the Independence in 1956.
Focus groups by site:
Table 6. 2. Focus groups sessions by location and date
Focus Groups

Location

Site

Date and time

FG 1

Sub-urban

Ahadaf, Azrou

May 26, 2007. 16:00-17:30

FG 2

Sub-urban

Karian Toma, Sidi Moumen, Casablanca

June 20, 2008. 10:00-11:30

FG 3

Rural

Dayet Ifrah, Province of Ifrane

July 14, 2007. 16:00-17:00

FG 4

Sub-urban

Timeddikine, Ifrane

July 8, 2007. 17:30-19:00

FG 5

Rural

Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, near
Tangier in the north of Morocco

December 7, 2008. 16:00-17:00

FG 6

Sub-urban

Ahadaf, Azrou

May 26, 2007. 10:00-11:30

FG 7

Sub-urban

Karian Toma, Sidi Moumen, Casablanca

June 20, 2008. 15:00-16:30

FG 8

Rural

Dayet Ifrah, Province of Ifrane

July 15, 2007. 16:30-17:30

FG 9

Sub-urban

Timedikine, Ifrane

July 7, 2007. 17:30-19:00

FG 10

Rural

Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, near
Tangier in the north of Morocco

December 8, 2008. 15:00-16:30

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, May, July, 2007; June, December, 2008.
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Concerning the setting, four sessions took place in classrooms of the local
elementary or secondary schools in the neighborhoods where the respondents lived; six
sessions took place in conference rooms at the local youth centers. The chairs were
configured in a way to allow for all group members to see each other.
6. 3. 6. Running the Focus Groups
Because the purpose of the focus group is to obtain data pertaining to the views of
audiences on their TV programs as a whole, the focus groups consisted of discussions
about TV programs offered by the two public service stations, and no screening of the TV
shows took place. Because the purpose is to look at the participants' opinions on the TV
programs as a whole, screening any particular show or shows may entail the risk of
directing and framing the discussions either in favor of the programs or the opposite.
The existing literature in research methodology suggests a set of guidelines on
how to conduct focus group sessions. Regarding the planning, I scheduled the sessions to
run for one to one hour and half. The start time depended on the availability of all the
participants in the group. Unlike Americans who take time commitments very seriously
and emphasize promptness, Moroccans consider time commitments as objectives to be
achieved, if possible. The start time was always approximate.
Because each session is a one-time occurrence, I laid out three ground rules at the
beginning of each session: a) stay focused on the questions asked, b) get closure on
questions, c) work in an orderly, polite and open environment where everyone is
encouraged to participate and where all opinions are welcome (Berg, 2007).
Regarding the focus group questions (see appendix C) and the order in which they
are asked, the literature suggests that the moderator asks questions about facts before
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asking more abstract questions (Berg, 2007). This approach allows respondents to easily
engage in the interview before moving to more personal matters. Besides, as a rule that
applies to one-on-one interviews, the facilitator should ask questions about the present
before asking questions about the past or the future. It is much easier for respondents to
talk about current and present matters than it is to talk about past or future issues. The last
question was devoted to allowing the respondents to provide any other information they
would like to add.
Therefore, the focus group sessions entailed four main phases:


Introduction: After introducing myself, I give a brief overview of the session
where I explain the purpose of the focus group interview and what the results will
be used for. Then I ask for a quick round of introductions so that group members
feel less anxious to participate in discussions.



Factual questions: In this phase I ask questions on the general context of the
theme to ease the group into responding to the key questions. In this phase I ask
two contextual/factual questions: What television channels do you watch the most
and why? What television programs do you watch the most and why?



Key questions: This phase is identical to the previous phase in terms of structure.
The following questions are asked during this phase: What are your opinions on
the locally produced programs? Do the two public television stations' programs
represent your lifestyle and your concerns? If the answer is ―no,‖ whose lifestyle
do you think is being represented on the two television stations? What
expectations do television viewers have of the two public TV stations? Are there
other information, issues, ideas, the respondents would like to add?
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Closing the session: In this phase, I summarize briefly the main points discussed
in the session and invite corrections and comments. Finally, I thank all the
participants.

6. 3. 7. Important Methodological Considerations
I anticipated some of the problems that may arise about the quality of data from
the group dynamics, but it is difficult to resolve all of them. The focus groups were
separated in terms of gender and age because research shows that masculinity and age
affect the dynamics in group discussions (Hollander, 2004). Older men tend to dominate
group discussions especially in a highly patriarchal society such as Morocco. There were
three instances where a few participants dominated the discussions; as the moderator I
call on the other participants to express their views. There were also instances where
some participants did not talk at all. Out of respect for their privacy, I did not call on
them to speak during the focus group session. I approached them during the break to ask
if there were any reasons for their silence and to encourage them to speak.
I struggled with the first part of the sessions because the participants seemed to be
more concerned about giving me the ―right‖ answers than it is to respond freely to the
questions. It is only in the last half of the sessions that discussions were more open. I am
not sure what the reasons for this might be. It could be the physical context (local
associations meeting rooms and classrooms) where the sessions took place. The
participants might have perceived the sessions as educational activities in the local
association especially that the moderator is a university person. I asked but never
received a clear answer to this question.
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The focus group sessions all used darija as the main language of interaction.
Although it is the language spoken by all Moroccans, for some participants it is a second
language. Residents of the rural communes of Dayet Ifrah in the Middle Atlas Mountains
and of Khmiss Anjra in the Rif region are Imazighen (also referred to as Berbers) and
they speak two different dialects. The participants from Dayet Ifrah (to a less extent in
Ifrane and Azrou as well) speak Tamazight and participants from Khmiss Anjra speak
Tarifit in their everyday life. While they are fluent in darija, many of them expressed a
desire to use their dialects because they said it helped them articulate their thoughts
better. Because I am not fluent in Tarifit and I do not speak Tamazight, and for data
collection purposes, I asked them to use darija alone. I am not sure how much data might
have gotten lost because of this language restriction.
I used English to process and summarize the data. When I translate a particular
testimony, I translate its overall cultural meaning. Translating the literal meaning would
certainly lead to confusion and misunderstandings.
6. 4. Findings
I used note-taking as a technique to record the contents of the focus groups
discussions. I managed to use a tape recorder to record only one of the 10 focus group
discussions. All the other groups refused to be tape recorded. Immediately after each
focus group, I go over the notes with the participants to confirm that all the main points
are included in the notes, and to invite corrections and additional comments. Then I
carefully examine the notes and look for key themes and issues raised in the discussions.
In this analysis, I will identify the trends and patterns that emerged from the 10 focus
groups conducted. Using an inductive approach, I isolate four themes that are
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meaningful in the current study:


Watching TV: The television channels and the programs that participants watch
and the reasons for their choices.



Understanding TV: The extent to which the participants understand the contents
of the TV stations.



Representations of lifestyle: The public service television representation of the
lifestyles and concerns of the participants.



Audience expectations: The expectations that the participants have of the two
public TV stations.
The responses to these themes were consistent for the most part. The responses to

the first and second themes varied slightly according to gender and the level of
literacy/education. The responses to the third theme were all consistent. The responses to
the fourth theme varied slightly according to the level of literacy/education.
6. 4. 1. Watching Television
All participants affirmed that they prefer watching Moroccan channels. They
admit that there is a variety of choices in the TV landscape with many satellite channels,
but their number one choice remains either Al Oula or 2M. They said that they liked to
watch the locally produced programs such as documentaries that deal with social issues
such as family, employment, education, and sports. They particularly like shows that
investigate sensational issues such as corruption within the police force, drug trafficking,
prostitution, sexual tourism, etc. Shows such as Tahkik, Moubacharatan Maakoum, and
Moudawala are very popular.
The participants also like Moroccan movies, sitcoms, and TV series, especially
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those dealing with everyday life of average Moroccans such as Oujea Trab, Lalla
Fatima, ‗Erbib, Al ‘Aaouni, and Mbarek ou Mes’oud. Among these TV series, Oujea trab
is the one most participants referred to as their favorite. Said, a 29 years old illiterate
male farmer from Dayet Ifrah, said that ―we watch the repeats over and over, I don't get
enough of the story, the emotions, the characters; it's a realistic story about life in rural
areas and about our reality. It's down to earth and it speaks to our reality and everyday
life‖.
The participants also watch other Arab channels as well. The responses here vary
across gender. Women like to watch music and fiction TV channels such as Rotana
Music, Rotana Cinema, Rotana Clip, Melody Hits, Melody Aflam, MBC1, and LBC.
They are mainly Egyptian, Lebanese, or Saudi TV channels. The TV series they watch
are the Egyptian and Turkish drama series like Noor, Sanawat al Dayaa‘, and Lahdat
Wadaa’, Iklil al Ward, Qissat al Ams. Music videos and music related programs such as
Pepsi Top 20 on Rotana Music and Rotana Clip are favorites among younger women.
Women also watch the news on Al Jazeera and Al Arabia as well as religious channels
such as Iqraa and Annas. Amr Khaled's show69 was mentioned as the most popular
religious talk show. Cooking programs and health related shows were also mentioned as
favorites.
Men said they watched mainly news, sports, music, film, and religious programs
in foreign channels. Like the women participants, they also prefer Arab satellite channels
over European channels. They mentioned Al Jazeera News, Al Arabia, CNBC Arabic,
BBC Arabic, Annas, Iqraa, and MBC 2. They also said they watched Al Jazeera Sport
69

Amr Khaled is a popular preacher and televangelist. Time magazine named him the 62 nd most influential
persons in the world in 2007. He is often referred to as Bill Graham of the Muslim world.
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channels on the weekends for the Spanish soccer league and other European soccer
championships. They also watch movie channels such as MBC 2 and MBC Action.
Asmae, a 20 years old female unemployed, elementary school education, from
Karian Toma, Sidi Moumen Casablanca, said that ―there are many channels and many
programs to choose from, but it‘s more interesting and more fun to watch something that
you relate to; we identify with our own culture, it's obvious and we only watch other
channels when we don't find something interesting on our TV channels.‖ In the same
vein, Fatiha, a 32 years old waitress from Ifrane said, ―whenever such shows (Moroccan)
are on TV, we don't watch anything else. Why watch other channels that talk about
Egypt, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia?‖
Participants with lower education backgrounds all said that they were loyal to the
two Moroccan television stations RTM and 2M. The shows that they like are the ones in
darija. Yamna, a 36 years old illiterate housewife from Rural Khmiss Anjra, said that
other than the few shows in darija, she did not understand what went on in the other
shows: ―when I see people sad on TV, I feel sad too, and when they look happy, I smile
and laugh too. I am not always sure why they're sad or happy, but I cry and laugh along
with them.‖
6. 4. 2. Understanding Television
The responses varied according to the level of literacy and education of the
participants. Participants with higher levels of education said that they understood the
contents of the TV channels. They said that they understood the programs in Modern
Standard (MS) Arabic but they struggled with the programs in French. Other respondents
with limited literacy skills said they did not understand the shows in MS Arabic or
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French. The only shows they enjoy are the ones in darija or tamazight. The literate
participants also said they played the role of translators for their parents and other
semiliterate or illiterate family members. Yassine, a 27 years old small business owner
and a high school drop-out, said ―I get tired after a while, the show has to be very
interesting for me to carry on with the translation work.‖
Hassan, a 32 years old male farmer from Dayet Ifrah, said that when a Moroccan
show is in MS Arabic or French, he switches to another channel, first Moroccan then
foreign. ―Older members of my family do not understand French, and it is very difficult
for them to understand Arabic, which means that they don't understand most of what's on
TV. If the program is in Darija, it's ok then, everybody understand and we have
discussions about the show, but when it's in classical Arabic or French, then I have to
explain.‖ He added an astounding fact, that ―even the weather forecast, and this is vital
information for us farmers, is not understandable for most people. The weather pretty
much determines most of our activities. I have to translate to my parents, uncles and
aunts all the information presented. They can interpret the signs of clouds and sun but
they still need directions as what they mean.‖
Other participants regretted the fact that there were many interesting shows in
French like Eclairage and Grand Angle but they find themselves compelled to change the
channel to accommodate the other members of the family who do not understand French.
Hafida, a 30 years old housewife from Khmiss Anjra, said that ―we switch to other
channels, there is no point in watching something most of us don't understand. People in
my family would rather watch foreign channels like Egyptian channels than watch a
Moroccan program that they don't understand.‖
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Older participants expressed their frustration with the news programs. They said
that the news bulletins are either in Modern Standard Arabic or French. They admit that
the news footage in the Arabic editions helps them have an idea of what is happening, but
without the help of their younger siblings, they remain more or less misinformed. What is
more frustrating is that the Arabic edition of the news bulletins in 2M is at 12:45 pm and
then at 23:00. News in French is during prime time at 20:45 pm. ―So if you miss the one
at 12:45,‖ Mohamed, a 38 years old grocery owner from Azrou said, ―you'd have to wait
till late at night to watch the news again. It does not make sense to me at all that they give
better timing to a language that only a few of us speak.‖
The shows that were praised and enjoyed unanimously by all participants are
shows that use darija or a mix of darija and MS Arabic, such as Biladi, Amoudou, and
Abwab Al Madina. They find the shows to be informative, entertaining and of good
quality. Some participants added that the quality of the programs depended on whether
they understood the program contents or not, and whether the content appeals to their
needs and relates to their daily lives. In other words, a good program is one that can first
be understood, if it is not understood, then the theme is meaningless.
6. 4. 3. Representation of Lifestyle
All participants agree that most television shows do not portray their lifestyle, and
that the shows have little if no relation to their lives. When asked about what lifestyle
they thought was represented, they unanimously agreed that it is the lifestyle of people
living in big urban centers, namely Casablanca and Rabat. In general, they refer to the
people being represented in the programs broadcasted by Al Oula and 2M as ―ouled

267

lemdina‖ (people from the city). The participants also agree that language70 is one of the
main factors why they do not feel their lifestyles are not represented in the public
television stations. They all pointed to the use of MS Arabic and French as a main
problem.
Lehcen, a 27 years old high school graduate and a farmer from Dayet Ifrah, said
that the two TV stations are the most popular in his village and yet the most
disappointing. ―What they portray has very little or no relation to our reality. I think they
both speak to the people from the big cities. I am an Imazighen, my village people speak
Tamazight. When we watch TV we don't see our reality being represented simply
because there are very few shows in Tamazight. It's only once every two or three months
that the TV channels screen an Amazigh show, and everything in between is a mix of
French and Arabic shows, or foreign films. When there is a program in Tamazight, it is
considered a major event, and people talk about it in the village or the neighborhood.
People remind each other not to miss the show, and they also inform each other of when
the re-runs will occur. The people on television say they're Moroccans and we say that
we are Moroccans, but they don't speak our language, they don't wear our clothes, they
don't share our values.‖
Besides the issue of language, many participants also pointed out that in
Moroccan sitcoms and series, the furniture and layout of the homes are too expensive for
the average Moroccan to afford. Ahmed, a 35 years old automobile repairman from
Azrou, says, ―when I watch those sitcoms, it feels like they happen in a magic world, I
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As I have demonstrated in the content analysis, 33.3% of the programs use either classical Arabic or
French, and the number of shows that use French alone is higher than the number of shows that use Arabic
alone or darija alone.
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cannot imagine myself owning such luxurious properties.‖ They also added that it is not
just a matter of being Amazigh or unable to understand Arabic and French, it is also a
matter of being poor. The lifestyle portrayed is unaffordable for most Moroccans.
Most participants said that they find it difficult to relate to most programs because
the programs do not address the issues of concern to rural areas, in particular those of the
Middle Atlas Mountains.71 Even when a sit com takes place in a rural area, the language
they use is not Amazigh and therefore the television representation remains unappealing
to them. Amina, a 22 years old housewife from Dayet Ifrah, said that ―when you are
living in a small rural village that is known to very few people, then the world that is
represented on television seems far from reality.‖ They admit, however, that they identify
with the characters in drama series such as Oujea’ trab, a story about life in rural areas,
because the show features people working on their land, and living in similar houses they
live in.
The participants from Karian Toma, the Casablanca suburb, said that some shows
are better than others in terms of how they portray their lifestyles. They drew some
comparisons between Al Oula and 2M shows. For instance, they compared two shows
about youth, 2M‘s Generation and Al Oula‘s 100% Chabab. Regarding Generation, all
participants in the focus groups said that they did not identify with this show, and that it
had nothing to do with their lives or the lives of the majority of Moroccan youth. Malika,
a 21 years old saleswoman at a local store, said: ―the show is supposed to be about us but
it is anything but that. The hosts speak mostly in French or use a mix of French and
darija. What they wear also is kind of unreal, very expensive clothes from very expensive
71

Nine of the 10 focus groups conducted took place in the Ifrane province which exists in the Middle Atlas
Mountains.
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places. None of the hosts, guests, or even the studio audience wears hijab (the head
scarf), the fact that I find quite fake and unreal since it seems like more than half of
Moroccan women wear hijab. Besides we don't learn anything, they talk about video
games and internet sites, it seems like the show is an exact copy of something European,
we don't see us connected to it in any way. This also applies to other shows produced by
2M.‖ 100% Chabab, the participants agree, is more connected to their lives. They find it
to be more down to earth and more accessible to all. The show is in darija and the hosts
dress and speak like an average citizen.
Loubna, a 25 years old nurse, gave another example by comparing the show Lalla
Laaroussa, a game show broadcast produced by Al Oula, and Studio 2M, a talent music
show. She says that she and many of her friends and relatives love Lalla Laaroussa
because it deals with issues that they care about such as issues of marriage and of being
single. More importantly, she says, ―the show is in darija, and the show hosts are humble,
they improvise most of their speeches and we feel close to them. When I watch this show
with my family, there are no moments of embarrassment like we feel sometime when we
watch Studio 2M. I feel embarrassed because of what people wear sometimes in 2M's
show, it is a shame that young Muslim girls wear tight clothes and show so much skin.
These are Western values, not ours.‖ Maha, a 24 years old high school drop-out and
unemployed, added that in Studio 2M the French speaking host does not pronounce the
Arabic sounds and therefore makes Arabic names sound like French names. ―I think they
are not proud of who they are,‖ she adds, ―it's like they refuse to accept that being
Moroccan is ok 'bhal ila ma radish'.‖
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To sum up, Mhamed, a 40 years old farmer from Dayet Ifrah, gives a compelling
testimony as to the distance between the two public service TV stations and their public.
He says, ―every time I watch TV and I see who speaks on it, it's always a well-dressed
person, in a Westernized tie and suit, and who is fluent in Arabic or French. I always
think about the number of things that I have to do to become like them. People in my
village feel much less important than those they watch on television.‖
6. 4. 4. Expectations
All participants agree that the two TV stations would serve them better if they
portrayed their lifestyles, addressed rural issues, and used either darija or tamazight as
the main languages. The responses in this segment of the focus groups varied slightly
according to age and education. The participants said they wanted to understand the
news, the weather forecast, and some shows and suggested that the TV stations should
use darija and their local dialects such as Tamazight and Tarifit. The more educated
participants had other thoughtful insights into this issue. They said that they wanted their
TV to represent their concerns, their everyday lives, in a manner that is accessible to all
Moroccans. Nadia, a 30 years old factory worker from Karian Toma, said that ―we want
our media to reflect who we are, not who some of us are; the hosts have to be humble,
speak a language we understand, be simple and down to earth. TV programs must deal
with our everyday problems. Every time there is a show in darija about an issue that
relates to us, and portrays a lifestyle that we identify with, we become loyal to the
program.‖
The participants also mentioned the lack of opportunity to participate in TV
debates and discussions. Karim, 33 years old car mechanic from Azrou, said that ―there
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are some live shows such as 7iwar and Moubacharatan maakoum that address important
issues, and in most shows I feel like I have so many things I can say and explain, but I'm
never given the chance to do that.‖ Participants also said that most shows do not allow
people to use the phone and voice their concerns. Moubacharatan maakoum allows for
some feedback but only through cellular phone text messaging but these can of course be
censored.
The participants expressed their frustration with the dominant format of the talk
shows. A host moderates the discussion among a group of experts about a theme. While
the themes discussed may be important, the manner in which these themes are discussed
render the show useless for the majority of the participants. ―When experts speak, they
use classical Arabic, they use big words, they use a language only they and the host
understand,‖ Jamila, a 31 years old nurse from Ifrane said, ―I find it a lot more interesting
when normal citizens speak about their problems, they are more in touch with reality and
I feel connected with them, they give real examples of real people. The experts speak and
that's all they do, they give you the impression like they try to avoid touching the real
issues, it's frustrating.‖
In the focus groups conducted in the rural communes of Dayet Ifrah and Khmiss
Anjra, many of the participants said they wanted to watch the imhalel or inchaden (the
Amazigh poets). These poets are known for their powerful lyrics, their magical stories,
and heroic characters. For Imazighen, these poems have been a major source of
entertainment and education for many centuries, but their impact has weakened because
of migration to cities as well as the overall impact of modernity. There are only a few old
poets and many participants lament the fact that whenever televisions wants to give
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homage to an old artist, it is usually someone who sang or wrote in Arabic. The TV
stations produced only a few shows that feature these Amazigh artists. Moha, a 40 years
old farmer from Khmiss Anjra said, ―Inchaden are our people, they tell great stories that
speak to our hearts, I miss listening to them.‖
The participants also asked for shows that give them a sense of empowerment.
Three focus groups with young female respondents said they liked a TV series that tells
the story of a woman police investigator. The title of the series is Yetou, a typical female
Amazigh name, the name of the main character. Yetou is 30 years old, single, female,
police officer and a member of a special team of forensic investigators. In the series, she
struggles with what society typically expects from an adult woman, which is marriage
and kids, and her commitment to being a successful and professional crime fighter.
Fatima, a 22 years old part time housekeeper from Azrou, said, ―Yeti is a great character,
a woman in a position of power is something fascinating. She has to take care of herself,
being a woman, but also be strong in her work. The show inspires me to want to be a
woman in power, to be a policewoman or a judge (laughter).‖ Many young female
participants said they wanted more shows like Yetou.
Other participants went further and linked television service with the sense of
being a citizen. They expressed their frustration with the fact that the two TV channels do
not consider them as full citizens. In the two focus groups conducted in Karian Toma in
Casablanca, the participants illustrated this fact by invoking an incident that happened in
their neighborhood. A few weeks before the focus group took place (May 2008), a bus
driver lost control over his bus, crushed and killed six people (according to the official
police account). The participants said that the coverage of 2M and Al Oula consisted of a
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two minutes report, where both TV stations tried to hide the facts. They said the facts in
the reports were not accurate; the TV reports said six people were killed while in reality
there were a lot more. They added that the footage was deliberately meant to hide the
extent of the damage the bus caused. ―The tragedy happened here,‖ Oussama, a 26 years
old unemployed high school graduate said, ―I was nearby when this accident happened, I
spoke to people and I saw the extent of the damage. Both TV station lied to us and that
was humiliating.‖ This feeling of humiliation was expressed by other participants as well.
Loubna, a 25 years old nurse, said that ―the TV reporters did not speak to the family
members of the victims. We had to watch Al Jazeera to get those testimonies. It was also
quite insulting to see both channels spend two minutes each covering the event, and then
spend more than ten minutes covering the national soccer team and their new coach. The
TV stations also aired the usual Saturday night music show as if those who died were a
bunch of ants.‖ She added that if this event were to happen in a wealthy Casablanca
neighborhood, the coverage would have been more accurate and more substantial.
The participants from other focus groups expressed similar sentiments. Because
they do not see their lifestyle, their language, and their every day life represented on TV,
they do not feel worthy as citizens. ―If we were worthy as citizens,‖ Lehcen a 27 years
old high school graduate and a farmer from Dayet Ifrah asks, ―then why isn't our media
devoting a decent amount of time to address issues we care about.‖ ―I feel humiliated,‖
Ikbal from Karian Toma said, ―when you see your own TV give more importance to
soccer than people's lives, it's as if we don't really exist.‖
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The participants also made an observation on how the two TV stations adjust their
programs to the two Muslim Holidays, Aid Al Fitr and Aid Al Adha.72 They noted that
during these two holidays, apart from covering the king's ceremonial activities and the
morning prayer, the remainder of the program is mainly the same. Asmae, a 32 years old
housewife from Ifrane, said that ―we don't feel like it's a different day or a special day. I
often wonder, who are these people in charge of the programming, what would they want
their sons and daughters to see on their TV during holidays? Maybe they spend the two
holidays in Spain or somewhere in Europe so they don't care. We don't see the
atmosphere of the Aids on our TV.‖
In conclusion, the overall response I received from the majority of the participants
is that their main problem is exclusion. They expressed a feeling of inferiority vis à vis
their TV stations, and a feeling of exclusion from their own media and their own society.
For them, the two public service television stations promote the Westernized and urban
lifestyle as the normal and the dominant lifestyle. Karima, a 32 years old unemployed
high school graduate, expressed this feeling vividly. She said ―we feel excluded from
these urban lifestyles and as a consequence we feel ignored by Moroccan society. This
situation breeds feelings of bitterness and frustration. We feel intimidated by our own TV
stations, we feel we're unable to claim our own lifestyle because it doesn't seem to have
any value. Bottom line is, what we do not like about our TV channels is the way we're
spoken to: we're spoken to with no respect.‖

72

Aid Al Fitr, day of feasting, is a day of celebration when Muslims rejoice for having completed the
commandment of Allah to fast during the holy month of Ramadan. Aid Al Adha is the Islamic religious
celebrations that commemorate the Prophet Abraham's willingness to sacrifice of his son Ismael as an act
of obedience to Allah.
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6. 5. Discussion of Findings
The responses of the focus groups participants were very consistent with regards
to the important issues of understanding television contents, representation of lifestyle,
and audience expectations. The focus groups participants expressed very clearly the
following:


They prefer to watch their own television stations.



They praise and enjoy the shows that use darija or a mix of darija and MS Arabic
and shows that portray their lifestyles and address their everyday life concerns.



All participants agree that most television shows do not portray their way of life,
and that the shows have little if no relation to their lives.



When asked about what lifestyle they thought was represented, they unanimously
agreed that it is the way of life of wealthy people living in big urban centers,
namely Casablanca and Rabat.



The participants expressed frustration with the manner in which the two television
stations excludes them and their lifestyles by using MS Arabic and French and by
promoting the westernized and urban lifestyle as the norm.
Stuart Hall's audience theory can be used to shed light on the interpretation by

Moroccan audiences of the contents of their two television stations. This theory
application will also show the extent to which Hall's theory is applicable to non-Western
audiences. For Hall, there are three possible readings for any given television text: the
dominant/hegemonic reading, the negotiated reading, and the oppositional reading. Hall
assumes that the receiver (viewer) is capable of decoding the signs in the television text
and attains a particular understanding which can then be categorized as a dominant,
276

negotiated, or oppositional reading. As noted in the theory section, these three readings
are moments of decoding that lie in the realm of pragmatics. In other words, the audience
members' interpretations of the television text are beyond the levels of semantics and
syntactics. In Hall's model, it is assumed that the audience members understand the literal
meanings and whether their readings are dominant, negotiated, or oppositional depends
on the connoted meaning (and pragmatic codes) of the text.
The participants in the focus groups are people of lower income and lower
educational backgrounds. As audience members, most of them do not understand the
literal meaning of the television texts. Because they watch television contents that use
MS Arabic and French, most of them do not recognize the semantic and syntactic codes
and are therefore incapable of understanding the literal meaning of the programs. Other
audience members are capable of understanding the contents of the programs in MS
Arabic and fewer can understand the contents in French. They all understand programs in
darija and some understand shows in tamazight.
After the examination of the data, I believe that there are two ways in which the
audience members read and decode television messages. They either decode the message
and offer a dominant/hegemonic reading, or they offer an oppositional reading. The
hegemonic and oppositional readings are not so much interpretations of the contents of
the shows, they are an interpretation and a response to the manner in which the audience
situate themselves vis à vis television as a social and political institution. In other words,
to borrow Bateson's ―report‖ and ―command‖ aspects of communication, the audience
reading is an interpretation of the command (relationship) aspect of communication
rather than the report or content aspect. According to Watzlawick et. al. (1967) each
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communication act involves two messages. The first is the report aspect of the message
and it refers to the content or information being conveyed. The second message refers to
the nature of the relationship between the communicators. For instance, when a father
tells his seven years old son ―go to your room,‖ the content message informs the son to
go to his room, and the relationship message informs the son that the father is the
authority in the house. The son's response may also convey a relationship dimension
which may express compliance, respect, or defiance. Watzlawick et. al. point out that
―relationship statements are about one or several of the following assertions: ―This is how
I see myself ... this is how I see you ... this is how I see you seeing me ... and so forth‖
(Watzlawick et. al., 1967, p. 52). They add that the relationship aspect of a
communication is a metacommunication, or communication about communication, and
that the ability to metacommunicate appropriately is a condition for successful
communication.
The focus group participants respond to the metacommunication. When the two
public service television stations use darija and address themes that audiences identify
with, the two TV stations communicate a relationship message to their audiences. The
message seems to be something like this: the audiences and their rights as citizens do
matter. According to focus group testimonies, when the participants understand the show
and relate to the show's theme and lifestyle, they tend to offer a dominant/hegemonic
reading. The participants expressed the joy of having watched and understood something
that resembled their own lives, and they did not question what Hall calls the hegemonic
viewpoint of the show, or ―what is 'natural', 'inevitable', 'taken for granted', about the
social order‖ (Hall in McQuail, 2002, p. 307). For instance, all participants expressed
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admiration to the TV series Oujea Trab, a drama series about small farmers‘ life in rural
areas. The show reproduces a view of the world that can be interpreted as hegemonic but
audiences do not produce negotiated or oppositional readings to this TV show. The
audience responded more to the fact that their TV station offered them an enjoyable and
entertaining show than to the actual content in the show itself.
However, when the two public service television stations use MS Arabic or
French and address themes that participants do not identify with, the two TV stations
communicate a strong metacommunicational (relationship) message to their audiences.
The message seems to be something like this: the audiences and their rights as citizens do
not matter. Here, the participants offer an oppositional reading. The oppositional reading
offers an alternative framework to the relationship message, and not to the content
message. The participants expressed this framework when they questioned the legitimacy
of the TV stations to exclude their lifestyles, when they linked the feeling of exclusion
from their own media with a feeling of exclusion from their own society. They also
expressed dissatisfaction regarding what they saw as illogical choices, such as presenting
the news and weather forecast in languages that only a few can understand. The
responses rarely addressed the content of the shows; they addressed instead the institution
of television, their rights as citizens, and the editorial choices of TV producers.
Hall argues that audiences that reproduce the dominant/hegemonic reading may
lack the necessary knowledge that would allow them to propose alternative readings for
the text. In other words, they may lack an alternative world view they can use to replace
the one offered by the TV content. For example, a union member has the necessary
knowledge, definitions, and terminology that can help him or her negotiate or counter the
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hegemonic contents of economic news. I am not sure if this is applicable to the focus
groups participants. I think that because they feel distanced from the concerns of decision
makers in the two TV stations, their interpretive activity as audiences is restrained to the
level of metacommunication (the relationship) message of TV contents. Therefore, when
they accept the hegemonic message, they accept it more as a way of expressing their
satisfaction with the relationship message, than as a way of expressing consent with the
hegemonic message.
This focus on the relationship level of communication is clearly manifested in the
participants' reference to their rights as citizens, to their perceived worth vis à vis the two
TV stations. As Watzlawick, Beaven, and Jackson (1967) rightly put it, ―the ability to
metacommunicate appropriately is not only the conditio sine qua non of successful
communication, but is intimately linked with the enormous problem of awareness of self
and others‖ (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 53). Awareness of the self comes as a result of
working out a relationship with another individual. For the participants, the two public
service television stations promote the Westernized and urban lifestyles as the normal and
the dominant lifestyles the fact that communicates a relationship message about the
worthlessness of the participants' own rural and suburban lifestyles. As a result, some
said that they felt ―less important than those they watch on television.‖ Others said that
they felt intimidated by the people and the lifestyles they see portrayed on their TV.
The application of Stuart Hall's encoding/decoding model in the Moroccan
context reveals some of the model's strengths as well some of its limitations. The model
provides very useful tools that help understand the relationship between how television
producers encode messages and how audiences decode them, and this study would not
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have been possible without the model's rich analytical tools. The model stems from
studies done in England where one of the best public service televisions exists and where
English is dominant even among the smallest minorities. The model is founded on the
assumption that audiences are capable of decoding the TV contents and that variations in
readings are the outcome of the audiences' reactions to the hegemonic message. The
model is also founded on the premise that audiences are capable of understanding the
literal meanings of texts, the readings are to be analyzed at the level of pragmatics, not
semantics or syntactics.
In the case of Moroccan television and their audience, the audience' readings of
the TV contents depend not so much on the content level, but on the relationship level of
the TV messages. Participants confirmed that they did not understand most of the
contents of the two TV stations, and they interpreted these contents by focusing on the
metacommunicational (relationship) messages. Hall's model does not account for these
situations where audiences, faced with lack of skills to understand the content (at the
levels of semantics and syntactics), resort to interpreting the relationship messages.
Sylvia Harvey (2004) from the Center for British Film and Television Studies
argues that a constant public policy issue in public service broadcasting is the provision
of high quality information, education and entertainment to households throughout the
country. She describes the programs as ones that offer some insight into the economic
and social conditions and that enrich the choices of individuals whether acting in their
capacity as citizens or as consumers. For instance, public service programs may facilitate
the recognition of human rights and may further democratic processes. There are a
variety of ways that this can be done: in drama as in documentary, in current affairs and
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in investigative journalism (Harvey, 2004).
On the basis of the audience reception analysis, one may conclude that the two
public broadcasting television stations fail to abide by the ―universal service‖ principle.
Besides, they do not produce high quality programs and even if they did, the programs
are not meant for all Moroccan households. The high rates of illiteracy among its
population and the TV stations refusal to communicate to their target audience in a
language they understand restrict audience access to most of the TV's contents. In terms
of public broadcasting role in furthering human rights and democracy, Moroccan public
service television is far from fulfilling this role. It actually communicates a relationship
message whereby it defines the Moroccan audience as unimportant, thereby denying
Moroccans one of the basic human rights, i.e. the right to information.
6. 6. Conclusion
The television viewers that are most concerned with the developmental role of the
public service television stations are of lower income and lower educational backgrounds.
The results of the focus groups allowed to distill some of the perceptions of this segment
of the Moroccan population of the public service provided by the two television stations.
These insights are of utmost importance and are necessary to obtain a clearer picture of
the investigation under study. The participants asserted that they preferred to watch their
own television stations. They praise and enjoy the shows that use darija or a mix of
darija, Arabic and Tamazight, shows that portray their lifestyles and address their
everyday life concerns. All participants agree that most television shows do not portray
their way of life, and that the shows have little if no relation to their lives. When asked
about what lifestyle they thought was represented, they unanimously agreed that it is the
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way of life of wealthy people living in big urban centers, namely Casablanca and Rabat.
The participants expressed frustration with the manner in which the two television
stations exclude them and their lifestyles by using MS Arabic and French and by
promoting the westernized and urban lifestyle as the norm.
These findings confirm the major hypothesis of this dissertation, that the two
public service television stations seem to promote a cultural agenda that benefits only a
small privileged segment of Moroccan society and seems to shy away from, if not
prevent, the possibility of allowing the concerns and perspectives of the poor and
marginalized to be highlighted. The two TV stations alienate the very audiences they
claim to serve.
The question of access and the relationship it entails between contents and
audiences show that the potential of Moroccan public service television to have any
positive impact on the development of the nation and its democratic transition does not
depend only on the existence of an independent and free media. It also depends on the
extent to which media offer the possibilities of access and participation to the majority of
Moroccan audiences. A core assumption of much of the literature on media in developing
countries is that a more independent press with greater freedom will make a positive
contribution to political change. Understanding the developmental role of Moroccan
public service television in the country's democratic transitions requires a nuanced
approach, based on uncovering multiple layers of ambiguity that address the legal,
economic, and political environments, the television contents, the production dynamics,
as well as the relationship between content and audiences.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations
7. 1. Conclusion and Summary
This study addresses the basic question of how public service television is put to
use to bring about rapid social change and economic progress for Morocco. The primary
task of this study is to examine the extent to which Moroccan public service television
serves the development objectives of the nation. To provide substantial answers to this
question, the study tackled this question from three main angles: content analysis,
production study, and audience reception analysis. This study looked at the research
question from both ‗sides‘ of the screen, examining the issues from the perspectives of
both the broadcasters (supply) and the audience (demand).
First, the content analysis investigated the issues of access and participation,
which constitute the foundation of the first principle in public service broadcasting:
universality of appeal. The study used quantitative content analysis as a counting tool to
address the demographic characteristics of participants in the television programs of Al
Oula and 2M, the languages used in the programs, and the availability of means of
feedback. The study supplemented this quantitative analysis with an interpretive
(qualitative) content analysis to help uncover and capture the essence of the television
programs in so far as their contents relate to development. It analyzed four shows, one
confirming, one disconfirming and two extreme cases. By choosing a combination of
confirming/disconfirming and exceptional examples for this study, this content analysis
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explored the boundaries of the data and identified the range of views including typical,
discordant and extreme cases.
The second area is the production study. Using in-depth interviews, the study
investigated the ways in which television producers and managers of Al Oula and 2M
interpreted and responded to the constraints of both the media organizations and those of
the larger economic and political environments. It investigated the views of TV producers
on the media policies and the ways in which they liberated and/or constrained them. TV
producers were asked questions about their own perceptions of their audiences'
educational level and language skills, and whether there were feedback mechanisms that
allowed them to know their audiences‘ opinions and satisfaction levels.
Finally, the audience reception analysis examined the opinions of television
viewers on the quality of the TV programs and their perceptions on the public service
provided by Al Oula and 2M. The focus was on the extent to which the television viewers
understood the contents of the TV stations, and the extent to which the TV programs
represented the viewers' lifestyles and concerns. The study also examined the
expectations the television viewers may have of their public service television.
Before summarizing the core findings of this study in Chapters Four, Five, and
Six, it is important to point out some of the major ideas that emerged from the theory and
historical surveys in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two, I argued that the
MacBride Commission‘s recommendation for the use of the mass media for public
service constituted the most coherent approach to the use of mass media for development.
The modernization approaches, the neo-Marxist approaches, and the participatory
approaches all had many limitations. They either misconceived the process of change or
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were focused on small scale development projects. The Commission‘s approach was also
the closest to Morocco‘s current vision of the role of mass media in development. The
Moroccan government has given important policy considerations to regulate the use of
television and radio airwaves to adhere to the public service broadcasting model. The
MacBride Report remains in my view the closest model for the use of mass media for
development.
Chapter Three provided a historical review of radio and television and
described the government-media relationship in light of the world media systems. It also
described the role of Moroccan broadcast media in the processes of nation-building
and the democratic transition period. In order to define Morocco's media system
during the periods 1956 – 1999 and 1999 – 2008, the chapter also examined Morocco‘s
legal, economic and political environments. The chapter concluded that Morocco‘s media
system is an unstable media system that swings back and forth from developmental to
authoritarian systems. Today, the legal, economic and political environments are certainly
more open and conducive to more freedom in the period from 1999 to 2008 than they
were during the ―Years of Lead.‖ The study found that there was however still more work
to be done with regard to the media policy and the organizational culture in formerly
state-run media institutions. The law still provides for jail sentences for journalists, and
the Audiovisual Communication Law has too many restrictions on what private radio and
TV stations can and cannot do. State run television seems to be stuck in the old regime,
and it seems that resistance to freedom and democracy emanates more from within the
media institutions and less from without. Media policy can improve but the remnants of
the old regime still persist.
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The core findings of this study emanate from the content analysis, the production
study, and the audience reception analysis. The focus of the content analysis was on the
public broadcasting principle of universality of appeal, and in particular on the questions
of access to and participation in public television, including the provisions for minorities.
Contrary to developmental, participatory, and public service theories of television, the
contents of the two public service television stations do not allow for access and
participation. The findings confirm my major hypotheses, that television programming
decisions in the two public stations is influenced by the elite upper-middle class, who
want more entertainment and have less need for educational programs than their rural and
urban-poor counterparts. Al Oula and 2M do promote the cultural agenda of a small
privileged segment of Moroccan society and seems to shy away from, if not prevent, the
possibility of allowing the concerns and perspectives of the poor and marginalized to be
highlighted.
The content analysis results show that programming decisions do not take into
account the interests of the Moroccan population as a whole, and that criteria such as
diversity, pluralism, access, and participation are virtually absent from the two public
service television stations. They appear to be more in line with the modernization
approach where communication and information flow in a top-down fashion with little or
no regard to the receivers' feedback.
Access and participation are the major cornerstones for the use of television for
development. Moroccan public service television is in clear violation of its public
broadcasting mandate, i.e. to appeal to all segments of Moroccan society, to offer
opportunities for assess and participation to its audiences, to stay detached from
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government interest, and to cater to national identity and community.
The two public television stations construct on a daily basis an undemocratic
social order by acting as media by the elite and for the elite and by narrowing down the
possibilities of participation for the underprivileged and the poor segments of Moroccan
society. An important and vital function of television is to help society understand itself.
Considering the confirming and the extreme cases examined in the interpretive content
analysis, the two public service television stations give an appalling sense of national
identity. When television news considers royal activities as more newsworthy than a
human tragedy of the Issasfa‘s magnitude, when television portrays Moroccans living in
the rural areas of the middle Atlas as props in the documentary, television communicates
and actively constructs a bizarre national identity. Moroccans seem to be defined as less
human than the wealthy tourists and their lives as less important than routine royal
activities. The participants in the audience analysis confirm this fact. They expressed
frustration with the manner in which the two television stations excluded them and their
lifestyles by promoting the westernized and urban lifestyle as the norm. in the words of
one participant, ―we feel less important than the people we watch on our TV.‖
If television is to become an important actor in Morocco's development, television
producers and decision makers need to be aware of the kinds of social constructs they
disseminate each day. The danger in portraying Moroccan national identity the way the
two public service television stations do is that they provide images, frames, and
descriptions on the basis of which national identities and national symbols are
constructed and defined.
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The apparent distance between Al Oula and 2M and their public service mandates
may be traced to an utter lack of understanding, on the part of television producers, of the
relationship between the television texts and the world they represent and understanding
the processes by which the meanings of these texts are constructed. A TV text that
represents an identity or state of being is a text that represents a particular conception of
power and responsibility. Television producers seem to be either oblivious or indifferent
to the impact TV representations may have on viewers‘ perceptions.
The two stations marginalize and dis-empower the very audiences they claim to
serve. The qualitative content analysis also showed that the contents of Al Oula and 2M
greatly hampered the attainment of their public service mandate and their desired
objectives. Because there seems to be a lack of vision about what public service means,
because TV producers seem to be assigned to produce programs for which they are not
trained and/or fail to employ the necessary external input, and because frequent
evaluation of the programs seems to be non-existent, the result is not likely to be what the
public service mandate intended.
In Chapter Five, the television producers in both stations confirmed the fact that
the major forces of structure in Moroccan TV production had been the State and the
Royal Palace. Before 1999, television functioned as a support system for Morocco's
authoritarian regime for 38 years. The regime used television mostly for propaganda and
entertainment purposes at the expense of other functions and services. After 1999, the
new political environment under the reign of King Mohamed VI made the promotion of
human rights one of its priorities. The legal environment had to change to accompany the
political reforms. While these changes, i.e. the creation of HACA and the new Audio289

visual Communication law, allowed for the liberalization of the sector and the creation of
new TV and radio stations, they had until now failed to exert and wield significant
changes in the contents and the public service function of the two television stations. The
fact that television functioned as a tool of an oppressive regime seem to have shaped the
cultural and institutional foundations of the television industry. These cultural and
institutional foundations are resilient and they resist much of the current legal and
political changes.
In response to the questions on the use of language and the availability of
audience feedback, the interviewees expressed incapacity to act from within the
television institutions to change any of these things. They refer to the State as the sole
entity that is able to dictate a change in issues such as the choice of language or the
availability of feedback. On the question of language for instance, one of main responses
was that using darija as the main language of the TV programs was a strong political
decision that needed to be taken at the highest level of the State.
The interviews also pointed to the presence of fear amongst TV producers. The
fact that television functioned as a tool of an oppressive regime for many years seems to
have shaped much of the cultural and institutional foundations of the television industry.
These cultural and institutional foundations became part and parcel of the organizational
culture of these TV stations. This is more evident in Al Oula than it is in 2M. With the
exception of Mr. Benjelloun who questioned the three taboo subjects (Islam, Monarchy
and Western Sahara), all the other interviewees either provided more justifications for
why they must remain taboos as the case of Mr. Moudden, or expressed a wish that
political freedoms should improve. The undemocratic and repressive features of the old
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regime still impact how media producers perceive their work and perceive the margins of
freedom they may or may not have.
Finally, the TV producers seem to perceive themselves more as patriotic citizens
who must be mindful of their responsibility to the State rather than as media professionals
with a mission to serve the public interest. The State is still the major force of structural
constraints on the two public service television stations. It controls the economic,
political, and legal environments. The elements of authoritarianism are still present
although there are signs that there is a movement towards a more developmental media
system. Therefore, unless the State lifts the legal and political constraints on the two TV
stations, unless revisions are made to the Licensing Obligations, unless a clear mission
statement for the role of public service broadcasting, Morocco‘s recent media policy
reforms will continue to be a varnish. Underneath lies the same old State-controlled
broadcasting system.
In Chapter Six, the results of the focus groups allowed to distill some of the
perceptions of the viewers of the public service provided by the two television stations.
The television viewers this study focused on are of lower income and lower educational
backgrounds. Besides the fact that they constitute the majority of the Moroccan
population, they are also the ones most concerned with the developmental role of the
public service television stations. Their insights are of utmost importance and are
necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the investigation under study. The participants
asserted that they preferred to watch their own television stations. They praised and
enjoyed the shows that used darija (or a mix of darija, Arabic and Tamazight), and
shows that portrayed their lifestyles and addressed their everyday life concerns. All
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participants agreed that most television shows did not portray their way of life, and that
the shows had little if no relation to their lives. When asked about what lifestyle they
thought was represented, they unanimously agreed that it was the way of life of wealthy
people living in big urban centers, namely Casablanca and Rabat. The participants
expressed frustration with the manner in which the two television stations excluded them
and their lifestyles by using Modern Standard Arabic and French and by promoting the
westernized and urban lifestyle as the norm.
In terms of public broadcasting's role in furthering human rights and democracy,
Moroccan public service television is far from fulfilling this role. It actually
communicates a relationship message whereby it defines the Moroccan audience as
unimportant, thereby denying Moroccans one of the basic human rights, i.e. the right to
information. The high rates of illiteracy among Morocco's population and the TV
stations‘ refusal to communicate to their target audience in a language they understand
restrict audience access to most of the TV's contents. Al Oula and 2M alienate the very
audiences they claim to serve.
7. 1. Recommendations
In a media environment that is changing rapidly, any attempts to make
recommendations for the future must be cautious. However, based on the findings of this
study, it is obvious to me that the Moroccan government either does not possess a clear
vision for the use of television for development, or lacks the willpower to make such use
possible. Chapter Four demonstrated that the potential of Moroccan media to have a
positive impact on the development of the nation and its democratic transition does not
depend only on the existence of an independent and free media. It also depends on the
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extent to which media offer the possibilities of access and participation to the majority of
Moroccan audiences.
However, to regulate the use of television as an outside source for promoting its
development goals, the government created the HACA and passed the Audio-visual
Communication Law to liberalize the sector. As a result, many television stations were
launched, five of which were thematic (Arriyadia for sports, Assadissa for religion, Aflam
TV for films and TV series, and Arrabia the education channel); one station was regional,
the TV station of Laayoun located in the capital of the southern provinces of Morocco.73
Therefore, instead of conducting large scale evaluation and assessment of the quality and
quantity of the programming of the existing two public service television stations (Al
Oula and 2M), the government launched new channels without knowing what works or
does not work in Morocco‘s TV landscape.
In order to comply with the principle of universality of appeal, the public service
TV stations must address the concerns of the local populations and show sensitivity to the
uniqueness of their local cultures and local dialects. Morocco is a diverse country that is
made up of distinct geographical, ethnic and cultural groupings. Many observers say that
travelling in Morocco from one region to the other seems more like travelling from one
country to another. Riffians in the north, Middle Atlas Imazighen in the center, Arabs in
the western plains, the Sous in the south, and finally the Sahraouis of the deep southern
territories, all have distinct dialects, cuisine, fashion, and lifestyles.
Therefore, I recommend that the TV stations must be regional, not national. For
television to have a development impact, TV audiences must have access to television
73

The station is located in the contested Western Sahara and it plays a major role in promoting Morocco's
official position vis à vis this territory.
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content. TV content must be communicated in the language spoken and understood by
the people and must address issues that are of concern to the people. The availability of
means of feedback is of utmost importance for relevant television program-making. The
long term goal must be to involve the local populations in the production of television
programs contents.
It is important to note that television content must be distanced from all vested
interests: this is a key principle in public broadcasting; the shows serve the public best
when they are produced within a structure of independence. Public service television
must remain distanced from any commitment to any power structure within the nation, be
it political or economic.
Based on the findings of the qualitative content analysis, the distance between Al
Oula and 2M and their public service mandates can be traced to an utter lack of
understanding, on the part of television producers, of the relationship between the
television texts and the world they represent and understanding the processes by which
the meanings of these texts are constructed. I recommend that TV producers undergo
intensive training in critical media studies so that they become aware of the kinds of
social constructs they disseminate each day to their audiences. For instance, the danger in
portraying Moroccan national identity the way the two public service television stations
do is that they provide images, frames, and descriptions on the basis of which national
identities and national symbols are constructed and defined. A TV text that represents an
identity or state of being is a text that represents a particular conception of power and
responsibility. Television producers seem to be either oblivious or indifferent to the
impact TV representations may have on viewers‘ perceptions. TV producers seem to be
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assigned to produce programs for which they are not trained and/or fail to employ the
necessary external input. Therefore, there is a need to train TV producers in message
production and reception.
Finally, I recommend that Al Oula and 2M adopt and implement a strategic
internal communication plan to transform the organizational culture of the two stations.
The fact that Al Oula and 2M functioned as tools of an oppressive regime for 38 years
has shaped the cultural and institutional foundations of the television industry. These
cultural and institutional foundations are resilient and they resist much of the desired
legal and political changes. Unless the organizational culture of the two stations change,
the undemocratic and repressive features of the old regime will continue to shape how
media producers perceive their work and perceive the margins of freedom they may have.

295

References

Abdel Rahman, H. (1998). Uses and gratifications of satellite TV in Egypt.
Transnational Broadcasting Journal, issue 1, fall 1998.
Alami, D. (Ed.) (1985). Le Parlement et la Pratique Legislative au Maroc. Casablanca:
Les Editions Toubkal.
Al-Bayati, Y. K. (2001). Satellite TV: The foreign culture and the visual
Authority: Libya as a case study'. Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi, Vol. 24(267): 111-127.
Al-Hroub, K. (2006). Satellite media and social change in the Arab world. In Arab
Media in the Information Age. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research.
Allen, R. C., Hill, A. (Eds.) (2004). The Television Studies Reader. New York: Routlege.
Al-Refai, M. K. (1995). Video: The modernisation of the means and the problem of
exposure: Syria as a case study. Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi, Vol. 17(194): 68-84.
Altschull, J. H. (1995). Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy. NY: Longman.
Asante, C. E. (1997). Press Freedom and Development: A Research Guide and Selected
Bibliography. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
Al Sahifa. (2000, September 29). pp. 2 - 3.
Auter, P. J., Arafa, M., & Al-Jaber, K. 2005. Identifying with Arabic journalists. How Al
Jazeera Tapped Parasocial Interaction Gratifications in the Arab World. Gazette:
296

The International Journal for Communication Studies, Vol. 67(2): 189-204.
Ayish, M. (2003a). Beyond Western oriented communication theories: A normative
Arab-Islamic perspective, in The Public, 10: 2, pp. 79–92.
Ayish, M. (2003b). Arab World Television in the World of Globalization. Hamburg:
Ubersee Institute.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Bandura, A. (1994). Social cognitive theory of mass communication. In J. Bryant & D.
Zillman (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in Theory and Research (pp. 61-90).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Baran, P. A. (1957). The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review
Press.
Baran, S. J., & Davis, D. (2006). Mass Communication Theory: Foundation, Ferment,
and Future. Belmont, CA.: Thompson Wadsworth.
Ben Ashour. A. (1992). Mass media in Morocco. Unpublished Master‘s Thesis in the
Institut Supérieur de Journalisme, Rabat, Morocco.
Ben Cherif, N. Morocco: Public TV, private business. Retrieved June 10, 2002, from,
http://www.allied-media.com/arabtv/2m_moroccan_tv_article.html
Benjamin, L. (1998). Working it out together: Radio policy from Hoover to the Radio
Act of 1927. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 42(2), (Spring 1998):
233.
Benton Foundation (2008). The Federal Radio Commission. Retrieved June 14, 2008,
from, http://www.Benton.org.
Berelson, B. (1952). Content Analysis in Communication Research. New York: Hafner.
297

Berg, B. L. (2005). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Boston: Allyn
& Bacon.
Berger, A. A. (2007). Media and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction to
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
Bertrand, J., Brown, J., & Ward, V. (1992). Techniques for analyzing focus group data.
Evaluation Review 16, 198-209.
Besley T., & Burgess R. (2001). Political agency, government responsiveness and the
role of the media. European Economic Review. 45(4-6): 629-640.
Boyd, D. (1999). Broadcasting in the Arab World. A Survey of Radio and Television in
the Middle East. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society. Boston:
Unwin Hyman.
Chadwick, A. (2006). Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication
Technologies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cantor, M. G. (1988). The Hollywood TV Producer: His Work and His Audience. NJ.:
Transaction Publishers.
Chomsky, N. (1989). Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies.
Boston, MA: South End Press.
Cook, D. (1996). The Culture Industry Revisited. Lanham, Maryland and London:
Rowman and Littlefield Press.
Croteau, D., & Hoynes, W. (2003). Media Society: Industries, Images, and Audiences.
Thousand Oaks, CA.: Pine Forge Press.
Curran, J. (2002). Media and Power. NY: Routledge.
298

D'Acci, J. (2004). Television, representation, and gender. In Robert C, Allen and Annette
Hill (Eds.) The Television Studies Reader. NY.: Routledge.
Dahlgren, P. (1995). Television and the Public Sphere. London: Sage.
Dahlgren, P., & Sparks, C. (1995). Communication and Citizenship. London: Routledge.
Darif, M. (1992). The Political Islam: A Historical Approach. Rabat: Makta bat Al
Maarif Al Jadid. (Arabic).
DeFleur, M. & Ball-Rokeach, S. (1990). Theories of Communication (5th ed.). New
York: Longman.
Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand
Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
Donohue G. A., Tichenor, P. et al. (1995). A Guard dog perspective on the role of the
media. Journal of Communication. 45(2): 115-128.
Downing, J., McQuail, D., Wartella, E., & Schlesinger, P. (2004). The SAGE Handbook
of Media Studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Downing, J. (2007). Drawing a bead on global communication. In Global
Communication. Yahia R. Kamalipour (Ed.). Belmont, CA.: Thompson
Wadsworth.
Durham, M. G., Kellner, D. M. (2006). Media and Cultural Studies: Keywords. Malden
MA.: Blackwell Publishing.
Edmunds, H. (2000). The Focus Group Research Handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
El Kobbi, M. (1992). L'Etat et la Presse au Maroc. Paris: L'auteur.
El Yahyaoui, Y. (2000). Malaise de la Télévision au Maroc. Rabat : Okad.

299

Ennaji, M. (2005). Multilingualism, Cultural Identity, and Education in Morocco. New
York: Springer.
Failakawi, Y. (2005). Kuwait viewers' behaviour: field study. Journal of the Gulf &
Arabian Peninsula Studies, Vol. 31(117).
Fisher, H. D., & Merrill, J. C. (eds.). (1976). International and Intercultural
Communication. New York: Hastings House Publishers.
Freedom House. (2004). Women’s Freedom in Focus: Morocco. Retrieved September 11,
2008, from, http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Freedom House. (2008). Enabling environments for civic movements and the
dynamics of democratic transition. Retrieved September 11, 2008, from,
http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum Publishing
Company.
Giddens, A. (1997). Sociology. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gilroy, P. (2000). Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line.
Cambridge. MA.: Harvard university Press.
Gilroy, P. (1991). There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race
and Nation. Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press.
Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World is Watching. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Gitlin, T. (ed.) (1987). Watching Television. New York: Pantheon.
Gomulko, S. (1971). Inventive Activity, Diffusion, and Stages of Growth. Institute of
Economics, Asrhus University Denmark.
300

Griffin, E. (2009). A First Look at Communication Theory. NY.: Mc Graw-Hill.
Haberman, P. (1986). Back at the Drawing Boards: The Third Decade in Development
Communication. Unpublished Manuscript. Miami, Florida: Florida International
University.
Hadj-Moussa, R. (2003). New media, community and politics in Algeria. Media, Culture
& Society, Vol. 25: 451-468.
Hafez, K. (2001). Mass Media Politics and Society in the Middle East. New Jersey:
Hampton Press.
Hagan, F. E. (2006). Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology. Boston:
Allyn and Bacon.
Hall, S. (1980). Encoding and Decoding. In Culture, Media, Language. London:
Hutchinson.
Hall, S. (ed.) (1997). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices.
The Open University, UK.: Sage.
Hallin, D. C., Mancini, P. (2005). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media
and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hamada, B. I. (1993). The Agenda-Setting Role of the Media in the Arab Region. Beirut:
Centre for Arab Unity Studies (in Arabic).
Hamada, B. I. (2001). Islamic cultural theory, Arab media performance, and public
opinion. In Slavko Splichal (ed.), Public Opinion and Democracy: Vox Populi
Vox Dei, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, pp. 215–39.

301

Harvey, S. (2004). Public service Television: Everyday life and the political process. The
Center for British Film and Television Studies. Retrieved March, 4, 2009, from
http://www.bftv.ac.uk.
Haute Authorité de la Communication Audio-Visuèlle (2006a). Description. Retrieved
November 22, 2006, from, http://www.haca.ma.
Haute Authorité de la Communication Audio-Visuèlle (2006b). Cahier des Charges de
2M. Retrieved November 22, 2006, from
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/NR/rdonlyres/6517D7FE-5F8C-4867-9AE5958734831D62/0/Cahier_de_Charges_2M.pdf.
Haute Authorité de la Communication Audio-Visuèlle (2006c). Cahier des Charges de
SNRT. Retrieved November 22, 2006, from
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/NR/rdonlyres/3451DD5C-F7DB-45D3-A927
D1EB691AD635/903/CCSNRT.pdf.
Haut Commissariat au Plan (2004). Le Rapport 2004. Retrieved January 14, 2006, from
http://www.hcp.ma/pubData/Demographie/RGPH/RGPHRapportNational.pdf.
Herman, E. (2002). The propaganda model. In D. McQuail (ed.), McQuail’s Reader in
Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage Publication.
Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of
the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon.
Herzog, H. (1941). On borrowed experience: an analysis of listening to daytime
sketches, Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX, No. 1: 65-95.
Hidass, A. (1992). Libérté et communication au Maroc, in L’Information au Maghreb.
Tunis: Ceres Production.
302

Hijams, E. (1996). The logic of qualitative media content analysis: a typology.
Communications, 21, 93-109.
Hollander, J. A. (2004). The social contexts of focus groups. Journal of Contemporary
Ethnography, Vol. 33, No. 5, 602-637.
hooks, b. (1990). Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics. Boston, MA.: South
End Press.
Horkheimer, M, & Adorno, T. W. (1972). Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Herder
and Herder.
Hornik, R.C. (1989). Channel effectiveness in development communication programs. In
Rice, R.E. & Atkin, C. K. (Eds.) Public information campaigns, 2nd edition, (pp.
309-330). Newbury Park: Sage.
Hur, K. K. (1984). A critical analysis of international news flow research. Critical Studies
in Mass Communication 1: 365-378.
Ibahrine, M. (2007). The Internet and Politics in Morocco: The Political Use of the
Internet by Islam Oriented Political Movements. Berlin: VDM Verlag.
Jaidi, D. (2000). Diffusion et Audience des Médias Audiovisuels: Cinéma, Radio,
Télévision, Vidéo et Publicité au Maroc. Rabat, Maroc: Al Majal.
Jaidi, L., & Zouaoui, M. (2005). Figure de la Précarité: Genre et Exclusion Economique
au Maroc. Casablanca: Najah El Jadida.
James C. J. (1991). Rethinking the media as public sphere. In Media and Society.
London: Routledge.
Jay, M. (1973). The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Jensen, K. (1995). The Social Semiotics of Mass Communication. London: Sage.
303

Jhally, S., & Lewis, J. (1992). Enlightened Racism: The Cosby Show, Audiences, and the
Myth of the American Dream. San Francisco: Westview Press.
Katz E. and Lazarsfeld, P. (1955). Personal Influence. NY: Free Press.
Kellner, D. (1989). Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity. Cambridge and Baltimore:
Polity and John Hopkins University Press.
Kellner, D. (1990). Television and the Crisis of Democracy. Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press.
Kellner, D. (1995). Media Culture. Cultural Studies, Identity, and Politics Between the
Modern and the Postmodern. New York: Routledge.
Kepe, G. (1984). Légitimation et Délégitimation de l’Autoritarisme dans le Moyen Orient
Contemporain. Grenoble.
Kepel, G., Leveau, R. (1996). Les Musulmans dans la Socièté Française. Paris:
Références.
Kothari, R. (1988). Rethinking Development: In Search of Human Alternatives. Delhi,
India: Ajanta Publications
Kraidy, M. M. (1998). Broadcasting regulation and civil society in postwar Lebanon. In
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media. V. 42, N. 3, p. 387-414.
Krueger, R.A. (1988). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research.
Newbury Park: Sage.
Kuhn, T. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL.: University of
Chicago Press.

304

Lambeth, D. (1995). The global perspective. In John Merrill (Ed.). Global
Journalism: Survey of International Communication. (3rd ed.). New York:
Longman Publishers.
Lamnadi, A. (1999). Communication Policy Making and Electronic Media in Morocco:
The Introduction of Private Television. Unpublished Dissertation.
Lasswell, H. (1927). Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Laswell, H. (1948). The structure and function of communication in society. In L. Bryson
(Ed.), The communication of ideas. New York: Harper.
Lazarsfeld, P. (1941). Administrative and critical communications research. Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX, No. 1: 2-16.
Lederman, L. (1990). Assessing educational effectiveness: The focus group interview as
a technique for data collection. Communication Education, 38, 117-127.
Littlejohn, S. (2004). Theories of Human Communication. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Pub.
Macnamara, J. (2003). Mass media effects: A review of 50 years of media effects
research. Retrieved August 28, 2004, from
http://www.masscom.com.au/book/papers/massmedia.html.
Maghraoui, A. (2001). Morocco in transition: Political authority in crisis, Middle East
Report. Retrieved June 23, 2007, from
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer218/218_mghraoui.html.
Maibach, E., & Murphy, D.A. (1995). Self-efficacy in health promotion research and
practice: conceptualization and measurement. Health Education Research,
Theory, & Practice, 10:37-50
305

Marzouki, A. (2001). Tazmamart: Cellule 10. Paris: Gallimard.
Marris, P., & Thornham, S. (Eds.). (1996). Media Studies: A Reader. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Matar, D. (2006). Diverse diasporas, one meta-narrative: Palestinians in the UK talking
about 11 September 2001. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 32(6):
1027-1040.
McChesney, R. W. (1999). Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in
Dubious Time. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
McKee, A. (2004). A beginner‘s guide to textual analysis. Retrieved April 13, 2004, from
http://www/enhancetv.com.au/ articles/article31.htm.
McQuail, D. (1983). Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. London:
Sage.
McQuail, D. (1994). Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. London:
Sage.
McQuail, D. (1992). Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest.
London: Sage.
McQuail, D. (2001). Political Communication Theory. London: Sage.
McQuail, D. (Ed.) (2002). McQuail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory. London:
Sage.
Media Education Foundation (Producer). (January 2009). Edward Said's Orientalism.
Podcast retrieved January 30, 2009, from http://www.Youtube.com
Media Policy (2006). A resource on television, change and standards. Retrieved June
10, 2006, from http://www.mediapolicy.org/.
306

Newcomb, H. (1982). Television: The Critical View. Oxford: Oxford University.
Merrill, J. C. (ed.). (1995). Global Journalism: Survey of International Communication.
(3rd ed.). New York: Longman Publishers.
Miladi, N. (2006). Satellite TV news and the Arab Diaspora in Britain: Comparing Al
Jazeera, the BBC and CNN. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 32 (6):
947 –960.
Miles, M., & Huberman, M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis. California: Sage.
Ministry of Communication. History of Moroccan media. Retrieved November 10, 2005,
from, http://www.mincom.ma.
Ministry of Communication (2003). Le Domaine de la Communication au Maroc. Rabat:
Al Anbaa.
Ministry of Communication (2006). Ministry of Communication Report. Rabat:
Al Anbaa.
Ministry of Development. (June 2007). Comprendre le développement humain. Retrieved
June 12, 2007, from http://www.social.gov.ma/upload/documents/Brochure%20
finale.pdf.
Ministry of development. (January, 2008). Fifty Years of Human Development &
Perspectives to 2025 Report. Retrieved January 10, 2008, from,
http://www.rdh50.ma.
Mody, B. (1991). Designing Messages for Development Communication: An Audience
Participation-based Approach. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
Mody, B. (2003). International and Development Communication: A 21st Century
Perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
307

Mowlana, H. (1985). International Flow of Information: A Global Report and Analysis.
Paris: UNESCO.
Morgan, D. J. (1997). Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. London: Sage
Morley, D. (1992). Television Audiences and Cultural Studies. London: Routledge.
Mumby, D. K. (1997). Modernism, postmodernism, and communication studies: A
rereading of an ongoing debate. Communication Theory, 7, 16-28.
Nair, K. S., & White, S. A. (1993). Perspectives on Development Communication.
London: Sage.
Napoli, P. (2001). Foundations of Communication Policy: Principles and Process in the
Regulation of Electronic Media. Cresskill, NJ.: Hampton Press.
Neuendorf, K. (2002). The Content Analysis Guidebook, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism Worldwide. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Oullette, L., & Lewis, J. (2004). Moving beyond the ‗Vast Wasteland:‘ Cultural policy
and television in the United States. In The Television Studies Reader. Robert C.
Allen and Annette Hill (Eds.). London: Routledge.
Picard, R. G. (1985). The Press and the Decline of Democracy The Democratic
Socialist Response in Public Policy. Santa Barbara, CA.: Greenwood Press.
Poindexter, M. (1991). Subscription television in the third world: the Moroccan
experience. Journal of Communication, 41, 27 – 38.
Preston, W., Herman, E. S., & Schiller, H. I. (1989). Hope and Folly: The United States
and UNESCO 1945-1985. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
308

Rogers, E. M. (1962). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press.
Rogers, E. M., Shoemaker, F. F. (1971). Communications of Innovations: A Cross
Cultural Approach. New York: Free Press.
Rogers, E. M. (1997). A History of Communication Study: A Biographical
Approach. NY: The Free Press.
Rugh, W. (1979). The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World.
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Rugh, W. (2004). Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics.
Westport, CT. Praeger Publishers.
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York : Pantheon Books.
Saeed, M. A. (2006). New trends and forces in the Arab media arena. In Arab Media in
the Information Age. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.
Scannell, P. (1986). Broadcast Talk. London: Sage.
Schiller, H. (1976). Communication and Cultural Domination. NY.: International Arts
and Sciences Press.
Schramm, W. L. (1964). Mass Media and National Development. Stanford University
Press.
Schramm, W. L., Chaffee, S. H., & Rogers, E. M. (1997). The Beginnings of
Communication Study in America: A Personal Memoir. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications.
Sen, A. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy, 10.3.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books.

309

Servaes, J. (1989). One World, Multiple Cultures. A New Paradigm on Communication
for Development. Leuven: Acco.
Shah, H.. (1996). Modernization, marginalization and emancipation: Toward a
normative model of journalism and national development. Communication
Theory. 6 (2).
Shoemaker, P. (1991). Gatekeeping. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text
and Interaction. London: Sage.
Singh, A. & Johnson, B. G. (Eds). (2004). Interviews with Edward Said. Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi.
Singhal, A. & Rogers, E. M. (1999). Entertainment-education: A Communication
Strategy for Social Change. PA.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. (1984). Foreign news in the media: International reporting in
twenty-nine countries. Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 93. Paris:
UNESCO.
Sreberny-Mohamadi, A. & Mohamadi, A. (1994). Small Media, Big Revolution:
Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: Minneapolis
University Press.
Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (2000). Television, gender, and democratization in the
Middle East. In L. Curran and M. Jin Park (Eds.). De-Westernizing the Media
Studies. London: Routlege.
Stevenson, R. L., Shaw, D. L. (eds.). (1984). Foreign News and the New World
Information Order Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press.
310

Stewart, D.W., & Shamdasani, P. N. (1990). Focus Groups: Theory and
Practice. Newbury Park: Sage.
Tessler, M. (2000). Changing Media Habits and Entertainment Preferences in Morocco:
An Inter-Generational Analysis. Retrieved June 25, 2007, from
http://nmit.georgetown.edu/papers/mtessler.html.
Thompson, J. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Thussu, D. K. (2000). International Communication: Continuity and Change. London:
Arnold Publishers.
Tozy, M. (1999). Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc. Paris. Presses des Sciences Po.
Tracey, M. (1998). The Decline and Fall of Public Service Broadcasting. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Tunstall, J. (1993). Television Producers. NY.: Routledge.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2003). The 2003 Report. Retrieved July 8, 2007, from
http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?URLID=3754&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL
_SECTION=201.
United Nations. United Nations Millennium Declaration. (2000). Retrieved June 20,
2007, from http://www.un.org/millennium.
United Nations for Development Program. Retrieved June 22, 2006, from,
http://www.undp.org.
Valdivia, A. N. (2003). A Companion to Media Studies. Malden, MA. Blackwell
Publishing.

311

Waterbury, J. (1970). The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite – A
Study of Segmented politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. H., & Jackson, D. D. (1967). Pragmatics of Human
Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes.
NY.: Norton.
White, S.A. (1994). The Concept of Participation: Transforming Rhetoric to Reality. In
White, S.A. et al. Participatory Communication: Working for Change and
Development. New Delhi, India: Sage Publications.
Williams, R. (1974). Television: Technology and Cultural Form. London:
Fontana/Collins.
Wilkins, K.G. (1999). Development Discourse on Gender and Communication in
Strategies for Social Change, Journal of Communication, 49(1), 46-58.
Whitney D. C., & Ettema J. S. 1994. Audiencemaking: How the Media Create the
Audience. London: Sage.
World Bank (2006). World Bank Annual Report. Retrieved June 25, 2007, from
http://treasury.worldbank.org/web/AnnualReport 2006.pdf.

312

Appendices

313

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results

314

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

315

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

316

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

317

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

318

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

319

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

320

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

321

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

322

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

323

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

324

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

325

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

326

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

327

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

328

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

329

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

330

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

331

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

332

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

333

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

334

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

335

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

336

Appendix A: Quantitative Content Analysis Data Results (Continued)

337

Appendix B: Chapter Five Production Study Interview Guide

This is an interview guide for six semi-structured qualitative in-depth interviews.
This interview guide facilitated the qualitative data collection for this dissertation. All the
interviews lasted from one hour to one hour and fifteen minutes. All interviews took
place between March 2008 and January 2009, except for the interviews conducted with
Reda Benjelloun (June 2006) and Fatima El Ouadi (November 2005). All interviews
were conducted in a language most appropriate to the participant, whether Arabic or
French. The interviews were then translated and transcribed into English within three
days after the interviews. Immediately after each interview, I go over the notes with the
interviewee to confirm that all the main points are included in the notes, and to invite
corrections and additional comments. The researcher recorded the context, process and
impression of the interviews in field notes.
Before each interview, I notified the interview participants with the following:
1. I will not ask private questions. If you are uncomfortable in disclosing certain
information, please feel free to avoid them.
2. The interview will last between 45 minutes to one hour long. The interview will
be audio-taped upon consent of the interviewee. (None of the interviewees
accepted to be tape recorded.)
3. Not all questions on this guide will be asked.
4. The main purpose of the interview is to share your stories concerning their
respective jobs at the two public service television stations.
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Table 5. 1. List of interviewees
Interviewee
Mr. Mohamed
Moudden
Mrs. Fatima Kheir

Mr. Reda Benjelloun

Mr. Salahddine
Ghomari
Ms. Fatima El Ouadi

Mr. Jamaa Goulehcen

Function
Senior news director and
TV producer at Al Oula
(1978-present)
Presenter and co-producer
of the show Oussar wa
houloul at Al Oula (2000present)
Producer of the show
Grand Angle and vice
director of information in
2M (1999-present)
Reporter and news
presenter at 2M (2001present)
Reporter and news
presenter at 2M (19902002)
Reporter and co-producer
of the show
Moubacharatan Maakoum
(2002-present)

Location
Conference room at Al
Akhawayn University

length
1 h 15 min

Date
March 10, 2008

Mrs. Kheir's office, Al Oula,
Rabat.

1 hour

January 3, 2009

Mr. Benjelloun‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 h 15 min

June 16, 2006

Mr. Ghomari‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 h 15 min

April 10, 2008

Conference room at Al
Akhawayn University

1 h 15 min

November 2005

Mr. Goulehcen‘s office, 2M,
Casablanca

1 hour

March 16, 2008

Source: Authors‘ fieldwork: November, 2005; June, 2006; March, April, 2008; January, 2009.

Interview questions in English


What are your comments on the results of the content analysis?



What are your perceptions of your audiences' educational level, attention span,
their biographical characteristics, and their values and beliefs?



Given the high rate of illiteracy in Morocco, why do the TV stations use
languages only a few Moroccans understand?



What are the feedback mechanisms that you have in place that allow you to know
your audiences‘ opinions on the quality of your programs?



Tell me your views on the audiovisual media policy in Morocco.



Who decides the type of program, the theme of the show, etc.?
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Are there any constraints, political or economic, that influence the decision
making process at the station with regards to production?



Is there any censorship or control from within or from without the TV station?



Is there any media guidelines or philosophy that informs the production process?
Interview questions in French



Que pensez vous des résultats de l‘analyse quantitative du contenu ?



Comment percevez-vous le niveau éducatif, la durée d‘attention, les valeurs et les
croyances de votre audience ?



Pourquoi vous utiliser des langues peu répandues au Maroc, notamment l‘Arabe
classique et le Français ?



Quels outils utilisez-vous pour connaître l‘avis de vos téléspectateurs au sujet de
la qualité de vos programmes?



Parle moi de la réglementation du champs audiovisuelle au Maroc.



Comment décide-t-on de produire et de passer à l‘antenne un programme/une
émission? Qui est responsable de ce genre de décision ?



Il y a t‘il des contraintes d‘ordre politique ou économique qui influent sur les
décisions prises au moment de la production d‘une émission?



Il y a t‘il des directives ou une philosophie particulières qui guide le processus de
production?
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Sampling Focus Group Participants
The participants in the focus group discussions constitute a purposive sample of
the target population (Lederman, 1990). As a non-probability sample, purposive sampling
is occasionally used as a sampling method in qualitative research (Berg, 2007). Given the
nature of the research question, researchers rely on their expertise about some group of
people to identify subjects who represent that population (Berg, 2007). For this study, the
decision to select the focus groups participants was based on the fact that people of lower
income and lower educational backgrounds are the main focus of both national and
international development programs and initiatives. As I mentioned in Chapter One, the
NIHD and the national media reforms that followed it are meant to address the needs of
those who lack access to basic social services such as, health, education, water,
electricity, etc. They also represent a large segment of the television viewers that are most
concerned with the developmental role of the public service television stations. This
group‘s assessment and perception of the public service provided by the two television
stations are of utmost importance and are necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the
investigation under study.
I contacted the participants via the local associations. I meet them after they finish
participating in one of the associations' activities: literacy classes or workshops on
computer skills. My choice of the local associations is only a mean to reach the
participants. Being involved in local associations is not considered part of the desirable
attributes in focus groups participants. In fact, I ask them to introduce me to their family
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members and their neighbors who do not take part in local associations‘ activities.
Framing Focus Group Participation
The invitation to the focus groups is done through a one-on-one meeting with
each potential participant. I tell them that I am a university researcher working on a
project about the two main Moroccan television channels, and that I am interested in
collecting information on their perceptions of the two public television stations. I show
them my university ID and explain that this is university research and that it is not
government sponsored research. Such assurance is necessary as government-related
activities are looked at with suspicion. I inform them that the purpose of the research is to
collect information about what they think of the contents of the TV programs. I do not
use the term ―quality‖ of the program, I just say contents of the programs.
Because of the results of the content analysis, one of my main concerns was that
the participants would use the focus group sessions as a place where they would vent
their frustrations about the two TV stations. I was aware that this assumption may
influence how I ran the focus groups, so I made sure, in case none of these feelings are
expressed, that I did not ask questions that may provoke them. I made sure that the
participants clearly understood the purpose of the invitation, that the purpose is to share
their opinions about the programs of the two TV stations. I inform them that all
participants are encouraged to share and express their opinions and views even when they
are in disagreement with others participants. I also remind them that the focus group is
not intended to be an exercise where participants try to persuade each other of their own
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points of view, but rather a platform where they share their views and opinions.
Focus Groups Demographics
The demographic characteristics of the participants in the groups are as follows:
women and men aged eighteen to forty years old, illiterate or semi-literate, average to
low income. The groups were divided up in terms of gender, age, and locality. There are
a total of ten focus groups, made up of eight to twelve individuals each.
The focus groups participants by age, gender, education, and marital status:
Table 6. 1. Focus Group participants by age, gender, and education
Focus
Group
FG. 1

Women/
Men
W

Age

Education

Number of
participants
12

31 - 40

All illiterate

FG. 2

W

18- 26

4 elementary school level, 6 illiterate

10

FG. 3

W

18 - 22

6 elementary school

6

FG. 4

W

26 - 32

4 elementary, 3 middle, 1 high school

8

FG. 5

W

20 - 34

All illiterate

6

FG. 6

M

30 - 38

8 elementary school, 3 middle school

11

FG. 7

M

22 - 35

10 elementary, 2 middle school

12

FG. 8

M

25 - 40

2 high school, 8 middle school

10

FG. 9

M

19 - 32

9 middle school

9

FG. 10

M

19 - 40

2 middle school, 6 illiterate

8
Sub-Total

92

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, May, July, 2007; June, December, 2008.

Focus Groups Sites:
The focus groups consist of Moroccan television audiences that reside in suburban and rural areas. Sub-urban areas are poor neighborhoods located at the outskirts of
the city. Six focus group sessions were conduced in the area close to Al Akhawayn
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University in the Province of Ifrane (see Appendix D). Timmedikine is a poor suburban
neighborhood in Ifrane where low income residents live. I used the local elementary
school (school Annasr) for the meeting. Azrou is fifteen-minutes drive (18 kilometers)
west of Ifrane. I know the members of a local youth association and I used their meeting
room for the focus groups. For the rural area, I used Dayet Ifrah, a rural community that
is 20 minutes drive north east of Ifrane. I used the local association to meet with the
participants.
Two focus groups were held in Khmiss Anjra (see Appendix D), Province of
Fahs-Anjra, 32 kilometers east of Tangier in the north of Morocco. I chose this rural area
to get a sense of what people from other rural areas think of the TV stations under
investigation. Khmiss Anjra is a small community of 14,700 inhabitants (Census Bureau,
2004). I also used the local association for contacts and for meetings. The last two focus
groups were conducted in a suburban neighborhood in Casablanca. Karian Toma is
located in Sidi Moumen, one of the poorest communes in the suburbs of Casablanca.
Inhabited by 170,000 inhabitants, the commune is infamous for its shanty towns and
dusty wasteland of low crumbling houses. Karian Toma was home to several of the
suicide bombers who killed 45 people in downtown Casablanca on May 16, 2003. This
was the deadliest terrorist attack in Morocco since the Independence in 1956.
Focus groups by site:
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Table 6. 2. Focus groups sessions by location and date
Focus Groups

Location

Site

Date and time

FG 1

Sub-urban

Ahadaf, Azrou

May 26, 2007. 16:00-17:30

FG 2

Sub-urban

Karian Toma, Sidi Moumen, Casablanca

June 20, 2008. 10:00-11:30

FG 3

Rural

Dayet Ifrah, Province of Ifrane

July 14, 2007. 16:00-17:00

FG 4

Sub-urban

Timeddikine, Ifrane

July 8, 2007. 17:30-19:00

FG 5

Rural

Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, near
Tangier in the north of Morocco

December 7, 2008. 16:00-17:00

FG 6

Sub-urban

Ahadaf, Azrou

May 26, 2007. 10:00-11:30

FG 7

Sub-urban

Karian Toma, Sidi Moumen, Casablanca

June 20, 2008. 15:00-16:30

FG 8

Rural

Dayet Ifrah, Province of Ifrane

July 15, 2007. 16:30-17:30

FG 9

Sub-urban

Timedikine, Ifrane

July 7, 2007. 17:30-19:00

FG 10

Rural

Khmiss Anjra, Province of Fahs-Anjra, near
Tangier in the north of Morocco

December 8, 2008. 15:00-16:30

Source: Author‘s fieldwork, May, July, 2007; June, December, 2008.

Concerning the setting, four sessions took place in classrooms of the local
elementary or secondary schools in the neighborhoods where the respondents lived; six
sessions took place in conference rooms at the local youth centers. The chairs were
configured in a way to allow for all group members to see each other.
Running the Focus Groups
Because the purpose of the focus group is to obtain data pertaining to the views of
audiences on their TV programs as a whole, the focus groups consisted of discussions
about TV programs offered by the two public service stations, and no screening of the TV
shows took place. Because the purpose is to look at the participants' opinions on the TV
programs as a whole, screening any particular show or shows may entail the risk of
directing and framing the discussions either in favor of the programs or the opposite.
The existing literature in research methodology suggests a set of guidelines on
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how to conduct focus group sessions. Regarding the planning, I scheduled the sessions to
run for one to one hour and half. The start time depended on the availability of all the
participants in the group. Unlike Americans who take time commitments very seriously
and emphasize promptness, Moroccans consider time commitments as objectives to be
achieved, if possible. The start time was always approximate.
Because each session is a one-time occurrence, I laid out three ground rules at the
beginning of each session: a) stay focused on the questions asked, b) get closure on
questions, c) work in an orderly, polite and open environment where everyone is
encouraged to participate and where all opinions are welcome (Berg, 2007).
Regarding the focus group questions (see appendix F) and the order in which they
are asked, the literature suggests that the moderator asks questions about facts before
asking more abstract questions (Berg, 2007). This approach allows respondents to easily
engage in the interview before moving to more personal matters. Besides, as a rule that
applies to one-on-one interviews, the facilitator should ask questions about the present
before asking questions about the past or the future. It is much easier for respondents to
talk about current and present matters than it is to talk about past or future issues. The last
question was devoted to allowing the respondents to provide any other information they
would like to add.
Therefore, the focus group sessions entailed four main phases:


Introduction: After introducing myself, I give a brief overview of the session
where I explain the purpose of the focus group interview and what the results will
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be used for. Then I ask for a quick round of introductions so that group members
feel less anxious to participate in discussions.


Factual questions: In this phase I ask questions on the general context of the
theme to ease the group into responding to the key questions. In this phase I ask
two contextual/factual questions: What television channels do you watch the most
and why? What television programs do you watch the most and why?



Key questions: This phase is identical to the previous phase in terms of structure.
The following questions are asked during this phase: What are your opinions on
the locally produced programs? Do the two public television stations' programs
represent your lifestyle and your concerns? If the answer is ―no,‖ whose lifestyle
do you think is being represented on the two television stations? What
expectations do television viewers have of the two public TV stations? Are there
other information, issues, ideas, the respondents would like to add?



Closing the session: In this phase, I summarize briefly the main points discussed
in the session and invite corrections and comments. Finally, I thank all the
participants.
Important Methodological Considerations
I anticipated some of the problems that may arise about the quality of data from

the group dynamics, but it is difficult to resolve all of them. The focus groups were
separated in terms of gender and age because research shows that masculinity and age
affect the dynamics in group discussions (Hollander, 2004). Older men tend to dominate
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group discussions especially in a highly patriarchal society such as Morocco. There were
three instances where a few participants dominated the discussions; as the moderator I
call on the other participants to express their views. There were also instances where
some participants did not talk at all. Out of respect for their privacy, I did not call on
them to speak during the focus group session. I approached them during the break to ask
if there were any reasons for their silence and to encourage them to speak.
I struggled with the first part of the sessions because the participants seemed to be
more concerned about giving me the ―right‖ answers than it is to respond freely to the
questions. It is only in the last half of the sessions that discussions were more open. I am
not sure what the reasons for this might be. It could be the physical context (local
associations meeting rooms and classrooms) where the sessions took place. The
participants might have perceived the sessions as educational activities in the local
association especially that the moderator is a university person. I asked but never
received a clear answer to this question.
The focus group sessions all used darija as the main language of interaction.
Although it is the language spoken by all Moroccans, for some participants it is a second
language. Residents of the rural communes of Dayet Ifrah in the Middle Atlas Mountains
and of Khmiss Anjra in the Rif region are Imazighen (also referred to as Berbers) and
they speak two different dialects. The participants from Dayet Ifrah (to a less extent in
Ifrane and Azrou as well) speak Tamazight and participants from Khmiss Anjra speak
Tarifit in their everyday life. While they are fluent in darija, many of them expressed a
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desire to use their dialects because they said it helped them articulate their thoughts
better. Because I am not fluent in Tarifit and I do not speak Tamazight, and for data
collection purposes, I asked them to use darija alone. I am not sure how much data might
have gotten lost because of this language restriction.
I used English to process and summarize the data. When I translate a particular
testimony, I translate its overall cultural meaning. Translating the literal meaning would
certainly lead to confusion and misunderstandings.
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